Suchergebnisse

In recent years the international community has engaged in an unprecedented joint naval effort to combat piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. This paper examines the legal basis of the multinational police missions deployed in Somali territorial and internal waters and the law applicable to their operations. Subsequently it discusses the scope of domestic criminal jurisdiction to try Somali pirates and armed robbers and the mechanisms for transferring suspects to the authorities of the prosecuting State. The responsibility of States and international organizations for wrongful acts allegedly perpetrated in the course of these counterpiracy operations is also assessed. Stressing the peculiarity of the Somali case and highlighting both the achievements and shortcomings of the missions authorised by the UN Security Council, it is argued that the "Somali strategy" is unlikely to be replicated elsewhere and is particularly unsuitable for the new hotbeds of piracy and armed robbery: the Gulf of Guinea and Indonesia.

Maritime engagement in the Gulf of Aden is a puzzling case for anyone interested in the political and institutional problems underlying European Union–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (EU–NATO) cooperation. Although the EU's operation NAVFOR 'Atalanta' and NATO's 'Ocean Shield' operate in the same theatre and with similar mandates, there is no formal link between them. No joint planning has been envisaged, and no official task-sharing takes place. As this article aims to show, cooperation and coordination between EU and NATO forces at the operational and tactical levels have nevertheless worked surprisingly well. Two faces of EU–NATO cooperation become apparent: the political level is dominated by a permanent deadlock, while on the ground and at sea staff have developed a modus operandi that allows them to deliver fairly successfully in complementing yet detached operations. Based on 60 interviews with EU and NATO officials (2010–2013), this article illustrates how the operational and tactical levels have developed ways of coordinating efforts informally despite the lack of a formal framework. It aims to show to what extent and how they succeed at bypassing organizational boundaries and at overcoming political limitations. Although these practices are becoming increasingly institutionalized, it remains to be seen whether this will translate into formal changes.

Durch die Globalisierung der Märkte nimmt weltweit der Verkehr auf den Meeren, dem Land und in der Luft rasant zu. Das maritime Umfeld bildet somit einen hochkomplexen Sicherheitsraum. Eine wesentliche Aufgabe der Behörden und Organisationen mit Sicherheitsaufgaben (BOS) ist die Gewährleistung der maritimen Sicherheit. Dafür benötigen sie schnelle und situationsspezifische Lageinformationen in Echtzeit, um Bedrohungen zu erkennen und möglichst präventiv zu begegnen. (Europäische Sicherheit & Technik / SWP)

Since 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched eight military operations with an executive mandate in the framework of its European (now Common) Security and Defence Policy (ESDP/CSDP), all of which have utilized deterrence to fulfil their missions. Some have done so implicitly by having a mission that requires them to keep certain actors from doing something unwanted, whilst others have done so explicitly by having deterrence clearly mentioned as one of their core tasks in their mandates. Despite this, deterrence in the context of CSDP has been an almost totally neglected subject in the academic literature. Furthermore, the EU itself has tended to take the deterrence effect of CSDP operations for granted, which is dangerous because it may blind it to potential problems that may in fact be undermining their credibility. This article seeks to launch a more focused discussion on deterrence in the context of EU security policy by analysing the credibility of CSDP operations' deterrence postures. Based on findings from case studies on operations Althea and Atalanta, it argues that CSDP operations' deterrence postures lack credibility because they have insufficient resources for taking care of their deterrence tasks. Furthermore, they do not communicate threats effectively.