Suchergebnisse

We propose a method for indentifying discretionary fiscal policy with real time data. The starting point is the observation that automatic stabilizers should depend on true GDP, while discretionary fiscal policy depends on the information that policy makers have in real time. We approximate the information set of policy makers with GDP data released in real time. True GDP is approximated using the last GDP release. Accordingly, we can compute a real time measurement error. Discretionary fiscal policy can be expected to react to this measurement error, whereas automatic fiscal policy will not. We apply this identification approach in order to test the central identifying assumption of Blanchard and Perotti's (2002) seminal structural VAR. According to this assumption, fiscal policy makers do not react to GDP evolutions contemporaneously in a discretionary fashion. We find that government expenditure is adjusted upward if GDP in real time is lower than true GDP. This suggests that fiscal policy makers can use short-term funds to buy goods and services in response to GDP updates. Our results therefore call the identifying assumption of Blanchard and Perotti's (2002) SVAR into question.

'Die Erfolge der wirtschaftlichen Integration in Europa sind für die Länder Südost- und Ostasiens zugleich Ansporn und Herausforderung. Dabei werden die Vorteile des europäischen Integrationsweges durch die schwere Finanzkrise noch unterstrichen. Diese Krise hat - anders als bei ähnlichen Fällen in der Vergangenheit - eben keine Währungskrise ausgelöst. Für die Länder Südost- und Ostasiens ist aber nicht nur die erfolgreiche europäische Integration ein Anlass, die eigenen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zu hinterfragen und über ein anderes Modell für ihre künftige Zusammenarbeit nachzudenken. Die Neuordnung der regionalen Finanzbeziehungen ist auch eine Spätfolge der Asienkrise von 1997/98. Die vom Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) schlecht gemanagte Krise hat in den damals direkt und indirekt betroffenen asiatischen Staaten dauerhafte Vorbehalte gegenüber den westlichen Industrieländern hinterlassen. Die bittere Erfahrung, in einer nur teilweise selbstverschuldeten Notlage keine wirksame Unterstützung erhalten zu haben, belastet die Beziehungen zum Westen bis heute und liefert zugleich einen Anreiz, in der Finanzpolitik neue, eigene Wege zu beschreiten. Unabhängig von den Ergebnissen der geplanten Weltfinanzgipfel werden asiatische Volkswirtschaften den eingeschlagenen Weg der Vertiefung ihrer finanzpolitischen Zusammenarbeit vermutlich fortsetzen und ausbauen.' (Autorenreferat)

Das Thema Staatsverschuldung war während der vergangenen 25 Jahre eines der prägenden Themen der Deutschen Innenpolitik aber auch bestimmend in Diskussionen vieler anderer Nationalstaaten sowie bei der Einführung des EURO. Standen früher in vielen wissenschaftlichen Analysen die Fragen nach den Ursachen der Staatsverschuldung im Mittelpunkt, so hat sich seit einigen Jahren die Perspektive gewandelt. Mittlerweile wird verstärkt danach gefragt, mit welchen Mitteln eine hohe Staatsverschuldung reduziert werden kann. Einige westliche Industriestaaten haben hierbei große Erfolge vorzuweisen. So gelang es den Iren, den Belgiern oder Neuseeländern Budgetüberschüsse zu erwirtschaften und dadurch ihre Staatsschuldenquoten deutlich zu reduzieren. Diese zu Deutschland gegenläufigen Entwicklungen stehen im Mittelpunkt dieser Studie zu den Budgetkonsolidierungen im internationalen Vergleich.

We investigate the effects of official fiscal data and creative accounting signals on interest rate spreads between bond yields in the European Union. Our model predicts that risk premia contained in government bond spreads should increase in both, the official fiscal position and the expected creative part of fiscal policy. The relative importance of these two signals depends on the transparency of the country. Greater transparency reduces risk premia. The empirical results confirm the hypotheses. Creative accounting increases the spread. The increase of the risk premium is stronger if financial markets are unsure about the true extent of creative accounting. Fiscal transparency reduces risk premia. Instrumental variable regressions confirm these results by addressing potential reverse causality problems and measurement bias.

The inability to implement economic reforms in efforts to improve the stagnant economic performance of Switzerland has been blamed on the political structures of direct democracy, federalism, & concordance, raising the cry for constitutional reforms to enable greater political leadership. Yet the strongly vertical checks & balances in place in Switzerland are intended to increase political competition to such a degree that the eventual decisions are oriented towards the needs of the citizens. Broad support is required to implement & maintain reforms, & the evidence indicates that direct democracy has positive economic effects at the canton level, with no persuasive argument provided for why it should have a negative impact at the national level. The Swiss federal structure offers opportunities for reform by spurring scientific & innovative processes. In addition, it has been shown that the size of the cabinet rather than the size of a coalition government has greater impact on fiscal policy. It is not a change in the checks & balances that is required, but rather adequate forms of economic policy reforms that can win the support of the citizens, without which rational & enduring reforms cannot be successful. References. L. Reed

In Germany the sustainability of fiscal policy is determined to a substantial part by the federal states (Bundeslaender). Their portion of the public debt amounts to nearly forty percent. In this study we test the sustainability of debt policies of the federal states on the basis of their intertemporal budget constraint. The fiscal policy of the federal states taken collectively is not sustainable. The same holds for the new eastern Laender and the city states (Stadtstaaten) whereas the fiscal policy of the western Laender seems to be consistent with the present-value budget constraint. However, econometric tests for the individual Laender show that the requirement for fiscal sustainability is fulfilled only by two western Laender, Hesse and North-Rhine Westphalia, and one eastern Land (Saxony).

In the European Monetary Union (EMU) development of unit-labor costs and inflation rates differs substantially among regions. This shows that the different wage determination models in the EMU did not converge to create a EMU-wide coherent wage bargaining system. The results are huge regional imbalances. Germany the biggest economy and the country with the lowest increase in unit-labor costs in EMU already realizes big and increasing current account surpluses against other EMU countries. Spain, Italy or Portugal suffer from big current account deficits. The financial power of the European centre is too limited to prevent increasing regional problems. What is needed in Europe is a deeper institutional and political integration to combine functional monetary, fiscal, wage and regional policies.

The pros & cons of deciding budgetary issues through a plebiscite are explored, studying the concrete case of Germany & examining this country's constitutional & legislative ramifications of a process in which budget decisions could be made through a direct vote of the people. The issues of representative vs populist democracy, discretionary vs nondiscretionary spending, the balance of power between parliamentary majority & minority, special interest, self-serving politics, & fiscal expertise are addressed. Paragraphs from the German constitution are quoted to illustrate how budget control & budgetary decisions are at the present regulated by this document. The question whether a plebiscitary approach to national budget would violate the principles of the German state as a republic & a modern democracy is addressed. The function of the budget in a democratic republic & the process of budget planning & budgetary legislature are discussed to demonstrate that in a modern democratic state, budget is no longer a simple question of finances but involves & impacts the very roots of politics. Z. Dubiel