Suchergebnisse

In numerous European countries, majority nations and national minorities that live in them, aware of the complexity of relations between majorities and minorities in the ethnic sense, and the ensuing dangers, have engaged in mutual accommodation and compromise, thus fashioning certain models of coexistence. Constitutional provisions of European states prove that there is no single model of the recognition of the rights of national minorities. Still, European states may be divided into three groups. The first group includes those states which advocate the constitutional principle of the integral nation and refuse to recognize any other ethnic origin of their citizens. The second group comprises those states which do not divide its ethnic communities into majority and minority ones, which practically means that they do not recognize the category of the national minority; they protect the ethnic identity of their members by dividing their equal citizens by the languages they use. The third group includes those countries which recognize the notion of the majority nation and national minorities. This group has elaborated the provisions regarding the rights of national minorities, particularly the protection of their national, cultural, religious and linguistic identity, with major differences in the scope of individual rights. (SOI : PM: S. 84)

In the introduction, the author analyses Clinton's approach to Europe and the European NATO allies, particularly his wish to develop the partnership and to expand the Alliance. The new post-cold-war relations in Europe contributed to the stronger American-European ties - the foundation of atlantism. This new model of relations is discussed in relation to the emerging challenges that pose the key questions: the creation of a new joint strategy, the problems of NATO's "out of area" interventions and the creation of such European relations that will not provoke uncalled-for Russian reactions. Seen within such a framework, NATO is going to remain the chief proponent of military-political actions of the developed world in which US is to play the leading role. (SOI : S. 102)

This work analyses the relation between democracy and political participation, the typology and model of political participation, the findings of the research of political participation in the world (S. Verba, N. H. Nie, 1972; S. H. Barnes, M. Kaase, 1 979; and others), and the research of the same phenomenon on a sample of Croatian students. This analysis has shown that today all the elements necessary for a more comprehensive theory of political participation are in place. This theory would enable a more systematic and standardized investigation of this phenomenon in the national and the international context. The article also shows how the non- conventional participation is gaining ground while the conventional is gradually levelling out. Significant are the results of the analysis of the etiology of political participation, particularly the relation between the standard SES model and the model of value orientations (left-right materialism, materialism-postrnaterialism, etc.). The analysis of the model of participation of Croatian students has shown that the model of protest behaviour/potential' has a more complex etiology than other models, such as conventional participation and voting in parliamentary elections. Thus, for the "protest potential" it is necessary to possess a developed civic competence, a critical attitude towards the government's performance, a liberal arts education, etc., while for the conventional participation it is central to have a higher level of political interest. Significant differences between the Croatian students and those from other European countries can be observed regarding the role of value orientations in explaining political participation. (SOI : PM: S. 140)

In the course of its history, Europe has structured itself by means of two models. The first was based on the territorial expansion of regional forces that used violence to break down the resistance of their weaker neighbors and establish the balance of power. In this way, at least temporarily, the way was paved for more radical changes in their polities. This model was in use until the end of World War II. The second model has been built around European integration. The aim of this process has not been the expansion of regional powers and the territorial conquest of their neighbors; it is based on the initiative of the weak to join the organizations that can satisfy their interests and goals. The process of integration excludes coercive methods. However, there is certain asymmetry in the relationship between the center and the periphery (the strong and the weak). The countries that belong to the center define the membership standards for the 'periphery' and evaluate their implementation. The 'central' countries are in a better position than the peripheral ones since the process of integration bolsters their collective identity, while the weaker states - by accepting the standards of stronger countries - have to alter their original identity. (SOI : PM: S. 97)

Polemically oriented towards Plessner's "Belated Nation" and the introductory presentations in the debate about this book at the Faculty of Political Science, the author is of the opinion that the German case is the one of a belated attempt at empire-creation, and that all the nations in the world are "late" - except for the Dutch. By referring to the literature on politico-economic history and the model and comparative analysis of the nation-state as a complex politico-economic community within the world system of the West, the author thinks that Schieder's typology of the creation of European nations is not plausible, neither theoretically nor factually/historically. (SOI : PM: S. 30)

The process of European integrations, with a growing political, economic, and security interdependence of member states is designed in such a way that, among other things, it can eventually result in developing a collective approach to defense, whose features would be a far cry from any other form of traditional alliances. The signatories of the Maastricht Agreement vowed to shape a common defense policy which would in time lead to the common defense. The common defense policy, whose structure would be built on the basis of the models and trends of the defense policies of the leading West-European countries, should evolve as an integral part of EU's common foreign and security policy. It should address all the aspects of the use of military power, and it will require an analysis of a broad spectrum of possible scenarios which may pose a threat to EU's security. EU countries have demonstrated certain shortcomings in their military capacities e.g. transport equipment and other capacities for deployment. Although in the economic field they have achieved consensus on numerous issues, it is obvious that defense issues such as nuclear weapons, professionalization of the military and the policies of defense industry are still a major bone of contention for EU members. Though EU, WEU, and NATO represent only a segment of the European security architecture, they will most probably serve as the key institutional framework for the development of a common defense policy and common defense. Further expansion of this triangular institutional framework is going to be interdependent, mutually supportive and parallel. (SOI : PM: S. 89)

This essay is an attempt to explore structural, value, ideological, and performance premises of partyism. It has been modelled after the methods and findings of eminent researchers (e.g. Inglehari, Klingemann, Knutesen, and others), who have devoted a major portion of their research to the relations among the mentioned concepts. The empirical research was conducted on a sample of Croatian students in 1998/99. By using complex analysis models of the mentioned variables we have showed that the ideological (left-right) orientation is more important for the electoral choice of Croatian students than the value orientations (religious/secular, left/righ materialism and materialism/postmaterialism). The author then shows why (in line with the results of European studies) the party orientation is more important than the values. What is most important here, however, is the finding that the two variables (the assessment of the democratic performance of the system and the ideological left/right orientation) are relatively the most significant variables for explaining the party identity and electoral choice of Croatian students. It has been shown that the leftist and the opposition parties in Croatia can count on the more left-oriented students and those who are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy in Croatia, plus those more secularly and post-materialistically oriented. The used analytical methods can contribute to a more detailed elaboration of the theory of partyism (party identities and electoral choices) and to the model of political polarization in the society. And this is surely one of the central tasks of modern political science. (SOI : SOEU: S. 178)