Suchergebnisse

What are fiscal policy rules? What are the principal benefits and drawbacks associated with various fiscal rules, particularly compared with alternative approaches to fiscal adjustment? Can fiscal rules contribute to long-run sustainability and welfare without sacrificing short-run stabilization? If so, what characteristics of fiscal rules make this contribution most effective? And in what circumstances and contexts, if any should the IMF encourage its member countries to adopt fiscal rules? This paper seeks to identify sensible fiscal policy rules that can succeed, if chosen by a member country, as an alternative to descretionary fiscal rules

This paper analyzes German and Spanish fiscal policy using simple policy rules. We choose Germany and Spain, as both are Member States in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and underwent considerable increases in public debt in the early 1990s. We focus on the question, how fiscal policy behaves under rising public debt ratios. It is found that both Germany and Spain generally exhibit a positive relationship between government revenues and debt. Using Markov-switching techniques, we show that both countries underwent a change in policy behavior in the light of rising debt/output ratios at the end of the 1990s. Interestingly, this change in policy behavior differs in its characteristics across the two countries and seems to be non-permanent in the case of Germany.

This paper analyzes German and Spanish fiscal policy using simple policy rules. We choose Germany and Spain, as both are Member States in the European Monetary Union (EMU) and underwent considerable increases in public debt in the early 1990s.We focus on the question, how fiscal policy behaves under rising public debt ratios. It is found that both Germany and Spain generally exhibit a positive relationship between government revenues and debt. Using Markov-switching techniques, we show that both countries underwent a change in policy behavior in the light of rising debt/output ratios at the end of the 1990s. Interestingly, this change in policy behavior differs in its characteristics across the two countries and seems to be non-permanent in the case of Germany.

Using an optimisation-based model with endogenous labour supply and a proportional tax rate, we compare the stabilising properties of different fiscal policy rules.The economy is affected by shocks from both government spending and technology.The fiscal policy rule can be based on government liabilities or the government budget deficit.As both are given as measures of fiscal policy performance in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), we also use a fiscal policy rule based on the combination of the two.We compare the accounting definition of deficit with the economic definition which takes inflation into account.The fiscal policy rule based on debt, with monetary policy consistent with the Taylor principle, results in an unstable solution.However, a fiscal policy rule based on deficit produces stable solutions with a wide range of fiscal policy parameters.Moreover, we find that putting more weight on the deficit than the debt in the fiscal policy rule creates less cyclical responses to shocks.Finally we find out that the SGP definition of deficit performs as well as the real deficit based on the government budget constraint.

In this paper, we analyze the impact fiscal policy rules have on budget deficits and forecasting biases in official budget outlooks. Persistent budget deficits and over-optimistic budget forecasts have been observed in many countries in the past, especially in the euro area. To prevent such developments from happening in the future, fiscal rules have been revised or implemented with the aim to strengthen both preventive (ex-ante) and corrective (ex-post) elements of fiscal rules frameworks. Do such ex-ante and ex-post rules differ in their effects? In an attempt to answer this question, we build a two-period model and distinguish between ex-ante rules that apply to budget forecasts and ex-post rules that apply to realized budget deficits. Our model indicates that effectively enforced ex-post rules are more effective than ex-ante rules at reducing budget deficits. Interestingly, ex-ante rules differ from ex-post rules in their effects on forecasting biases. Only ex-post sanctions reduce forecasting biases, while ex-ante rules have no impact on such biases. In addition, we show that political stability and the size of government increase the effectiveness of fiscal rules. If, however, financial markets have a disciplining effect on governments, the effectiveness of fiscal rules is reduced. Our results imply that if fiscal policy rules cannot be effectively enforced, reforming other areas such as electoral rules or financial market regulations might be a more promising approach to ensuring sound public finances than fiscal policy rules.

Theory suggests that government should as far as possible smooth taxes and its recurrent consumption spending, which means that government debts should act as a shock absorber, and any planned adjustments in debt should be gradual. This suggests that operational targets for governments (e.g. for 5 years ahead should involve deficits rather than debt, because such rules will be more robust to shocks. Beyond that, fiscal rules need to reflect the constraints on monetary policy, and the extent to which governments are subject to deficit bias. Fiscal rules for countries in a monetary union or fixed exchange rate regime need to include a strong countercyclical element. Fiscal rule should also contain a 'knock out' if interest rates hit the zero lower bound: in that case the fiscal and monetary authorities should cooperate to formulate a fiscal expansion package that allows interest rates to rise above this bound. In more normal times, the design of fiscal policy rules is likely to depend on the extent to which governments are subject to deficit bias, and the effectiveness of any national fiscal council. For example, governments that had not shown a history of deficit bias could aim to target deficits five years ahead (rolling targets), and these would not require cyclical adjustment. In contrast, governments that were more prone to bias could target a cyclically adjusted deficit at the end of their expected period of office. In both cases fiscal councils would have an important role to play, in ensuring plans were implemented in the first case and allowing for departures from target when exernal shocks occurrred in the second.

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) can be characterised as a complicated set of legislation and institutions governing monetary and fiscal responsibilities.The measures of fiscal responsibility are to be guided by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which sets rules for fiscal policy and makes a discretionary fiscal policy virtually impossible.To analyse the effects of the fiscal and monetary policy mix, we modified the New Keynesian framework to allow for supply effects of fiscal policy.We show that defining a supply-side channel for fiscal policy using an endogenous output gap changes the stabilising properties of monetary policy rules. The stability conditions are affected by fiscal policy, so that the dichotomy between active (passive) monetary policy and passive (active) fiscal policy as stabilising regimes does not hold, and it is possible to have an active monetary - active fiscal policy regime consistent with stability of the economy.We show that, if we take supply-side effects into account, we get more persistent inflation and output reactions.We also show that the dichotomy does not hold for a variety of different fiscal policy rules based on government debt and budget deficit, using the tax smoothing hypothesis and formulating the tax rules as difference equations. The debt rule with active monetary policy results in indeterminacy, while the deficit rule produces a determinate solution with active monetary policy, even with active fiscal policy.The combination of fiscal requirements in a rule results in cyclical responses to shocks.The amplitude of the cycle is larger with more weight on debt than on deficit.Combining optimised monetary policy with fiscal policy rules means that, under a discretionary monetary policy, the fiscal policy regime affects the size of the inflation bias.We also show that commitment to an optimal monetary policy not only corrects the inflation bias but also increases the persistence of output reactions.With fiscal policy rules based on the deficit we can retain the tax smoothing hypothesis also in a sticky price model.

Theory suggests that government should smooth taxes and spending, and adjustments in the level of debt should be gradual. Fiscal rules should therefore relate to deficits rather than debt. Rules should also reflect constraints on monetary policy. In normal times, rules should reflect political and institutional considerations, such as the potential for 'deficit bias', and the effectiveness of any fiscal council. For example, governments without a history of bias might target deficits five years ahead. However, if interest rates hit the zero lower bound, fiscal and monetary policy coordination is required, and here fiscal councils can also have an important role.