Suchergebnisse

Fallibilists claim that one can know a proposition on the basis of evidence that supports it even if the evidence doesn't guarantee its truth. Jessica Brown offers a compelling defence of this view against infallibilists, who claim that it is contradictory to claim to know and yet to admit the possibility of error.

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Tables -- 1: Introduction -- 2: Free Will and Indeterminism -- 2.1 A Brief History of the Problem -- 2.2 The Simple Theory of Free Will -- 2.3 Some Complexities of Action -- 2.4 Cornucopia of Confusion -- 2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 3: Rationality and Fallibilism -- 3.1 Compulsion, Submission and Spontaneity -- 3.2 Deductive Reasoning -- 3.3 Improving Our Theories -- 3.4 Deciding How to Act -- Risk -- Ignorance -- Uncertain Knowledge -- Blame -- Arbitrary Decisions -- 3.5 Rationality in the Round -- References -- 4: Persons and Animals -- 4.1 Persons -- 4.2 The Natures of Animals -- 4.3 The Natures of Persons -- 4.4 Identity and Authenticity -- 4.5 Conclusion -- References -- 5: Freedom and Constraint -- 5.1 Self-Interest and Morality -- 5.2 Evaluating Moral Theories -- Technical Note: 'Ought' and 'Is' -- 5.3 Rights and Freedoms -- 5.4 Private Property -- 5.5 Animals That Are Not Persons -- 5.6 Conclusion -- References -- 6: Individual and State -- 6.1 A Brief History of the Problem -- 6.2 The Liberal State -- 6.3 Obligations to the State -- 6.4 Freedom of Speech -- 6.5 Illiberal States -- 6.6 Conclusion -- References -- 7: Conclusion -- 7.1 A Summary of the Argument -- 7.2 Brief Comparison with Pettit -- 7.3 Further Work -- References -- Index.

lt is very likely that the most difficult task of moral and political philosophy has always been that of assessing comprehensive views which contradict each other, not so much in what concerns the interests expressed by individuals but in what regards what is considered to be of genuine value.' lf individuals do not agree with each other about what constitutes a good and valuable life, then they would probably end up having dramatic conflicts, even if their actions are motivated by an honest altruistic attitude. Our deep beliefs about what is good and valuable for the life of all the individuals in our own community will prompt u5 to use the coercive mechanisms of the state in order to achieve the desiderata and the ideals that we share, not only for our own sake but also for those who happen not to share the same vision on the values and meaningfulness of a good life. Of course, those who disagree with us will try to make use of the institutions of the state in the very same way as we do in order to promote and support their own values and ideals. Unfortunateiy, as we know too well from history, the deep disagreements concerning values can turn into very traumatic conflicts to a much greater extent than the mere conflicts of interests.

Man has ever sought knowledge (science), and in different forms. And, empirical knowledge is one of these forms, which is always hoisted as having stood the test of time. Hence, the problem was to see if empirical knowledge has yet overcome the age long problem of fallibilism. The purpose here was to show that empirical knowledge is still fallible. HIV/AIDS as a form of empirical science investigation was used to show case this. This was seen as important because if empirical knowledge has failings these should be shown to be the case. Fallibilism in empirical knowledge was showcased as deriving from politics of experience, foundation of the empirical science, the scourge of imperialism, pseudo-phobia and obsessive solipsism, social and cultural factors in hermeneutics and stereo-typed obsession with final authority.

The recent growth in the importance and apparent power of the Supreme Court has been one result of our rapidly changing twentieth century society. In the social ferment of the last two decades, the Court, more than Congress, has expressed the conscience and intellectual consensus of American culture. Speaking as a practicing attorney and concerned citizen, the author of this article does not criticize the Court for stepping into this gap in our governmental structure, but he feels that the possibility of increased activism on the part of the Court indicates a serious breakdown in governmental checks and balances and may be leading to the 'fatal infallibility" of the judicial branch. After tracing the historical events which have eroded the ideas of the framers of the Constitution, Mr. Goodwin suggests two ways to restore the Court to a position of "viable fallibilism'" that retains the confidence of the people and reinstates the original balance. He advocates a permanent panel, of judges and citizens to assist in the important process of judicial selection, and he outlines a procedure by which the Constitution may be more easily amended in response to changing social needs and urgent problems.