Suchergebnisse

"Executive–Legislative Relations in Latin American Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.

THIS ARTICLE ANALYZES CHANGES IN EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS IN AUSTRIA OVER THE POSTWAR PERIOD. THE INTRAGOVERNMENT MODE AND THE OPPOSITION MODE ARE IDENTIFIED AS THE MOST IMPORTANT PATTERNS OF RELATIONS. TWO EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CHANGES WITHIN THESE RELATIONS ARE OFFERED: INCREASING PARTY SYSTEM COMPETITIVENESS AND THE DIFFERING DEGREES OF EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE TYPES OF GOVERNMENT IN POSTWAR AUSTRIA. WHILE BOTH CAUSES ARE RELEVANT, IT IS PRIMARILY THE GOVERNMENT TYPES THAT HAVE INFLUENCED EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS AND ACCOUNT FOR THEIR CHANGES OVER TIME. FINALLY, THE AUSTRIAN CASE IS PUT INTO COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE. ITS PECULIAR STRESS ON CONSENSUS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION IS EXPLAINED AS A SPECIAL FORM OF POLITICAL COMPETITION.

Traditionally, it is assumed that the executive strongly controls Parliament within the Belgian political system. The absence of a federal government following the 2010 elections had three consequences on the activity of the Belgian Parliament. Some actions were put on hold, and essential reforms were delayed. On other issues, however, Members of Parliament took the lead, developing ad hoc majorities that cut across earlier cleavages between majority and opposition. Third, however, parties continued to vote along the majority of the caretaker government. While it could be expected that this situation, in the long run, might lead to a stronger position of Parliament vis-a-vis government, it is to be expected that traditional power relations will be restored once a full government has been formed. Adapted from the source document.

Die im postkommunistischen Osteuropa anzutreffenden konstitutionellen Formen variieren stark voneinander. Infolge ihrer starken Tendenz zu Präsidialsystemen unterscheiden sie sich darüber hinaus stark von den Mustern, die in den entwickelten europäischen Ländern verbreitet sind. Häufig gibt es keine klare Trennung der Kompetenzen zwischen Präsident und Regierung mit allen damit verbundenen Folgeproblemen für die Ausübung politischer Autorität in diesen Ländern. (BIOst-Mrk)

AbstractAnthony King's 1976 article 'Modes of executive–legislative relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany' is a classic in legislative studies. It argued that it is simplistic to analyse relations between 'the executive' and 'the legislature' in parliamentary systems, because parliaments are complex organisations comprised of competing actors. Instead, we must consider the various 'modes' through which these actors can interact to challenge the executive. As King pointed out, the classic view of the British Parliament was of a dominant 'opposition mode' and yet, in fact, the most important relationship was the 'intraparty mode': between the government and its own backbenchers. Other options, such as the 'non‐party mode' or 'cross‐party mode' were considered weak in Britain. This article revisits King's modes in the light of changes at Westminster during the intervening forty years. Developments such as the establishment of the select committee system and a more confident and party‐balanced House of Lords require significant changes to his conclusions. But his central insights, encouraging readers to focus on the multiple relationships inside legislatures, including those within political parties, remain fundamentally important.