State financial intermediation
In: Discussion paper - Institute for Economic Research, Queen's University 294
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In: Discussion paper - Institute for Economic Research, Queen's University 294
This dissertation consists of two chapters that concern financial intermediation. Many shadow banks rely heavily on bank-sponsored private credit and liquidity support instead of government guarantees. Bank capital regulation cannot be effective without explicitly considering these facilities. In the first chapter of the dissertation, I use a continuous time model with maturity mismatch and bank moral hazard to study the impact of credit and liquidity guarantees on bank capital structure. I focus on a particular type of shadow banking called asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). When banks provide credit guarantees to ABCP conduits, assuming that the validity of the guarantees is ensured by rating agencies, the commercial paper becomes risk free and is always priced at par. Rolling over the commercial paper is thus costless, so that frequently rolling over the short term ABCP to fund long term assets---a maturity mismatch---has no impact on bank value. Regulators can eliminate a bank's moral hazard by imposing a simple capital ratio requirement. However, the capital ratio requirement is no longer valid if banks use liquidity guarantees in their ABCP conduit funding because the funding maturity becomes important. Moreover, a liquidity guarantee becomes as costly as a credit guarantee when the maturity shortens. Using Moody's ABCP conduit data, I confirm that shorter ABCP maturity causes the bank's return to be more sensitive to the conduit credit loss. Thus, when banks have significant exposure to a liquidity guarantee, the search for a single appropriate risk weight is futile. More sophisticated tests, such as model-based tests are not only necessary but also have to be carried out under stressed scenarios.The second chapter studies the current London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Recent investigation reveals banks might have manipulated the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR). With banks concern about derivative position, net interest income and signaling effect, the equilibrium reporting strategy is a monotonic non-linear function of borrowing cost. Current trimming mechanism cannot block tacit collusion: when banks benefit from lower LIBOR, tacit collusion leads to downward biased LIBOR quotes. Signaling effect causes further depressed LIBOR. Equilibrium submissions do cluster together, as people have observed from the data. Comparative statics suggest LIBOR bias spikes during the crisis, due to more dispersed borrowing costs and consumers' less confidence in banks. I propose a direct and \emph{ex ante} budget balanced LIBOR fixing mechanism. Finally, by calibrating the model to the ratio of dispersion among banks' LIBOR submissions to their CDS spreads, I come up with an initial estimation, which matches practitioner's opinions back in 2008, about LIBOR bias during the recent crisis.
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World Affairs Online
In: Journal of international economics, Band 24, Heft 1-2, S. 187-189
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 66, Heft 1, S. 192
ISSN: 2327-7793
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SSRN
In: Economic bulletin for Latin America, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 1-56
ISSN: 0041-6398
In this dissertation, I analyze behavior of two types of financial intermediaries that play critical roles in capital allocation: ratings agencies and merger advisors. Each type of intermediary survives due to (assumed) informational advantages relative to firms and investors. In the following chapters, I analyze how differences in information between market participants and intermediaries lead to signaling behavior related to privately-observed quality. My results explain some seemingly-anomalous aspects of financial markets, and provide a framework for assessing the impact intermediaries can have on efficient capital allocation.In the first chapter, I examine whether rating agencies strategically manipulate the informativeness of bond ratings in response to competition from private lenders. I model a monopolistic rating agency that caters to a low-quality marginal customer with uninformative ratings. High-quality customers prefer informative ratings but are captive customers of the rating agency in the absence of competition from private lenders. With competition from private lenders, the rating agency uses informative ratings to keep high-quality customers in public markets. The model also suggests that the ratings sector dampens the impact of capital supply shocks, and offers a strategic pricing rationale for the controversial practice of issuing unsolicited credit ratings. In the second chapter, I test predictions of the model using a measure of informativeness based on the impact of unexpected ratings on a debt issuer's borrowing cost. I analyze two events that increased the relative supply of private vs.\ public lending: the temporary shutdown of the high-yield market in 1989 and legislation in 1994 that reduced barriers to interstate bank lending. After each event, I find that the informativeness of ratings increased for issuers whose relative supply of private vs.\ public capital increased most. In the third chapter, I analyze how acquiring firms select and pay advisors. I present a model in which an advisor with privately known quality screens targets (due diligence) and improves negotiation outcomes (bidding). When a transaction involves only bidding, advisors pool by offering fees contingent on a completed transaction. By contrast, a transaction involving due diligence can lead to a separating equilibrium and fixed fees. The model predicts that acquirers use advisor market share instead of stock return-based measures to select advisors when synergies are not observable, and that acquirers with better information about advisor quality pay higher fees. I argue that investors in leveraged buyouts are skilled in acquisitions, and find that they pay higher fees for both mergers and tender offers, controlling for assignment and deal characteristics. They are also less likely to include contingent fees than other acquirers. Results suggest skilled investors use private information about advisor ability to hire advisors, and do so primarily to screen targets rather than to improve negotiation outcomes.
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In: Core discussion paper 9330
In: Civitas: časopis za društvena pitanja, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 47-59
ISSN: 2466-5363