Suchergebnisse

This study examines the role of a long-standing international transparency scheme known as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in helping build trust in politicians. It presents the first known econometric investigation studying the relationship between the EITI and trust and also uses a novel instrument exploiting the variation in neighbouring countries' EITI participation to control for the endogenous nature of one's own EITI involvement. The basis of this instrument reflects on a broader literature concerning the historic influence of policy borrowing in the geographical diffusion of public policies. The results show a positive relationship between countries' EITI membership and trust in politicians. In particular, estimates offer consistent evidence of significantly improved levels of trust among members that are compliant with the EITI's transparency standards.

For a long time, Cameroon was a success story in the context of Africa's development. Unfortunately, the economic crises of the eighties and early nineties led to the failure of the development strategies that had been pursued until then, resulting in a severe deterioration of the country's economy and the living standards of the Cameroonian people (Mentan, 2003). However, this country possesses significant oil wealth which if properly managed can generate abundant revenue to boost economic growth and fund anti-poverty measures. In 2005, Cameroon adhered to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). A proper implementation of this initiative will improve transparency in the country's oil sector and support national efforts against poverty and underdevelopment. In recent years though, donor organizations have made good governance and democracy cardinal conditions for the flow of development assistance (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). A situation that has encouraged the proliferation of "pseudo" or "virtual" democracies across Sub-Saharan Africa (Diamond, 2002; 1999; 1996; Joseph, 1999). Is Cameroon's adherence to the EITI part of a pseudo-democratic scheme? Is it merely aimed at gaining international approval and assistance without any desire for reform? The significant problems affecting the EITI program in Cameroon seem to confirm this opinion. On the basis of the experiences and opinions expressed by the key actors in Cameroon's oil sector (interviews) and in line with previous studies (Diamond, 2002; 1999; 1996; Joseph, 1999) this thesis argues that Cameroon is an "arche-typical" virtual democracy. It then describes and explains how this mode of political organisation relates to and inhibits the efficacy of the national EITI program. The thesis ultimately suggests proposals - after identifying the various actors with the authority to initiate reforms - for a more efficient and sustainable EITI implementation in this Central African state.

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched in 2002, has been promoted as an international anti-corruption tool. Several empirical evaluations on the effectiveness of the EITI scheme provide average estimates based on cross-country analysis. However, little empirical work has been conducted on individual case studies, especially in the context of Latin America. Our study uses a Synthetic Control Methodology (SCM) to measure the EITI's impact on several measures of corruption in the first five Latin American countries to join the initiative: Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. The method allows us to assess the magnitude and statistical significance of the EITI's effect on perceived corruption at each stage of implementation. Our results cast doubt on how decisive the scheme has been in combatting corruption. In the vast majority of cases, participation in the scheme either had no statistically significant effect or even coincided with marginally increased corruption levels (only in very few cases it was associated with temporary minor improvements). Taken together, the results indicate that joining EITI did not lead to a substantial decrease of corruption in any of the countries under scrutiny.

This study looks at the adaptation and implementation of the E.I.T.I principles in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and assesses whether governance through transparency and accountability practices in its extractive sector have improved. It relies on 18 interviews with stakeholders implicated in the E.I.T.I implementation, a literature review, and reports from various stakeholders. The analysis of data is based on Michel Foucault's theory of governmentality as well as a review of key concepts such as transparency, accountability and governance. The study uncovers that a culture of transparency and democratic debate is gradually gaining ground, although there is still too much resistance that prevents the E.I.T.I from leading to profound changes in policies in the extractive sector. In line with the previous studies, the E.I.T.I institutional and operational goals are progressing at the macro level of institutions but progress is almost inexistent at the micro-level. It concludes that in the DRC, E.I.T.I's development goals are far from being achieved because all stakeholders do not fully understand the standard's objectives. The study proposes that government sticks to E.I.T.I's guidelines in administrating mining revenue's, setting clear and measurable targets, implementing efficient data collection systems, put together a review system mechanism, and set up a punishment/reward mechanism that works. In sum, this study contributes to the field of natural resource management by pointing out that internal motivation, internal capacity, and external pressure appear to facilitate or limit the success of the global standard in solving the resource curse in poor countries that are rich in natural resources.

Many resource-rich countries face the paradoxical situation that their wealth in natural resources coincides with low economic and human development rates. To address this so-called resource curse, academics and practitioners turn their hopes to institutional quality. Yet whether, how and with what consequences institutional quality is transformed in resource curse contexts remains poorly understood, especially so at subnational levels. The most widely implemented initiative that seeks to address the resource curse through enhanced institutional quality is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). This article analyses to what extent and how the EITI transforms institutional quality at national and subnational levels in Myanmar, focusing on transparency, civil society participation and accountability. We show that many transformations go beyond the official EITI process and report. While the EITI report itself is not heavily used by civil society organisations (CSOs), the EITI process motivated CSOs to gather data and organise themselves both around and beyond EITI-related issues at subnational levels. Such participatory processes of constituting transparency improved relations between the (regional) government, CSOs and private companies, but also created new forms of in- and exclusion among civil society. While avenues opened up for CSOs to demand accountability regarding the impacts of resource extraction, the extent to which they are able to trigger action of extractive industry actors in their region remains limited. In conclusion, we argue that transformations in institutional quality are not characterised by a linear trajectory from transparency in the form of the EITI report to accountability, facilitated by civil society participation in EITI multi-stakeholder groups, as the EITI standard posits. Rather, transformations in institutional quality are characterised by spin-offs, dynamic interlinkages, trade-offs, limitations and a reinforcing cycle between participation and transparency ...