Suchergebnisse

The natural speed of the contemporary world demands large investment projects which require specialized financial techniques such as Project Finance, defined as a fund to finance investment projects of great magnitude. Every Project Finance involves a wide range of elements such as promoters, government, contractors andsuppliers, among others, that will ensure project success. ; La rapidez del mundo contemporáneo exige que los grandes proyectos de inversión requieran de técnicas financieras especializadas como el Project Finance, definido como un fondo para financiar proyectos de inversión de gran envergadura. Todo Project Finance involucra elementos como promotores, gobierno, contratistas, proveedores, entre otros, que garantizan el éxito del proyecto.

This essay examines the questions raised by the present financial crisis through an enquiry into the institutional foundations of American finance. We view with some skepticism strong claims concerning the disastrous outcome for the structural dynamism of the global financial system and America's position in it. Many critical political economists tend to take the system of global financial markets as their point of departure and then locate the US in this system. Such approaches, however, generally fail to do justice to the decades-long build up of US financial power and do not capture many of the organic institutional linkages through which the American state is connected to the world of global finance and which are responsible for its imperial sprawl. In many ways, financial globalization is not best understood as the re-emergence of international finance but rather as a process through which the expansionary dynamics of American finance took on global dimensions. Because the present system of global finance has been shaped so profoundly by specifically American institutions and practices, it will not do to evaluate the changes and transformations of this system on the basis of either an abstract, generic model of capitalism or mere extrapolations from conjunctural crises. Crisis and instability are part and parcel of the dynamics of imperial finance and so are the managerial capacities developed by the US state. The most important questions that should occupy critical political economists therefore have to do not with what appear to be external challenges to US financial power (or the putative opportunities for progressive change opened up by them), but rather relate to the ways in which the imperial network of intricate, complex and often opaque institutional linkages between the US state and global finance is managed and reproduced. ; This essay examines the questions raised by the present financial crisis through an enquiry into the institutional foundations of American finance. We view with some skepticism strong claims concerning the disastrous outcome for the structural dynamism of the global financial system and America's position in it. Many critical political economists tend to take the system of global financial markets as their point of departure and then locate the US in this system. Such approaches, however, generally fail to do justice to the decades-long build up of US financial power and do not capture many of the organic institutional linkages through which the American state is connected to the world of global finance and which are responsible for its imperial sprawl. In many ways, financial globalization is not best understood as the re-emergence of international finance but rather as a process through which the expansionary dynamics of American finance took on global dimensions. Because the present system of global finance has been shaped so profoundly by specifically American institutions and practices, it will not do to evaluate the changes and transformations of this system on the basis of either an abstract, generic model of capitalism or mere extrapolations from conjunctural crises. Crisis and instability are part and parcel of the dynamics of imperial finance and so are the managerial capacities developed by the US state. The most important questions that should occupy critical political economists therefore have to do not with what appear to be external challenges to US financial power (or the putative opportunities for progressive change opened up by them), but rather relate to the ways in which the imperial network of intricate, complex and often opaque institutional linkages between the US state and global finance is managed and reproduced.

In response to the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009, governments in the United States, Europe and elsewhere have invested billions of dollars in financial institutions to prevent them from going bankrupt and from further disrupting the global economy. Despite these massive public bail-outs, a government and "elite" consensus has emerged that these nationalized or quasi-nationalized financial institutions should be privatized as soon as possible, and that, apart from modest changes in financial regulation, our economies should return to the status quo ante financial structure as soon as possible. In short, despite a massively disruptive economic crisis caused by financiers, our best option as a society is to return to a financial system run by these financiers. We disagree. As the crisis reveals, financier dominated finance has a number of crucial flaws: it creates major externalities that contribute to financial and real economic instability; it promotes short-term investment strategies; it contributes to inequality; and it undermines economic efficiency and the achievement of social goals in the real economy. We argue that a better strategy for achieving economic recovery, restructuring and widely shared, sustainable prosperity is to use public investments in the financial sector to build on the successful Post-World War II experiences of publicly oriented financial institutions in Europe and the US to create a stronger presence of "finance without financiers". We provide case studies of the positive and negative experiences with publicly owned and controlled financial institutions in the United States, France, Germany and Italy, and draw lessons for successfully creating more publicly oriented financial institutions moving forward. We emphasize local differences, policy space and "social management" of these financial institutions to ensure that publicly owned financial institutions is, at the same time, genuinely publicly oriented institutions that fit local conditions. ; In response to the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009, governments in the United States, Europe and elsewhere have invested billions of dollars in financial institutions to prevent them from going bankrupt and from further disrupting the global economy. Despite these massive public bail-outs, a government and "elite" consensus has emerged that these nationalized or quasi-nationalized financial institutions should be privatized as soon as possible, and that, apart from modest changes in financial regulation, our economies should return to the status quo ante financial structure as soon as possible. In short, despite a massively disruptive economic crisis caused by financiers, our best option as a society is to return to a financial system run by these financiers. We disagree. As the crisis reveals, financier dominated finance has a number of crucial flaws: it creates major externalities that contribute to financial and real economic instability; it promotes short-term investment strategies; it contributes to inequality; and it undermines economic efficiency and the achievement of social goals in the real economy. We argue that a better strategy for achieving economic recovery, restructuring and widely shared, sustainable prosperity is to use public investments in the financial sector to build on the successful Post-World War II experiences of publicly oriented financial institutions in Europe and the US to create a stronger presence of "finance without financiers". We provide case studies of the positive and negative experiences with publicly owned and controlled financial institutions in the United States, France, Germany and Italy, and draw lessons for successfully creating more publicly oriented financial institutions moving forward. We emphasize local differences, policy space and "social management" of these financial institutions to ensure that publicly owned financial institutions is, at the same time, genuinely publicly oriented institutions that fit local conditions.

This year, we mark the 70th anniversary of the IMF and World Bank and the 50th anniversary of F&D. The world has seen a staggering amount of change in the past seven decades. So, with these two anniversaries in mind we focused our attention on the transformation of the global economy-looking back and looking ahead. What will the global economy look like in another 70 years?Five Nobel laureates-George Akerlof, Paul Krugman, Robert Solow, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz-share their thoughts on which single "frontier" issue promises to shape the economic landscape in the years ahead.In "A Wor

By combating malaria with mosquito nets or buildingschools and providing basic sanitation, philanthropyis helping transform the developing world. Rich donorsare devoting fortunes?many of them earnedthrough computer software, entertainment, and venture capitalism?to defeating poverty and improving lives, supplementingand in some cases surpassing official aid channels.Frombillionaires Bill and Melinda Gates and WarrenBuffett to Aliko Dangote and George Soros, the titans ofcapitalism are backing good causes with their cash. Whetherfinancing new vaccines, building libraries, or buying upAmazon rai

El propósito de este artículo es mostrar que, en contra de lo que muchos analistas preveían hace pocos años, las finanzas públicas en Colombia obtuvieron un beneficio significativo del proceso reciente de reducción de la inflación. El menor ritmo de crecimiento de los precios estimuló la demanda de saldos monetarios reales y aumentó por esa vía el señoreaje total generado por el Banco de la República. Por esa razón, la magnitud del señoreaje se mantuvo en niveles relativamente altos, pese a la contracción de los encajes requeridos al sistema financiero que tuvo lugar desde mediados de la década de los noventa y a la consiguiente reducción en esta fuente de señoreaje. Por su parte, los cambios en la utilización del señoreaje han permitido que la porción que beneficia directamente al Gobierno -el señoreaje fiscal- aumente de manera notoria en el período reciente. Este beneficio fiscal, sin embargo, puede verse afectado negativamente en la medida en que una porción mayor del señoreaje total se destine a la compra de divisas para acumulación de reservas internacionales. Finalmente, el artículo cuantifica el beneficio que ha tenido la caída de la inflación sobre las necesidades de financiamiento del Gobierno y la magnitud del déficit fiscal, a través del impacto de menores tasas nominales de interés. ; This paper shows that the Colombian public finances benefited from the recent process of reduction in the rate of inflation. It stimulated the demand for real cash balances and allowed the central bank to keep relatively high levels of seignorage, despite the fact that the reserve requirement on the Colombian financial sector -and this source of seignorage- was reduced sharply since the mid-1990s. Furthermore, changes in the distribution of the seignorage led to an important increase in the portion that goes directly to the government -the fiscal seignorage-. This fiscal effect, however, may be negatively affected if the share of total seignorage that is used to buy international reserves is increased. Finally, the paper illustrates the positive effect that the reduction in the rate of inflation -and the corresponding reduction in the nominal interest rates- had on the fiscal deficit and the government borrowing requirements.

The conventional wisdom on public finances presupposes a similar performance between an individual or domestic economy and that of an economy at the macro level. By contrasts, the financial perspective according to its functionality with respect to the macroeconomic level shows both deficits and surplus are mechanisms to obtain other macroeconomic objectives and never an objective in itself. In terms of local currency, the State's debt never turns into a bankrupt situation, as it happens with foreign currency debt. Consequently, the State's indebtedness in local currencyisn't a problem in spite of reaching fiscal deficit status. The only issues against development are obstructing currency coming from abroad and not local currency which is issued by the State(capitalism). Functional finances –understood as the public expenditure activity to obtain full-use of resources and, at the same time, at low inflation rates– are limited by external money-inflowfactors. In other words, the functional finance focus –originally developed by Abba Lerner to get, with expansionary management demand and fiscal policy, objectives to obtain high-employment numbers and "full employment" in developed countries– is modified by particular conditions in low and medium economies because it is required to create cushion conditions beforehand for external money-inflow for that "expansionary management demand." Therefore, it means to reorient fiscal policy objectives in order to move the external constraints for development. ; La consideración convencional de las finanzas públicas supone un comportamiento similar entre las variables de una economía doméstica o individual y las de la macroeconomía. En cambio, la visión de las finanzas de acuerdo a su funcionalidad respecto de la macro muestra que los déficits o superávits son instrumentos para obtener otros objetivos macroeconómicos y nunca un objetivo en sí mismo. En términos de moneda doméstica, las deudas del Estado nunca representan una situación de quiebre, como sí sucede con la deuda en divisas, y por lo tanto el endeudamiento del Estado en moneda doméstica no representa un problema aún creciendo en déficit fiscal. La única traba al crecimiento es la restricción externa, la falta de divisas, y no la de moneda doméstica donde el propio Estado es su emisor (cartalismo). Las finanzas funcionales –entendidas como la actividad del gasto público para obtener pleno empleo de recursos y al mismo tiempo inflación baja– se encuentran limitadas en su formulación original por la restricción externa. En otras palabras, el enfoque de finanzas funcionales –originalmente pensado por Abba Lerner para obtener, con un manejo expansivo de la demanda y de la política fiscal, objetivos de un alto crecimiento y del "pleno empleo" en países de centro– se ve modificado para las condiciones particulares de una economía pequeña y abierta, porque antes se requiere generar las condiciones de alivio dela restricción externa para ese "manejo expansivo de la demanda". Por lo tanto, eso implica que se deben reorientar los objetivos de la política fiscal con tal de desplazar la restricción externa al crecimiento.