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The danger of underestimating the material significance of global finance and the American Empire is argued to require a deeper understanding of the actual historical process that led to the realization of a global financial quarter centered in New York, & the American imperial state as its political carapace. The "embedded liberalism" of the postwar era & the Bretton Woods years must be understood as the cradle of the new, globalizing & liberalizing American imperium. It was in the context of the "Volcker shock" of 1979-1982 that resulted in the "triumph of central banking", & the overcoming of barriers to managing risk. The "functional" role finance played in both global accumulation & the American Empire has experienced a series of severe disruptions in the accumulation process into repeated crises in Latin America, the East Asian crisis, & Africa's perpetual crisis. Although the traditional Marxist theories of structural crises provide valid insights into the nature of global economic discontinuities, they sometimes tend to fetishize crises as something that leads capitalism to unravel on its own. Theories of crisis must be politicized to integrate the responses of both states & class actors. The openings for radical change in present era capitalism will revolve around problems of political legitimacy rather than any sudden economic collapse. We cannot rely on intra - imperial rivalries or financial crisis to clear the way to social transformations. It is the openings provided by the problems of neoliberal & imperial legitimacy that provide terrain for the development of new political strategies to fundamentally challenge capitalist social relations. References. J. Harwell

Competing conceptions of corruption & their use in contemporary struggles to reform campaign finance laws are examined. Problems with James Scott's (1972) identification of three approaches to defining corruption are disclosed. Three standards of corruption used by US courts in corruption cases are discussed: quid pro quo, in which officials accept monetary compensation for performing an action; monetary influence, in which public officials perform public duties with the thought of receiving money; & distortion, in which officials' policy decisions are influenced by campaign contributions rather than public opinion. It is contended that the monetary influence standard offers the best approach for explaining political corruption. In addition, it is argued that deliberative theory offers strong support for the monetary influence standard approach. It is concluded that the US judicial system must consider explanations of corruption more carefully before attempting to influence campaign finance law. J. W. Parker

In this chapter of Life after Reform: When Bipartisan Campaign Reform Meets Politics, the authors address the impact of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) on presidential politics to predict that the law will generate two tiers of candidates & increase the importance of the "invisible army" of pre-campaign fundraising. The problems of soft money & front loading are discussed in the context of public financing created by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The choice by presidential candidates to opt out of the public finance system in favor of reliance on outside money is discussed. The authors analyze three scenarios of the impacts of BCRA had existed in the 2000 primary elections to argue that BCRA will strengthen incentives against use of the public finance system by presidential candidates. 2 Tables, 4 Figures. J. Harwell

Laffan illuminates the European Union (EU)'s governance by describing its budget-making process & politics. The primary functions of budgets are listed along with the EU's budget amounts, 1973-1998. There is a brief review of the budget of the EU's predecessor, the European Coal & Steel Community, 1952-1969, budgetary crises & conflicts, 1970-1986, & the institutionalization of the budget, 1987-1999. Data on budget creation & management are enriched by information on macronegotiations, the annual budget cycle, 1990's expansion, auditing, the discharge procedure, & means of addressing fraud. Future budgetary planning & conflicts are revealed by details of Agenda 2000, proposal formatting, & negotiations within the EU's councils. Ways in which the budgeting process embodies EU's goals of integration & representation are explored. The need for stabilization, accountability, & flexibility is addressed. 4 Tables, 1 Figure, 2 References. M. C. Leary

An assessment of international, national, & regional efforts to trace terrorist funding carried out both before & after 11 September 2001 focuses on "finance warfare" in Europe & the UK & linkages with US strategies. Regulatory & legislative measures implemented since 9/11 to attack the enemy's economic assets & infrastructure are explored in relation to earlier anti-money-laundering tactics aimed at criminal activities that were not politically or ideologically driven. The Bush administration's declaration of financial war against international terrorists & their allies immediately following 9/11 was similar to earlier efforts to identify bin Laden's assets. The specifics of an agreement on fast-track measures against terrorist funding reached at an October 2001 meeting of the European Union are described. Special attention is given to vulnerabilities in the financial systems that made terrorist financing possible, as well as links between the more informal financial networks in the developing world & sophisticated financial complexes in the developed world. The need to enhance global cooperation & refine strategies intended to deal with money laundering is emphasized. J. Lindroth

A discussion of Poland's position in the budget & finance area of accession negotiations for EU membership focuses on Poland's stance that it should "achieve the position of a net beneficiary from the first year of membership." The feasibility of this arrangement that would necessitate payments to the EU budget that are smaller than transfers, is considered by examining the possible size of transfers, problems of their utilization, & the probable size of contributions. Key elements of the contributions EU members are required to make to the budget used to finance common policies are described. It is concluded that Poland's request to phase in its budget contribution is justified but, in order to avoid becoming a net contributor to the EU budget & not a net beneficiary, Poland must arrange to make the most efficient use of EU financial transfers in addition to negotiating a phasing in of budget contributions. Also, the terms of payments to the EU common budget should be determined only after talks in other areas are completed. J. Lindroth

"For the most part, the theory of public finance treats government as a unitary being that intervenes into polyarchically organized market processes. While this treatment leads to simple and tractable models, it also misrepresents the tasks of organizing public governance. The situation for governance is not one where a government governs people, but is one where people govern themselves. It is one where people participate in the governance of their own activities, and not one where 'the state' governs people. Recognition of this distinction leads to a polycentric formulation of governance, where various governmental organizations provide arenas where people participate in the governance of their relationships and activities." (author's abstract)

Considers the impact of 1980s-1990s transformations in global financial markets on capitalist diversity. Financial markets are described as a central mechanism through which diverse market processes are brought together in a single web. Currently, financial markets are undergoing a transformation in which they are being integrated at a global level. This process has reduced the ability of national political structures to regulate & stabilize their markets. It has also seriously eroded capitalist diversity. While the proper solution to this situation may be the development of international-level regulatory solutions, these have not been developed because of political difficulties. Better forms of regulation will require a strong international coalition, considerable political & legal autonomy on the part of the negotiators, a narrow technical focus, & that it be enforceable. Without the institution of transnational regulation, it is likely that the transnational financial structure will be run by a private regime located in the financial markets themselves. D. Ryfe