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Throughout most of its national history, Venezuela has been the victim of long and tyrannical dictatorships, broken only by brief spells of semi-democratic government. Constitution after constitution has fallen before the whims of self made generals. Numerous major revolts and countless minor civil uprisings have scarred the country, all having the twofold objective of acquiring for their leaders national power for power's sake and the privilege of organizing Venezuela as a private economic and political domain.In almost all instances the politicians have travelled a bloody road to national power. Having once established themselves in the presidency, they demonstrated considerable reluctance to observe the functional separation of powers decreed by the constitution. As a result of this attitude the legislature and judiciary were weakened to the point of impotency. The raison d'être of these branches thus came to be the legalization of the programs and activities of the executive, even if this meant, as it often did, violating the constitution. The purpose of this article is to examine the evolution and application of executive power.

Major crises can threaten political regimes by empowering demagogues and promoting authoritarian rule. While existing research argues that national emergencies weaken formal checks on executive authority and increase public appetites for strong leadership, no research evaluates whether crises increase mass support for the president's institutional authority. We study this question in the context of the coronavirus/COVID-19 pandemic with an experiment embedded in a national survey of more than 8,000 U.S. adults. We find no evidence that the public evaluated policies differently if they were implemented via unilateral power rather than through the legislative process, nor did the severity of the pandemic at either the state, local, or individual levels moderate evaluations of executive power. Instead, individuals' partisan and ideological views were consistently strong predictors of policy attitudes. Perhaps paradoxically, our results suggest that elite and mass polarization limit the opportunity for crises to promote public acceptance of strengthened executive authority.

"The execution of laws is more important than the making of them" : reconciling executive power with democracy -- Executive power and the Virginia executive -- Executive power and the constitution of 1787 -- "To place before mankind the common sense of the subject" : declarations of principle -- The real revolution of 1800 : Jefferson's transformation of the inaugural address -- To "produce a union of the powers of the whole" : Jefferson's transformation of the appointment and removal powers -- The Louisiana purchase -- To "complete their entire union of opinion" : the twelfth amendment as amendment to end all amendments -- "To bring their wills to a point of union and effect" : declarations and presidential speech -- Development and difficulties.

Since September 11, 2001, long-standing debates over the nature and proper extent of executive power have assumed a fresh urgency. What is executive power? When did it first emerge, and why? And what is the role of the executive within the American regime? In this book, eleven leading scholars of American politics and political theory address these and related questions, in essays on topics ranging from Aristotle and the Roman Republic to the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama.

"Necker's On Executive Power in Great States, written as the events of the French Revolution were still unfolding, sheds fresh light on timely topics of executive power, constitutionalism and the rule of law, federalism, balance of power, and the dependence of liberty on morality and religion"--

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- The State in Imperial Russia and the USSR -- The State and the Economy -- The State and Security -- The State and the Future -- Index -- Contributors -- 1 The Government in the Soviet Political System -- 2 Party-State Relations -- 3 Executive-Legislative Relations -- 4 The Rise of Presidential Power under Gorbachev -- 5 The Ministry of Finance -- 6 The Industrial Ministries -- 7 The Agricultural Ministries -- 8 The Ministry of Defense -- 9 The Ministry of Internal Affairs

AbstractIn the multilevel system of the European Union (EU), national governments have been empowered at the expense of parliaments. We study the executive power shift in EU politics in the formation of national preferences. This article shows that governments are more likely to integrate parliaments and external actors, such as other governments and EU institutions, when they advocate extreme bargaining positions in EU negotiations. We theoretically develop this argument and provide an empirical study of Eurozone politics, covering the preference formation of 27 EU member states. The analysis shows that the executives are overall the dominating power: most of the time, governments form national preferences on their own. When governments integrate additional actors, they mostly rely on external actors and do so to avoid blame and to shift responsibility. These findings question whether the integration of national parliaments in EU politics indeed addresses democratic accountability concerns.