Finance and Development, June 2014
In: Finance & Development v.Finance & Development
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In: Finance & Development v.Finance & Development
In: Finance & Development v.Finance & Development
In: Bo , P 2014 , ' A Study of the BRICS Bank from the Perspective of Global Financial Governance ' , Journal of China and International Relations , bind 2 , nr. 2 , s. 50-57 . https://doi.org/10.5278/ojs.jcir.v2i2.939
The transition of the global financial governance system is a history of the rise and fall of the Western advanced countries in the post-war international political and economic system. Since the end of the Second World War, the International Monetary Foundation and the World Bank have always taken the dominant role in the field of global financial governance. However, after the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, many drawbacks have become apparent concerning these two significant institutions, such as the lack of representatives, the slow and ineffective response to the crisis, etc. Following a strong appeal from the developing countries (with the emerging powers as their representatives), the global financial governance system has experienced several rounds of reforms which have yet to yield acceptable results. Therefore, it is highly necessary to create a new institution which can play a complementary role in the existing financial governance system rather than overthrow it. Complying with the tide of history, the official establishment of the BRICS Bank can be of great significance to the reform of current global financial governance systems such as diversifying the global financial governance bodies, representing the interests of developing countries in a better way, enhancing the status and improving the importance of emerging economies in the international political and economic order. Admittedly, the BRICS Bank also faces great challenges and limits such as the lack of a core leadership and the absence of a unified currency, etc.
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In: The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences yearbooks
In: Population and labor volume 3
Preliminary Material -- Chapter One Demographic Changes During the Period of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan and Predictions for Population Development /Ying Hu , Fang Cai and Yang Du -- Chapter Two Low Fertility and Related Theoretical Issues in China /Zhigang Guo -- Chapter Three How China Tackled the Global Financial Crisis /Fang Cai , Yang Du and Meiyan Wang -- Chapter Four Public Investment and Employment: An Empirical Analysis /Jie Cheng and Dewen Wang -- Chapter Five Growing Pains: What Employment Dilemma Does China Face at Its Lewis Turning Point? /Fang Cai -- Chapter Six The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Employment in Small and Medium Enterprises /Yaowu Wu and Yang Du -- Chapter Seven Changes in Industrial Location and Labor Flows in China /Fang Cai , Meiyan Wang and Yue Qu -- Chapter Eight Population, Industrial Development, and Employment in Chinese Urbanization /Yang Du and Meiyan Wang -- Chapter Nine Has Labor Migration Really Not Narrowed the Rural-Urban Income Gap? /Fang Cai and Meiyan Wang -- Chapter Ten Emission Reduction Compatible with Economic and Employment Growth /Fang Cai , Yang Du and Meiyan Wang -- Chapter Eleven The New Elements of China's Labor Market in the Post-Financial-Crisis Era /Fang Cai and Meiyan Wang -- Chapter Twelve Reform of the Hukou System and Unification of Rural-Urban Social Welfare /Fang Cai -- Index.
中國作為國際證監會組織的成員國,有責任落實國際証監會組織發佈的《金融市場基礎設施原則》。儘管國際貨幣基金組織發表的評分報告肯定中國落實了國際証監會組織提倡的金融規管原則,但事實上該等原則於納入法規後未獲執行。以上的分歧現象引起了對「中國金融規管制度會趨向國際原則」說法的質疑。 ; 本研究的討論重點在於中國金融法規會否跟國際原則趨向相同。本研究以系統化綜述分析國際貨幣基金組織對各國落實《金融市場基礎設施原則》情況的評分報告,並以內容分析法分析傳媒在中國二零一五年「股災」發生前後發表關於金融市場的報導。目的在於顯示中國政府以及金融監管機構在「股災」發生前後,在監管事宜上取態有明顯分別。 ; 本研究根據目的決定論提出中國金融監管趨向於與國際原則分歧。目的決定論、趨同理論以及有限度趨同理論的分別含意及對分歧現象的解釋在本研究中獲審視。根據目的決定論,由於中國金融市場有獨特社會目標,加上中國金融市場需要兼顧中國獨特社會背景,因此中國金融監管制度應該趨向獨特。換而言之,中國金融監管制度不應引入國際原則。目的決定論的論據在於中國政府領導層與金融業監管員在共產黨內有從屬關係。該從屬關係導致監管機構的監管行為被政府俘虜。 ; 根據規制俘虜理論,金融監管機構本來的職能被政府的提出議程取締。根據經濟目標合法性,中國政府的合法性源於其維持經濟發展的能力。因此,中國政府在金融市場的利益在於鞏固其執政合法性,而中國政府要達到以上目的,則需要令金融監管機構配合其經濟政策,修改監管方法及監管重點。最終,監管機構成為推動救市,並且宣揚政府權威形象的主力。 ; 綜觀以上提到中國的獨特金融監管制度,本研究旨在指出制度安排如何影響監管機構對金融業的監管。該等影響關連到中國金融監管制度是否趨向與國際間通用的監管原則同化。 ; Evaluations by International Monetary Fund (IMF) have shown increased implementation of International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) regulatory principles in China. However, findings show that international regulatory principles have not been practiced in China. Enforcement efforts of the principles remained low in China, and this casts doubts on the claim that Chinese financial regulation would develop towards the convergence of international regulatory principles due to the globalization of regulations. ; This research discusses on whether Chinese financial regulation has adopted international regulatory practices. Systematic review of IMF reports on implementation of IOSCO principles in different countries and content analysis of media reports issued around the happening of the 2015 stock market selloff crisis in China are employed to discover and examine findings. The selloff crisis is selected as a case for studying Chinese financial regulation because government interference in financial market made China's development away from international regulatory principles apparent, and arguments of this research are built on changes in financial regulatory patterns in China. ; This research supports the view of teleological determinism applied by Wilbert ...
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The COVID-19 pandemic brought on the so-called "coronacrisis," a global crisis event enormous in size and force. The crisis questioned the ability of states and instruments of international governance to respond quickly and effectively to the global threats. It is noteworthy that there was no strong correlation between crisis management efficacy and the type of political system of a country. However, the countries with elaborated and well-financed health systems, were able to struggle with the devastating consequences of the coronacrisis better than those with systemic, structural and financial problems of their healthcare sectors. It is obvious that the ability to manage the coronacrisis is not related to the type of political governance or ideology, but to the state administrative resources and competence of the cabinet / leaders. That potentially gave an opportunity for countries with different ideological foundations to neglect their tensions and unite the efforts in the containment of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (e.g. create mutual programmes of vaccination and medicine distribution). The main forces are the Transatlantic alliance, Russia and China. Unfortunately, no visible COVID-19-related agreement between them ever happened so far. Instead, the coronacrisis situation was used by the political rivals to intensify their aggressive rhetoric against each other (e.g., USA and Russia, USA and China) or profit from it in deepening international collaboration not connected with the pandemic itself (e.g., Russia and China). We do not observe any real mutual efforts of liquidating the pandemic consequences even within an ideological block, to say nothing about different blocks. The US–EU relationships worsened during the pandemic, especially at the background of Trump's cool attitude towards international organisations and his decision to leave the World Health Organization in the midst of the pandemic and his threatening words that US may also abandon the NATO. Likewise, John Bolton spoke of the EU as an entity hostile ...
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Väitöskirjan tavoitteena on selvittää valtiontukisääntelyn ja sen tulkinnan yhteyttä EU:n politiikkaan sekä käytettyihin taloudellisiin ajattelutapoihin. Politiikan lisäksi väitöskirjassa tarkastellaan erityisesti tukikilpailuun liittyvän taloustieteellisen keskustelun vaikutusta valtiontukisääntelyyn. Lisäksi tavoitteena on selvittää, miten tavoitteet tosiasiassa ohjaavat valtiontukisääntelyn kehitystä ja miten nämä tavoitteet mahdollisesti kehittävät valtiontukisääntelyä tulevaisuudessa. Valtiontukipolitiikkaa harjoitetaan pääasiassa SEUT 170(3)(c) -artiklan nojalla. Artikla on poikkeus SEUT 107(1) -artiklan sisältämään laajaan valtiontukikieltoon. SEUT 107(3)(c) -artikla mahdollistaa sellaisten tukien myöntämisen, jotka tuottavat enemmän yhteistä etua kuin haittaavat kilpailua sisämarkkinoilla. EU:n tuomioistuin on vahvistanut, että Euroopan komissiolla on laaja harkintavalta arvioidessa, mitkä tuet täyttävät tämän artiklan edellytykset. Komissio onkin toteuttanut valtiontukipolitiikkaa pitkälti tämän artiklan soveltamisella. Väitöskirjassa on kolme tutkimuskysymystä. Ensimmäinen tutkimuskysymys on "Mitkä ovat olleet merkittävimmät valtiontukisääntelyyn vaikuttavat taustaolettamat ja tavoitteet?" Tutkimuskysymykseen vastataan tutkimuksen luvuissa 2, 3 ja 4, joissa käsitellään valtiontukisääntelyn taustalla vaikuttanutta politiikkaa, sääntelyn historiallista kehitystä sekä tukikilpailuun liittyvää tutkimusta. Merkittävin valtiontukisääntelyn tavoite on ollut estää jäsenvaltioiden välistä tukikilpailua, jonka on katsottu haittaavan kaikkia jäsenvaltioita. Taustaolettamana on ollut, että tukikilpailussa kaikki sisämarkkinoilla toimivat jäsenvaltiot häviävät, ja jos valtiontukipolitiikkaa ei säännellä, jäsenvaltiot tukevat yrityksiään, mikä johtaa tukikilpailuun. Toiseksi tavoitteeksi tukikilpailun estämisen rinnalle on 2000-luvun taitteessa noussut tavoite poistaa markkinahäiriöitä valtiontuilla. Näitä markkinahäiriötä ovat olleet mm. kasvihuonekaasupäästöihin liittyvät ulkoisvaikutukset ja finanssikriisi. 2010-luvulla valtiontukisääntelyn tavoitteena on ollut myös lisätä talouskasvua ja parantaa ympäristön tilaa. Näiden lisäksi valtiontukisääntelyä ja komission julkaisuja tarkastelemalla voidaan havaita yksi EU:n toimivaltaan kuulumaton valtiontukisääntelyn tavoite: jäsenvaltioiden varojen säästäminen. Toinen tutkimuskysymys on "Miten nämä [tavoitteet ja taustaolettamat] ovat historian saatossa näkyneet valtiontukisääntelyssä ja komission toiminnassa?". Tutkimuskysymykseen vastataan luvuissa 1.5, 3 ja 4, joissa käsitellään valtiontukisääntelyn historiaa osana EU:n historiaa sekä nykyisen sääntelyn tavoitteita ja muutoksia. Historiallisesti tukikilpailun estäminen on ollut voimakkaimmin näkyvä tavoite, sillä valtiontukipolitiikka ja sääntelyn tulkinta ovat kiristyneet koko EU:n historian ajan, ja Unionin tuomioistuin on katsonut yhä useampia tukia kielletyksi valtiontueksi. Myös komissio on jatkuvasti kiristänyt linjaansa katsoen yhä useampia tukia sisämarkkinoille soveltumattomaksi valtiontueksi. Viimeisin merkittävä kehitys on ollut erilaisiin verotukiin puuttuminen 2010-luvulla. Tämän lisäksi myös tavoitteet markkinahäiriön poistamisesta ja talouskasvun lisäämisestä ovat näkyneet sääntelyssä. Markkinahäiriön poistamisen nojalla komissio on sallinut valtavasti ympäristö- ja erityisesti energiatukia. Nämä tuet ovat nykyään suurin tukiryhmä EU:ssa. Talouskasvua taas on pyritty lisäämään sallimalla yhä useampien erilaisten talouskasvulle hyväksi katsottujen tukien myöntäminen, osittain jopa luopuen tavoitteesta estää tukikilpailua. Kolmas tutkimuskysymys on "Miten nykyiset ympäristö- ja energiatuet sopivat tähän kehitykseen ja voidaanko tukipolitiikan katsoa muuttuneen näiden vuoksi?". Tutkimustulosten perusteella ympäristö- ja energiatukiin liittyvä komission sääntely on pyrkinyt lisäämään näitä tukia. Tuet sopivat teoriassa hyvin valtiontukien systematiikkaan, koska sallitut tuet eivät vääristä kilpailua voimakkaasti, mutta ne lisäävät yhteistä etua ja samalla säästävät jäsenvaltioiden varoja turhalta tukemiselta. Tämä perustuu tosin pitkälti komission asettamaan teoreettiseen viitekehykseen ja ennalta määrättyihin päätöksentekosääntöihin ilman empiiristä tarkastelua. Loppulauseena voidaankin todeta, että valtiontukipolitiikka perustuu pitkälti ajatukseen, että jäsenvaltiot tukevat yrityksiään, jos se vain sallitaan. EU-tasolla tapahtuvien päätösten rahankäytöstä katsotaan olevan järkevämpiä kuin jäsenvaltioiden tasolla tapahtuvien päätösten. Tämän vuoksi valtiontukipolitiikka on perustunut siihen, että yhteisen hyvän mukaiset tuet sallitaan, ja jäsenvaltiot tukevat halutessaan. Tähän mennessä politiikka on ollut tehokasta, koska jäsenvaltiot käyttävät merkittävästi varoja sellaisten kohteiden tukemiseen, jotka on erikseen sallittu SEUT 107(3)(c) -artiklan nojalla. ; The goal of this thesis was to find out how state aid regulation and interpretation of the regulation are connected to EU policies and economic theories used to form said policies. In addition to studying the policies, the effects of economic theory related to subsidy competition is studied. The goal of this thesis is to find out how these policy goals affect state aid regulation and how these goals will affect state aid regulation in the future. The state aid policy is mostly based on TFEU article 107(3)(c). The article contains an exception to the broad state aid prohibition in TFEU article 107(1). TFEU article 107(3)(c) enables granting aids that facilitate economic development and common good more than it adversely affects trading conditions within the internal market. CJEU has stated that the European Commission has broad discretion when evaluating which aids meet the criteria set in TFEY article 107(3)(c). The commission has used this article to execute state aid policy in the EU. The thesis contains three research questions. The first research question is "What are the most significant presumptions and goals affecting state aid regulation?". This research question is answered in chapters 2, 3 and 4, which study the policies behind state aid regulation, the historical development of state aid regulation and the research related to the subsidy competition. The most significant goal for state aid regulation has been to prevent subsidy competition between member states, which has been seen to harm all member states. The presumption behind state aid regulation has been that in subsidy competition everybody loses, and that if national state aid policies are left unregulated, all member states will subsidy their companies, which will lead to subsidy competition. In the 2000s, another goal of the state aid regulation has been to use the state aids to prevent market failures. Market failures referred to in this goal are e.g. externalities related to greenhouse gases and financial crisis. In addition to these goals, one other goal of state aid regulation in the 2010s has been promoting economic growth and improving the environment. Additionally, one other state aid policy goal that is not within the EU jurisdiction can be derived from state aid regulation and the commission's publications: saving member states' public funds. The second research question is "How these [goals and presumptions] have affected state aid regulation and the commission's actions in history". This research question is answered in chapters 1.5, 3, and 4, which study state aid history within the EU history and the current regulation's goals, as well as changes in current legislation. Historically, the most significant goal has been preventing subsidy competition; the state aid policy and the interpretation of the regulation have become more and more strict during the whole history of the EU. In addition to this, CJEU has deemed more and more aids incompatible with the internal market. The commission has continuously tightened its decisions and deemed more and more aids incompatible with the internal market, the last significant change being the state aid decisions regarding different tax measures in the 2010s. In addition to this, goals to remove market failure and to promote growth have influenced the regulation and its interpretation. In order to remove market failures, the commission has allowed significant subsidy programs for environment and renewable energy. These subsidies are currently the largest subsidy group in the EU. Economic growth has been promoted by allowing more and more different aids that are seen beneficial to growth, even partially abandoning the goal to prevent subsidy competition. The third research question is "How are the current environmental and energy aids suited for this development and is the subsidy policy changed due to this development". Results show that the commission regulation related to environmental and energy aids is designed to increase the amount of these aids. These aids are theoretically aligned with the state aid system, because the allowed aids do not significantly disturb competition, but they promote common good and simultaneously save public funds from useless subsiding. This conclusion is mostly based on theoretical framework and predetermined decision-making rules without any empirical evaluation. As a conclusion, it can be stated that the state aid policy is mostly based on the idea that member states will grant aids if it is allowed. Additionally, it is also based on the idea that the financial decision-making is better on the EU level than on the national level. In result, the basis of the state aid policy has been that aids beneficial to common good are allowed, and it is up to the member states to grant the aids if they want to. This policy has been effective because member states have been using significant amounts of funding to the goals allowed in TFEU article 107(3)(c).
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