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In 1970, a new institutional arena for interpolitical party competition was introduced in Italy with the creation of fifteen regions. This paper aims at developing the topic of territorial differentiation of the Italian party system. It highlights facets & features of regional party arenas through a comparison between these arenas & the national system. Five systemic properties are taken into account: fragmentation, concentration, competitiveness, net volatility, & regionalism of voting behavior. The various indexes measuring these dimensions have been computed from both regional & national election results. It appears that a general nondifferentiation between local & national arenas has occurred, with a few relevant exceptions. Also investigated is whether these properties & the pattern of regional voting have undergone any significant change during the transition from the so-called "first" to the "second" Italian Republic. Some distinctive cases &, overall, four clusters of local party systems are identified, & some hypotheses concerning the reasons for the emergence of the various patterns are offered. Notably, a "personal factor" in several southern regions may be regarded as relevant. 7 Tables, 3 Appendixes, 47 References. Adapted from the source document.

Since its inception in the late 1950s & for about three decades the process of European integration (EI) did not significantly interfere with the logic of functioning of the nation-based welfare states. EI had essentially to do with "market making" at a continental level. Solidarity, redistribution & social justice only concerned national communities & remained essentially a business of national governments. The 1990s have however witnessed the emergence of increasing strains in the relationship between "Europe" & "solidarity." With its emphasis on sound budgets, competition, market promotion, free circulation, etc, EI has increasingly transformed itself as a source of "threat" for the national social models. Competition rules & the four freedoms have started to interfere with various domestic practices of social sharing. This logic of "opening" tends to clash with the logic of "closure" which historically inspired the formation of welfare states & which still largely underpins their programs today. The tension between the two logics is clearly revealed by opinion surveys. So far, the "tightening" of the link between EI & the nation-based welfare state has been promoted by the former ("Brussels"), privileging "market making" & insisting on the need for reform & "modernization" of traditional social protection schemes at the domestic level. But some adaptation is needed also on the side of EI, i.e., of its overall mission, institutional logic & constitutional framework. This is admittedly a difficult task, but it is not beyond reach. The paper suggests a number of strategies for reconciling within the EU institutional framework the reasons & "logics" of the two prime drivers of progress on the European tradition, i.e. the marketplace & the welfare state. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

The experience of the government contract in the version created at the beginning of the current legislature presents lights and shadows. However, the stipulationof negotiating clauses should be considered positive insofar as it has allowed the contracting political forces to overcome mutual mistrust and to be able to form a government majority despite the clear programmatic differences. The negative aspects, as we have attempted to underline, lie in the inconsistency and incompleteness of the contents, as well as in the rigidity of the agreed solutions, which are not always reasonable and feasible. The comparison, from this point of view, could perhaps offer useful elements for reflection for a critical evaluation of our experience and for the identification of corrective profits in the future. In Germany, for example, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, thanks to the stipulation of a government contract, managed to form a large coalition capable of supporting a stable and efficient federal executive, despite the fact that both parties had ruled out this eventuality during the election campaign. ; L'esperienza del contratto di governo nella versione realizzata all'inizio della corrente legislatura presenta luci e ombre. Va considerata comunque positiva la stipula di clausole negoziali nella misura in cui ha consentito alle forze politiche contraenti di superare le reciproche diffidenze e di riuscire a formare una maggioranza di governo nonostante le nette differenze programmatiche. Gli aspetti negativi risiedono nella incoerenza e incompletezza dei contenuti, oltre che nella rigidità delle soluzioni convenute, non sempre ragionevoli e attuabili. La comparazione, da questo punto di vista, potrebbe forse offrire degli elementi di riflessione utili per una valutazione critica della nostra esperienza e per la individuazione di utili correttivi in prospettiva futura. In Germania, ad esempio, cristiano democratici e socialdemocratici, proprio grazie alla stipula di un contratto di governo, sono riusciti a formare una grande coalizione in grado di sostenere un esecutivo federale stabile ed efficiente, nonostante entrambi i partiti avessero escluso recisamente tale eventualità durante la campagna elettorale.

Regional assemblies are among the losers of the European inte-gration process. Strengthening information rights and parliamentary scrutiny at both the national and the sub-national level is considered as the right way to address the European democratic deficit. The new toolbox provided by the Lisbon Treaty for a stronger commit-ment of regional assemblies within the EWS seems to be ineffective, even in genuine federal states, like Germany, Austria and Belgium. This paper examines the different domestic institutional frame-works emphasizing that, as the assemblies are getting more involved in EU proposals scrutiny, they rely always more on the technical ex-pertise of their government and on the support of parliamentary staff, which is far from an enhanced democratic control on EU matters.