Suchergebnisse

"Since the advent of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a key turning point in terms of the crystallisation of opposition towards the European Union (EU), Euroscepticism has become a transnational phenomenon. The term 'Euroscepticism' has become common political language in all EU member states and, with the advent of the Eurozone, refugee and security crises have become increasingly 'embedded' within European nation states.Bringing together a collection of essays by established and up-and-coming authors in the field, this handbook paints a fuller, more holistic picture of the extent to which the Eurosceptic debate has influenced the EU and its member states. Crucially, it also focuses on what the consequences of this development are likely to be for the future direction of the European project. By adopting a broad-based, thematic approach, the volume centres on theory and conceptualisation, political parties, public opinion, non-party groups, the role of referendums--and the media--and of scepticism within the EU institutions. It also reflects on the future of Euroscepticism studies following the United Kingdom's vote to leave the EU.Containing a full range of thematic contributions from eminent scholars in the field, The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism is a definitive frame of reference for academics, practitioners and those with an interest in the debate about the EU, and more broadly for students of European Studies, EU and European Politics."--Provided by publisher.

"Since the advent of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a key turning point in terms of the crystallisation of opposition towards the European Union (EU), Euroscepticism has become a transnational phenomenon. The term 'Euroscepticism' has become common political language in all EU member states and, with the advent of the Eurozone, refugee and security crises have become increasingly 'embedded' within European nation states.Bringing together a collection of essays by established and up-and-coming authors in the field, this handbook paints a fuller, more holistic picture of the extent to which the Eurosceptic debate has influenced the EU and its member states. Crucially, it also focuses on what the consequences of this development are likely to be for the future direction of the European project. By adopting a broad-based, thematic approach, the volume centres on theory and conceptualisation, political parties, public opinion, non-party groups, the role of referendums--and the media--and of scepticism within the EU institutions. It also reflects on the future of Euroscepticism studies following the United Kingdom's vote to leave the EU.Containing a full range of thematic contributions from eminent scholars in the field, The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism is a definitive frame of reference for academics, practitioners and those with an interest in the debate about the EU, and more broadly for students of European Studies, EU and European Politics."--Provided by publisher

A comparative analysis of Euroscepticism explores what it means in two nations and what is then articulated in specific newspapers. The theoretical terrain, Italy's and Britain's post-war relationships with the European Union, the countries' media structures and the specific context of Il Giornale (owned by Silvio Berlusconi's family) in Italy and The Times in the United Kingdom (owned by Rupert Murdoch) are mapped out. Some 21 interviews were conducted with relevant journalists and politicians (including reporters covering Europe for the aforementioned) offering further context. A critical discourse analysis of news stories and commentaries then spans the last decade. Although there is some Euroscepticism in Il Giornale , it has historically been localised, yet now seems to be growing in intensity. In The Times , however, the Euroscepticism conveyed is more pervasive and deeper. Its fact-based news can actually be very persuasive – ironically more akin to the commentary-laden news of Il Giornale – as the debate looms ahead of the planned 2017 UK referendum on European Union membership. ; Pre April 2016 so full text not required; file attached is published pdf which is not permitted so am passing metadata only. RVO 27/11/17

While the European Union (EU) increasingly strengthens its social integration, opposition towards this process can also be observed, here defined as 'welfare Euroscepticism'. To better understand this newly defined policy paradigm, this article aims to explain longstanding cleavages in both social policy and EU research: socioeconomic status (SES) divides. Contrary to the literature on public support for European integration, this article argues that higher SES groups are more likely to be welfare Eurosceptics than lower SES groups. This argument and its underlying explanations are examined through a multilevel approach using European Social Survey data from 18 EU member states, using the example of a potential EU-wide minimum income scheme. First, the results demonstrate that welfare Euroscepticism is indeed more prevalent among higher SES groups than lower SES groups (measured through occupation, education, income, and employment). The results indicate robust self-interest patterns among higher SES groups that do not want to carry (perceived) financial burdens of EU social policies. The opinion patterns also emphasize the multidimensionality of attitudes towards EU policies since the SES cleavages can reverse, depending on the policy in focus. Overall, the results indicate much potential to mobilize the larger proportion of the public to support EU social policies, that is, lower SES groups. However, potential conflicts may arise when the EU expands on policies that their traditional supporters – higher SES groups – are more likely to oppose. The article also shows that welfare solidarity on the individual and the country level can mitigate such conflicts. This is because higher levels of welfare generosity and lower levels of welfare chauvinism on the individual and the country level are related to smaller SES cleavages.

As the introduction to this special issue highlights, the Great Recession, along with the more recent phenomenon such as the refugees' crisis and the Brexit referendum, has contributed to the success and strengthening of populist Eurosceptic parties across European party systems. The loss of legitimacy of governments and European institutions has opened a window of opportunity for parties expressing anti-establishment positions and populist orientations and criticizing the political-economic arrangements prevailing in Europe. Our study focuses on the rise of a specific left-wing populist Euroscepticism linked with the impact of the Great Recession and austerity measures in Portugal and Spain and the party system transformations. Thus, economic issues, bailouts, and, above all, anti-austerity measures were the main driving forces behind the transformations of Iberian party systems. The increase in populist reactions in both countries after the economic crisis and the implementation of austerity had to do with the transformation of the radical left emphasizing distributive issues in Eurosceptic populist directions. Finally, the analysis shows the distinctiveness of the populist Euroscepticism of the new challenger, Podemos, which illustrates the opportunities afforded with the economic crisis for the rise of new challenger parties exhibiting the contemporary link between populism and Euroscepticism in the radical left.

A comparative analysis of Euroscepticism explores what it means in two nations and what is then articulated in specific newspapers. The theoretical terrain, Italy's and Britain's post-war relationships with the European Union, the countries' media structures and the specific context of Il Giornale (owned by Silvio Berlusconi's family) in Italy and The Times in the United Kingdom (owned by Rupert Murdoch) are mapped out. Some 21 interviews were conducted with relevant journalists and politicians (including reporters covering Europe for the aforementioned) offering further context. A critical discourse analysis of news stories and commentaries then spans the last decade. Although there is some Euroscepticism in Il Giornale, it has historically been localised, yet now seems to be growing in intensity. In The Times, however, the Euroscepticism conveyed is more pervasive and deeper. Its fact-based news can actually be very persuasive – ironically more akin to the commentary-laden news of Il Giornale – as the debate looms ahead of the planned 2017 UK referendum on European Union membership.

AbstractThis article examines the role played by national history in generating and sustaining the popularity of British Eurosceptic arguments. The core argument advanced is that the modernist approach to history prevalent among British historians and the society in which they work has to be considered the key reason for Euroscepticism retaining such a popular appeal in Britain. The overly reverential attitude to recent martial history on the part of the British, and an almost total neglect of the peacetime dimensions of modern European history since 1945, both serve to exaggerate the tendency in the country to fall back on glib images of Britain as a great power with a 'special relationship' across the Atlantic and Europe as a hostile 'other' to be confronted rather than engaged with constructively.

Why is there so much reservation and scepticism among the Czech public as well as politicians towards the European Union? Has the experience of the Czech Republic as a member of the EU changed Czech Euroscepticism since 2004? The authors provide a detailed analysis of the dynamics of Euroscepticism using the concept of Europeanisation. The unique connection of the concepts of Euroscepticism and Europeanisation creates an innovative research framework.

With the Treaty of Lisbon, national Parliaments obtained a direct role in the legislative process of the European Union (EU). When the Commission releases a legislative proposal, each national Parliament has eight weeks to issue a Reasoned Opinion stating that the draft violates the EU principle of subsidiarity if they wish to do so. This article provides context on this so‐called Early Warning System (EWS), and then studies empirically when national Parliaments issue Reasoned Opinions under the EWS. A within‐between panel regression covering all 28 EU countries for 2010–16 leads to novel findings on the issuance of Reasoned Opinions. In particular, there is no robust statistical evidence that variations in public attitudinal euroscepticism in a country affect the number of Reasoned Opinions issued by its Parliament. In contrast, electoral euroscepticism as measured by the election of eurosceptic Parliaments is found to have a strongly significant across‐country effect on the number of Reasoned Opinions.

This study explores the relationship between historical resistance and their relationship to modern-day Euroscepticism. It can be seen that within the European Union, the political orientation of Eurosceptic parties differs, with some political orientations being more popular in some parts of the continent compared to others—Eastern European states tend to have right-wing parties, while many Southern European states having left-wing parties. The author suggests that this is a result of the orientation of the resistance movements to the state's historic authoritarian regime. Case studies were conducted on Spain and Poland—two EU with similar sized area, population, and economies—looking at their respective resistance movements to authorization and their connection to their respective dominate Eurosceptic parties, PiS and Podemos. The author observed clear links and similarities between the tactics, ethos, and rhetoric between these parties and their respective national resistance movements to authoritarianism.

The aim of the chapter is to discuss the idea that the growing of Eurosceptic, or Euro-critical, feelings can even be a sign of vitality in the construction of the European project, although it remains difficult to ignore the risks, as the United Kingdom's recent decision to withdraw from the European Union demonstrates.