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Abstract.This article rejects the widely held view that economic nationalism is an anachronistic economic doctrine in the age of globalisation. Rather than being the opposite of economic liberalism, as the conventional view maintains, economic nationalism is better understood as a generic phenomenon that can accommodate almost any doctrinal content, including economic liberalism. Economic nationalism is not so much about the economy as it is about the nation, as illustrated by literature on economic nations and national economic cultures. Such a broader conception of economic nationalism is then placed in the context of a larger 'nationalising mechanism' that sheds new light on a variety of phenomena discussed in the globalisation debate, such as economic performance, state disintegration, or cultural conflict, and success or failure in post‐communist systemic change.

The problem of explaining racist behavior in the UK is explored. Racist views remain widespread, & British politicians from virtually the entire spectrum from Left to Right have been able to justify discriminatory policies & behavior without using explicitly racist language to do so. Support for the National Front largely grows out of racist views, which remain deeply rooted in British society. W. H. Stoddard.

Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, decisions, and intentions. In different combinations and contexts, these states constitute cases of imagining. This reductive approach to imagination is at direct odds with the current orthodoxy, which sees imagination as an irreducible, sui generis mental state or process—one that influences our judgments, beliefs, desires, and so on, without being constituted by them. Explaining Imagination looks closely at the main contexts where imagination is thought to be at work and argues that, in each case, the capacity is best explained by appeal to a person's beliefs, judgments, desires, intentions, or decisions. The proper conclusion is not that there are no imaginings after all, but that these other states simply constitute the relevant cases of imagining. Contexts explored in depth include: hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning, engaging in pretense, appreciating fictions, and generating creative works. The special role of mental imagery within states like beliefs, desires, and judgments is explained in a way that is compatible with reducing imagination to more basic folk psychological states. A significant upshot is that, in order to create an artificial mind with an imagination, we need only give it these more ordinary mental states.

Dr. Silke Ötsch is currently working on a research project on the role of architects as intermediaries in financialization founded by the Austrian Research Found (FWF) at the Department of Sociology at the University of Innsbruck. She worked as scientific employee at the Institute of Construction and Design at the Innsbruck University, as lecturer at the Institute for Architecture Theory at the University of Innsbruck (Austria), in the architectural offices of Arets Architekten in Maastricht as well as Haid und Partner in Nürnberg and for Attac Germany. Silke Ötsch received her doctoral degree at the Bauhaus-University Weimar and studied architecture in Weimar and Paris. She published books in the field of architecture theory with the title "Stripping las Vegas" (with K. Jaschke) and "Überwältigen und Schmeicheln", and articels in the review GAM and others, and published in the field of political economy, among others the book "Das Casino schließen" (together with T. Sauer and P. Wahl) on the financial crisis and "Räume der Offshore-Welt" (together with Celia Di Pauli), which is a publication on concrete spaces of tax havens and offshore centres in Europe and their implications. Her main research interest is globalization and financial architecture.

Dr. Silke Ötsch is currently working on a research project on the role of architects as intermediaries in financialization founded by the Austrian Research Found (FWF) at the Department of Sociology at the University of Innsbruck. She worked as scientific employee at the Institute of Construction and Design at the Innsbruck University, as lecturer at the Institute for Architecture Theory at the University of Innsbruck (Austria), in the architectural offices of Arets Architekten in Maastricht as well as Haid und Partner in Nürnberg and for Attac Germany. Silke Ötsch received her doctoral degree at the Bauhaus-University Weimar and studied architecture in Weimar and Paris. She published books in the field of architecture theory with the title "Stripping las Vegas" (with K. Jaschke) and "Überwältigen und Schmeicheln", and articels in the review GAM and others, and published in the field of political economy, among others the book "Das Casino schließen" (together with T. Sauer and P. Wahl) on the financial crisis and "Räume der Offshore-Welt" (together with Celia Di Pauli), which is a publication on concrete spaces of tax havens and offshore centres in Europe and their implications. Her main research interest is globalization and financial architecture.

I am concerned with values in the descriptive rather than in the normative sense. I am interested in theories that seek to explain one or another aspect of people's moral psychology. Why do people value what they value? Why do they have other moral reactions? What accounts for their feelings, their motivations to act morally, and their opinions about obligation, duty, rights, justice, and what people ought to do?A moral theory like (one or another version of) utilitarianism (or social-contract theory, natural-law theory, Kantianism, or whatever) may be put forward as offering the correct normative account of justice, or of the good, or of what people ought morally to do. The answers such a theory offers may be surprising in suggesting that what people ought to do is quite different from what they think they ought to do. I am not concerned with normative moral theories of this revisionary sort. Indeed, I am interested in less revisionary normative theories only to the extent that they can be reinterpreted as offering potential explanations of people's actual moral reactions.