Suchergebnisse

Wenn ausgerechnet Pazifisten bei der Verfechtung ihrer Position aggressiv werden, so finden wir das besonders verstörend – jedenfalls verstörender als bei anderen Spannungen zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Woran liegt das? Meiner Ansicht nach kommen in diesem Fall drei Elemente zusammen, deren Mischung die pazifistische Position von innen bedroht: Während sich der hasserfüllte Pazifist schon beim Diskutieren schnell von negativen Emotionen fortreißen lässt, also alles andere als Willensstärke dokumentiert, verlangt er in seiner Theorie ein Höchstmaß an Willensstärke, und zwar gerade im Umgang mit Emotionen. Dass er das nicht schafft, wirft nicht nur ein negatives Licht auf seine Person, sondern liefert Gründe gegen seine Theorie. Lektion: Der Pazifist ist gut beraten, vorbildlich mit seinen Emotionen umzugehen. ; Sometimes pacifists get full of hatred when arguing for their moral position. This is particularly disturbing–or anyway, more disturbing than in other cases where there occurs a tension between theory and practice. Why is that so? According to my diagnosis, in the case of hateful pacifists there are three elements which (when taken together) threaten pacifism from inside: (i) Hateful pacifists are carried away by negative emotions. (ii) This shows that they lack self-control in political practice, i.e. in contexts which are far easier than war. (iii) In theory, however, they demand that conflicting parties be able to exert a lot of self-control, particularly with respect to aggressive emotions. – As long as they themselves are not capable of doing this, they are not only ruining their nice image; they are also providing strong reasons against their moral theory. Lesson: In political discussions, pacifists are well advised to control their negative emotions. ; Not Reviewed

One: A Brentanist Theory of Moral Judgments -- 1.1. The Theory -- 1.2. Grounds for Preferring the Brentanist Theory to the Standard Non-Cognitivist Theories -- 1.3. Grounds for Preferring the Brentanist Theory to the Standard Cognitivist Theories -- 1.4. Answers to Some Objections to the Brentanist Theory -- Two: The Ideal Observer Theory and Moral Objectivism -- 2.1. An Argument for Accepting the Ideal Observer Theory as a Standard for Determining the Correctness of Moral Judgments -- 2.2. Firth's Version of the Ideal Observer Theory -- 2.3. My Characterization of the Ideal Observer -- 2.4 Three Versions of the Ideal Observer Theory and Their Implications for the Objectivity of Moral Judgments -- 2.5. Sermonette on the Importance of Empathy -- 2.6. Intuitionism and the Ideal Observer Theory -- Three: Relativism and Nihilism -- 3.1 Some Different Meanings of the Term 'Ethical Relativism' -- 3.2. The Definition of 'Meta-Ethical Relativism' -- 3.3. Some Necessary Conditions of One's Accepting a Moral Judgment or a Moral Principle -- 3.4. Meta-Ethical Relativism and Nihilism -- 3.5. A Non-Nihilistic Version of Meta-Ethical Relativism -- 3.6. Conclusion -- Four: The Wages of Relativism -- 4.1. What Sorts of Attitudes and Commitments Presuppose a Belief in the Objectivity of Normative Judgments? -- 4.2. Causal or Psychological Connections Between Meta-Ethical Views and Attitudes and First-Order Normative Standards -- Appendix I: Nietzsche on the Genealogy of Morals -- 1.1. Nietzsche's Claims Concerning the Genealogy of Morals -- 1.2. What Are Nietzsche's Genetic Claims Intended to Show? -- Appendix II: Normative Relativism and Nihilism -- Appendix III: Hare's Version of the Ideal Observer Theory -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography.