Suchergebnisse

U prilogu je donesen prijepis 12 tjednih političkih izvještaja koje je Konzulat Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH) tijekom 1942. godine slao Ministarstvu vanjskih poslova NDH u Zagrebu, odnosno ministru vanjskih poslova dr. Mladenu Lorkoviću. Usto je donesen prijepis dijela jednog tjednog izvještaja Odsjeka za Italiju Političko-pravnog odjela Ministarstva vanjskih poslova NDH iz rujna 1941. koji se odnosi na otvaranje Konzulata NDH u Ljubljani. Spomenuti izvori, iako fragmentarni, daju niz podataka o ratnim događajima u Ljubljanskoj pokrajini, koju je Kraljevina Italija uspostavila kada je, nakon sloma Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941., anektirala dio slovenskog teritorija ; The paper contains the transcription of 12 weekly political reports of the Consulate of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) in Ljubljana from 1942 sent to the NDH's Ministry of foreign affairs in Zagreb, more precisely to the minister of foreign affairs Mladen Lorković. The paper also contains the transcript of a weekly report of the Detachment for Italy of the Political-legal department of the NDH's Ministry of foreign affairs from September 1941 dealing with the establishment of NDH's Consulate in Ljubljana. Transcripts of these documents, although fragmentary, give a whole variety of information dealing with the events in the Ljubljana province. Kingdom of Italy established the Ljubljana province on the Slovenian territory annexed by Italy after the Axis attack on Kingdom of Italy in April 1941.

Ova analiza vanjske politike socijalističke Jugoslavije, a posebno razdoblja vladavine Josipa Broza Tita, prvo je politološko razmatranje te teme nasuprot većini studija koja se njome bave iz historiografske perspektive. U prvom dijelu članka prikazani su glavni elementi analize vanjske politike, pri čemu se autor usredotočuje na odnos aktera i struktura kao jedan njezin element. U drugom dijelu prikazane su teorijske i metodološke postavke na kojima se zasniva analiza vanjske politike socijalističke Jugoslavije. Autor zaključuje da je proces odlučivanja o vanjskoj politici Jugoslavije evoluirao od 1945. do 1980. tako što je Tito, kao glavni donositelj odluka, sve više morao voditi računa o strukturi i raznim akterima unutar nje. Očita je bila sve veća pluralizacija procesa odlučivanja, kako na horizontalnoj razini, u interakciji Saveznog sekretarijata za inozemne poslove, partijskog vrha i Titova kabineta, tako i na vertikalnoj osi, kroz utjecaj republika i pokrajina na odlučivanje na saveznoj razini. Iako je ostao glavni donositelj odluka, Titovu su moć s vremenom znatno ograničili utjecaji drugih aktera, osobito otkako je sedamdesetih godina Predsjedništvo SFRJ dobilo mnoge ovlasti. ; Unlike the great majority of analyses that have taken the historiographic perspective, this study of socialist Yugoslavia's foreign policy, focusing on the Josip Broz Tito era, is the first of its kind to provide a perspective of political science. The first section of this article provides an overview of the main elements of foreign policy analysis, whereby the author focuses on the relationship between the actors and the structures as one of its inherent elements. The second section offers insight into the theoretical and methodological tenets on which the analysis of socijalist Yugoslavia's foreign policy resides. The author argues that the foreign-policy decision-making process in Yugoslavia evolved between 1945 and 1980 as Tito, the chief decision-maker, increasingly had to take into account the structure and the multiple actors within that structure. Evidently, the decision-making processes were becoming more and more pluralized both horizontally, in the interaction between the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, party leadership and Tito's cabinet, and vertically – as seen from the influence the republics and provinces hadon federal decision-making. Though he remained the chief decision-maker, with time Tito's power became limited by other actors' influence, in particular after the Presidency of Yugoslavia was given extensive authority in the 1970s.

Historian T. Jakovina spoke with the diplomat and ambassador Cvijeto Job. Job took part in the Second World War on the side of the Partisan movement, when he became a member of the Communist Party. The first diplomatic assignments of Cvijeto Job were in Oslo and London. Already in 1950 he is a member of the Yugoslavian diplomatic mission to the United Nations in New York. From 1962 to 1968 he is an advisor to the press in the Yugoslavian embassy in Washington. Following that he returns to Yugoslavia as chief of the Department for the United States of America and Canada in the Federal Secretariat for foreign affairs, and from 1971 to 1976 he is advisor to the Security Council for the Yugoslavian mission at the UN and the deputy ambassador. From 1980 to 1984 he was named the Yugoslavian ambassador to Cyprus. He was retired in 1989, until which time he had served as chief of the Group for planning politics (GZZP) in the Federal Secretariat for foreign affairs (SSIP). He left Yugoslavia in 1991 to reside in the United States. He was an associate of the United States Institute of Peace, and now he is an associate of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington.

Autor iznosi ključne postupke diplomacije Nezavisne Države Hrvatske: od ustrojstva ministarstva vanjskih poslova u travnju 1941. do zadnjih pokušaja spašavanja NDH u svibnju 1945. U članku su prezentirani svi relevantni događaji za diplomaciju NDH s naglaskom na najvažnije aktere u pojedinim diplomatskim akcijama. Navedeni su svi ministri vanjskih poslova koji su bili na čelu ministarstva, njihove diplomatske aktivnosti te razlozi njihove smjene ili ostavke. Članak također daje uvid u krajnju zavisnost ustaškog režima prema fašističkim saveznicama, Njemačkoj i Italiji – obrađujući odnos sa svakom od njih posebno. Učestalo mijenjanje ministara vanjskih poslova i poslanika u najvažnijim državama za NDH izraz je visoke nestabilnosti i podčinjenosti ustaškog režima okupacijskim silama. ; The author presents the key moments of the diplomacy of the Independent State of Croatia: from the organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 1941 to the last attempts to save the Independent State of Croatia in May 1945. The article presents all relevant events for the diplomacy of the Independent State of Croatia with a focus on the most important participant in certain diplomatic actions. The paper lists all foreign ministers who headed the ministry, their diplomatic activities and the reasons for their dismissal or resignation. The article also provides an insight into the utmost dependence of the Ustasha regime on fascist allies, Germany and Italy. processing the relationship with each of them separately. The frequent change of foreign ministers and ambassadors in the most important states for the NDH is an expression of high instability and subordination of the Ustasha regime to the occupying forces.

Članak se bavi korelacijom diplomatske profesije i etičkog ponašanja. Pomoću tri ključna momenta u povijesti diplomatske profesije, autor razmatra mogućnost etičkog djelovanja u okvirima diplomacije i vanjskih poslova. Kao prvi moment se uzima Machiavellijevo pisanje o ulozi poslanika u stranom kraljevstvu kako bi se pojasnilo, a kasnije i usporedilo, njegovo viđenje poslaničkih dužnosti u odnosu na današnje. Nadalje se, pomoću važnih povijesnih događaja i razmišljanja teoretičara, prikazuju i analiziraju moralne dileme u diplomaciji. Završni dio se odnosi na uspostavu Dissent Channela u State Departmentu koji je važan jer je, makar prividno, pružio priliku američkim diplomatima da djeluju prema savjesti. ; The paper is focused on correlation between diplomatic profession and ethical behaviour. Using three main moments in the history of diplomatic profession, the author is considering possibility of ethical behaviour in terms of diplomacy and foreign affairs. The first moment is based on Machiavelli's view on the role of representative in foreign kingdom in order to explain and later to compare his vision with current vision of representative's duties. Further on, using important historic events and thoughts of theorists, paper shows and analyzes moral dillemas in diplomacy. The final part is focused on establishing Dissent Channel in the State Department which is important because it seemingly gave American diplomats opportunity to act according to their consciousness.

Dugo je vremena koncept suvereniteta smatran kamenom temeljcem domaćeg i međunarodnog prava te političke misli. Koncepcija suvereniteta blisko je povezana s koncepcijom države. Bilo je to »normalno« stanje države, u kojem ona ima vrhovnu ili konačnu vlast u unutarnjim političkim i pravnim pitanjima, a svojstvo neovisnosti prema drugim državama. Međunarodnu zajednicu činile su ravnopravne i neovisne države. Danas, na početku 21. stoljeća, koncept suvereniteta izložen je mnogim izazovima, od kojih je najznačajniji proces globalizacije koji je doveo do sve veće međupovezanosti ljudi širom svijeta vidljive na svim poljima: političkim, vojnim, ekonomskim, kulturnim i pravnim. U ovom radu usredotočit ćemo se na pitanje kako globalizacija utječe na državni suverenitet te da ti pregled argumenata korištenih u novijoj literaturi. ; The concept of sovereignty was for a long time considered as one of the cornerstones of national and international law, and of political thought. The concept of sovereignty was closely connected with the concept of the state. It was a »normal« situation of a country where it had supreme or final power in political and legal matters in its domestic affairs, while at the same time it was independent in relation to all other countries. The international community used to consist of equal and independent states. At the beginning of the 21st century, the concept of sovereignty is faced with many challenges, both in theory and in practice. What happens within a country's territory and to its inhabitants is now less a consequence of national politics than the result of international circumstances – the difference between internal and foreign affairs is becoming increasingly vague. Several processes are happening simultaneously: globalisation (the development of information and communication technology; increase in foreign investments, the development of multinational corporations, and strengthening of the international economic and trade organisations' role), the process of European integration, the development of international protection of human rights (the development of cogent rules of international law, humanitarian interventions, the role of transnational non- governmental organisations), and the phenomenon of »failed states«. All the above mentioned has created a need to redefine the concept of sovereignty.

Dugo je vremena koncept suvereniteta smatran kamenom temeljcem domaćeg i međunarodnog prava te političke misli. Koncepcija suvereniteta blisko je povezana s koncepcijom države. Bilo je to »normalno« stanje države, u kojem ona ima vrhovnu ili konačnu vlast u unutarnjim političkim i pravnim pitanjima, a svojstvo neovisnosti prema drugim državama. Međunarodnu zajednicu činile su ravnopravne i neovisne države. Danas, na početku 21. stoljeća, koncept suvereniteta izložen je mnogim izazovima, od kojih je najznačajniji proces globalizacije koji je doveo do sve veće međupovezanos- ti ljudi širom svijeta vidljive na svim poljima: političkim, vojnim, ekonomskim, kulturnim i pravnim. U ovom radu usredotočit ćemo se na pitanje kako globalizacija utječe na državni suverenitet te dati pregled argumenata korištenih u novijoj literaturi. ; The concept of sovereignty was for a long time considered as one of the corner- stones of national and international law, and of political thought. The concept of sovereignty was closely connected with the concept of the state. It was a »normal« situation of a country where it had supreme or final power in political and legal matters in its domestic affairs, while at the same time it was independent in relation to all other countries. The international community used to consist of equal and independent States. At the beginning of the 21st Century, the concept of sovereignty is faced with many challenges, both in theory and in practice. What happens within a country's territory and to its inhabitants is now less a consequence of national politics than the result of international circumstances - the difference between internal and foreign affairs is becoming increasingly vague. Several processes are happening simultaneously: globalisation (the development of information and communication technology; increase in foreign Investments, the development of multinational corporations, and strengthening of the international economic and trade organisations' role), the process of European integration, the development of international protection of human rights (the development of cogent rules of international law, humanitarian interventions, the role of transnational non/governmental organisations), and the phenomenon of »failed States«. All the above mentioned has created a need to redefine the concept of sovereignty.

Iz teksta: ''Knjiga The Border Dispute Between Croatia and Slovenia: The Stages of a Protracted Conflict and Its Implications for EU Enlargement (u prijevodu Granični spor između Hrvatske i Slovenije: faze dugotrajnog sukoba i njihov odraz na proširenje Europske unije) autora dr. sc. Thomasa Bickla objavljena je 2020. godine na engleskom jeziku u izdanju nakladničke kuće Springer. Knjiga predstavlja autorovu doktorsku disertaciju obranjenu 2019. godine pri Fakultetu društvenih znanosti Sveučilišta Duisburg-Essen u Njemačkoj pod vodstvom mentora prof. dr. sc. Susanne Pickel i prof. dr. sc. Michaela Kaedinga. Autorovo su područje zanimanja političke znanosti i međunarodno pravo, posebice sukobi i europske integracije u razdoblju nakon raspada Jugoslavije. Bavi se proučavanjem teritorijalnih i drugih otvorenih bilateralnih pitanja među državama na području bivše Jugoslavije. Predmet je ove knjige granični spor na kopnu i moru između Hrvatske i Slovenije [.] '' ; From the text: ''This book in its six chapters and four appendices deals with the unresolved legal matter between the two countries related to the land and sea border. The two main sources of data used for the author's research are interviews and documents. The author held 76 interviews with stakeholders directly involved in the various phases of resolving the border dispute: prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, civil servants, scholars, and many others. In particular, the interview with our esteemed Professor Emeritus Vladimir-Đuro Degan should be mentioned. The author analyses relevant public documents together with drafts and undisclosed documents, such as drafts of the arbitration agreement.'' [.]

U radu se prikazuju rezultati istraživanja ustroja i djelovanja Izvršnog vijeća Sabora SRH u ustavnom razdoblju 1963-1974. Rad Izvršnog vijeća prati se kroz četiri mandatna razdoblja: četvrto 27. lipnja 1963.-11. svibnja 1967, peto 11. svibnja 1967.-9. svibnja 1969, šesto 9. svibnja 1969.-7. siječnja 1972. te sedmo 7. siječnja 1972.-8. svibnja 1974. Rezultati istraživanja temelje se na analizi arhivskog gradiva fondova Izvršno vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990. i Sabor SRH 1945-1982. u Hrvatskom državnom arhivu, te propisa i drugih akata objavljenih u službenim listovima. U radu se donosi sistematizirani pregled svih članova po mandatnim razdobljima, pregled propisima definirane nadležnosti i unutarnjeg ustroja te analiza obilježja i rezultata rada Izvršnog vijeća u promatranom razdoblju. ; The article presents Executive Council of Parliament of Socialist Republic of Croatia (1963-1974), as one of the central governing institutions, with special interest in its organization, functions and activity. The first chapter gives an overview of the provisions about constitution and procedure of members' election. Four mandate periods were established within which the activity of the Executive Council should be monitored: The fourth mandate from 27th June 1963 till 11th May 1967, the fifth mandate from 11th May 1967 till 9th May 1969, the sixth mandate from 9th May 1969 till 7th January 1972 and the seventh mandate from 7th January 1972 till 8th May 1974. The same chapter brings the list of all members organized according to mandates. The second chapter gives an overview of the functions defined in regulations. The next chapter gives an analysis of its organization, divided in four parts: guidance of Executive Council, working bodies (boards, commissions, workgroups), councils and committees, and administrative and professional service. The last chapter gives an analysis of the activity of Executive Council. It is concluded that the most of the activity concerns the discussion of questions related to economy and finances, organization of central Republic's institutions, republican and regional (local) governing bodies, as well as system of justice, security and home affairs. As well, follow questions related to education, science and culture, health care system and social policy, labour relations, foreign affairs and international relations.

Ideja o nastanku jedne zajednice koja bi obuhvatila Europu seže daleko u prošlost, ali tek 1950. godine nastaju prvi koraci ka stvaranju Europske unije. Velika razaranja u ratovima nametnula su razmišljanja o tome kako nadići antagonizme među europskim državama. Nakon Drugog svjetskog rata, europske države shvaćaju da imaju zajedničke probleme i odlučuju se dobrovoljno udružiti u zajednicu kako bi stvorile bolju budućnost za nadolazeće generacije. Tako nastaje Europska zajednica za ugljen i čelik, koja se kasnije udružuje s Europskom ekonomskom zajednicom i Europskom zajednicom za atomsku energiju te se od 1993. godine formalno formira Europska unija pod tim nazivom. Sadrži veliki broj članica koje se povećavaju iz dana u dan. Osnovni cilj rada jest prikazati kakva je to zapravo bila ideja o osnivanju zajednica koje bi ujedinile Europu, kako je nastala Europska zajednica te kako se razvijala, prikazati ciljeve EU-a, kakve je promjene donijela u Europi te je li ispunila svoj prvobitni i najznačajniji cilj, a to je ujedinjenje Europe. ; The European Union represents the most significant segment of the European integration. The idea about its formation and the formation itself have a long history. In 1950, the French Foreign Minister – Robert Schuman, motivated by the need of establishing peace, presented a project as the beginning of the European federalization process or more clearly as the first step towards the European Federation. Under this influence, in 1952¸ European Coal and Steel Community was established. In the upcoming years, two more communities were founded – European Economic Community and European Community for Atomic Energy. The result of the cooperation and integration of these two communities is the European Union. Formally, it is established on the 1st of November, 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty. European Union is the result of a discussion on building the everlasting peace in this region. It was created as a consequence of fear from the internal and foreign threats to the safety of Europe. The main goals of the European integrations are: encouraging the balanced and tenable economic development; to confirm its identity on the international scene, especially by spreading common foreign and secure politics; to strengthen the protection of rights and interests of the citizens of its members by the introduction of the rights of Union citizenship; to develop a close cooperation in the field of judiciary and internal affairs. Political activities of the European Union can be seen in different spheres – from the health care and economics to the foreign affairs and defence politics. Depending on the development of every country individually, the organization of the European Union differs on different fields. European Union, as the organization that unites Europe and that represents an important segment in development of the international cooperation and the peacekeeping, has become a subject of a study and research of the international historiography. Today, the establishment and development of the European Union are being studied greatly, but also is a question whether it shows some indications of its disruption and disadvantages that could be the reasons of the EU falling apart. Therefore, thanks to many authors, a lot of work exists that talks about this. Is EU going to fall apart in the future - remains the question for which we will be able to find an answer only in days ahead of us.

U radu se na temelju arhivskih izvora, stručne literature i onovremenoga tiska analizira povratak jugoslavenskih iseljenika iz Argentine i ostalih dijelova Južne Amerike u prvim godinama nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata. Prati se priprema, organizacija, brojnost, transport, dolazak, smještaj i razmještaj iseljenika u domovini. Analizira se i stručna, nacionalna i spolna pripadnost iseljenika povratnika. Posebna pozornost posvećena je odnosima dviju država, Jugoslavije i Argentine, u ovom pitanju. ; Diplomatic, consular and economic relations between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Argentina were established on 16 September 1946. The agreement was signed by General Ljubo Ilić, chief of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in South America, and Juan Atilion Bramuglia, Argentinian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Religion. In the first decade after World War II, the two states had some open problems and unresolved issues such as the question of commercial agreements, Yugoslav political emigration in Argentina, especially the Ustasha movement, Argentine nationalised property in Yugoslavia, visas for entering Argentina etc. Following World War II, Argentina became the country with the most emigrants of Yugoslav origin in the entire Latin America. The major part of those were Croats and Slovenes, while emigrants from Montenegro and Serbia made up a smaller proportion. The issue of Yugoslav immigrants in Argentina was of the greatest importance in the relations between two countries. In the late 1940s, the interests of Yugoslavia and Argentina in this matter were opposed. Both sides wanted to use a qualified work force for building their own country. Yugoslavia tried to recruit immigrants to come back and take part in fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan established in 1947. Argentina on the other hand, wanted to keep able-bodied people for building its own industry. The Yugoslav government sent ships for immigrants and organised housing and jobs for them upon their return. The majority of them were construction, agriculture, and textile workers. The peak of the repatriation was 1948, when 83% of Yugoslav immigrants returned from Argentina. There was another problem, and that was the different treatment of immigrants with dual citizenship, which especially referred to the children of Yugoslav immigrants who were born on Argentine soil. According the law, they were Argentine citizens, but Yugoslav authorities still thought of them as their own. According to official data, of all the people to return in Yugoslavia in the 1946–51 period, a total of 1,748 arrived from Argentina, which was 10.84% of the total number of returning Yugoslav citizens. Only France was ahead of Argentina in this period in terms of numbers of returns, with 3,914, while Canada was behind, with 1,727.

Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.

Ovaj rad ispituje hipotezu prema kojoj je vanjsko djelovanje EU (koje prema Lisabonskom ugovoru kao važećem ugovornom okviru EU objedinjuje vanjske odnose EU kao zbirni naziv za eksternalizirane unutarnje politike EU i vanjsku politiku EU) neuspješno na Mediteranu zbog nekonzistentnosti u vanjskopolitičkom procesu, i zbog nekoherentnosti u sadržaju/ciljevima triju mediteranskih politika EU (Euro-mediteransko partnerstvo - EMP, Europska susjedska politika – ENP i Unija za Mediteran - UFM). U tom smislu prvi cilj disertacije je pokazati razloge neuspjeha vanjskog djelovanja EU spram mediteranske regije, a drugi je ukazati na šire implikacije tog neuspjeha za ambicije EU kao globalnog aktera. Korištene istraživačke metode analiza sadržaja primarnih i tercijarnih izvora podataka u kombinaciji sa diskurzivnom analizom primarnih i sekundarnih izvora, potvrdile su sljedeće. Vanjsko djelovanje EU spram mediteranske regije je neuspješno kroz sve tri faze vanjskopolitičkog procesa. (1) U fazi formuliranja mediteranskih politika zbog neusklađenosti/nekonzistentnosti između institucija EU (Europskog vijeća i Europske komisije) u definiranju mediteranske regije kao strukturnog konteksta mediteranskih politika EU, svrhe EMP-a i prioriteta EMP-a i ENP-a. (2) U fazi odlučivanja/usvajanja mediteranskih politika EU zbog nekompatibilnost/nekoherentnost ciljeva vanjske politike EU i većeg broja eksternaliziranih unutarnjih politika EU između EMP, ENP i UFM, pri čemu je najveća nekoherentnost postojala u razdoblju od 2004.-2008. između EMP i ENP po pitanju vanjske politike, JHA, trgovine i energetike, a od 2009. stanje se između trenutno aktivnih ENP i UFM nije bitno promijenilo jer su ostale nekoherentne vanjska politika, JHA i energetika, dok trgovinska politika nije sastavni dio UFM-a. (3) U fazi implementiranja mediteranskih politika EU zbog neusklađenosti/nekonzistentnosti u bilateralnoj implementaciji multilateralnih instrumenata mediteranskih politika EU na vanjskopolitičkom području i u JHA od strane južno-mediteranskih partnera unatoč činjenici da su ove instrumente zajednički usvojili sa državama članicama EU. Nekonzistentnost u vanjskopolitičkom procesu i nekoherentnost u sadržaju/ciljevima između triju mediteranskih politika EU slabe mogućnosti EU (shvaćene kao sposobnost formuliranja, usvajanja i implementiranja politika). Ove mogućnosti zajedno sa neiskorištenim prilikama (shvaćenima kao prilike za suradnju EU kako sa južno-mediteranskim partnerima kroz uzimanje u obzir i njihovih interesa, te sa drugim regionalizirajućim akterima koji jednako kao EU djeluju u mediteranskoj regiji) kao dva analizirana elementa akterstva EU, pokazuju da je EU tek (regionalni) akter u nastajanju i da još uvijek ne može bez problema koji proizlaze iz njezine kompleksne prirode pretendirati na ulogu vanjskopolitičkog aktera u globalnim razmjerima. ; This paper examines the hypothesis that EU external action (which, according to the Lisbon Treaty as the relevant EU framework agreement, encompasses EU external relations as a collective term for externalized EU internal policies and EU foreign policy) has been unsuccessful in the Mediterranean region due to the inconsistency of the foreign policy process and incoherence of the aims of three EU Mediterranean policies (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership–EMP, European Neighborhood Policy–ENP, and Union for the Mediterranean–UFM). In that context, the first objective of this dissertation is to provide the reasons as to why the EU external action has failed in the Mediterranean region. Secondly, it will point at the wider implications of this failure in terms of EU aspirations to be a global actor. Research methods used in empirical analysis that included content analysis of primary and tertiary sources, combined with discourse analysis of primary and secondary sources, has resulted in the following. EU external action in the Mediterranean region has been unsuccessful in all three stages of the foreign policy process. (1) In the stage of formulating Mediterranean policies due to inconsistency between EU institutions in defining the Mediterranean region as a structural context of EU Mediterranean policies, EMP's purpose and EMP's and ENP's priorities. (2) In the decision making stage of EU Mediterranean policies due to the incoherence of aims of EU's foreign policy and many EU's externalized internal policies between EMP, ENP and UFM, whereby this incoherence was most prominent between 2004-2008 regarding foreign policy issues, JHA, trade and energy between EMP and ENP. Since 2009, the situation concerning the currently effective ENP and UFM has not changed significantly, since foreign policy, JHA and energy policy have remained incoherent, while trade policy is not part of the UFM. (3) In the implementation stage of EU Mediterranean policies due to the inconsistency in bilateral implementation of multilateral instruments of EU Mediterranean policies in the foreign policy field, and in the JHA from the side of south-Mediterranean partners, despite the fact that they have adopted these instruments jointly with EU Member States. Inconsistency of the foreign policy process and incoherence of the aims between the three EU Mediterranean policies are weakening the EU capabilities (the ability to formulate, adopt and implement policies). These together with unutilized opportunities (for cooperation with south Mediterranean partners through taking into consideration their interests, and interests of other regionalization actors in the Mediterranean region) as the two analyzed elements of EU actorness, are demonstrating that the EU is still an emerging (regional) actor that is yet unable to assume the role of a foreign policy actor on a global level due to its complex nature.

Europska unija se politizaciji svoje plinske trgovine s Ruskom Federacijom u 21. stoljeću prilagođava hibridnim modelom, koji je mješavina različitih mjera. Kako bi spriječila ili barem ublažila rusko korištenje te trgovine u realističkoj politici moći, odgovara mjerama koje se sve više udaljuju od ekonomske, osobito slobodnotržišne, i približavaju političkoj perspektivi, jer je unošenje političkog elementa u vanjskotrgovinski odnos tražilo netržišne odgovore. Na temelju analize odgovora Europske unije na prijetnju čije je ishodište u ruskoj politizaciji plinske trgovine moguće je pratiti postupnu transformaciju liberalno- ekonomskog identiteta Europske unije u sve više geopolitički u svijetu koji postaje sve realističniji kako u energetskim pitanjima konkretno tako i u međunarodnim poslovima općenito. Europska unija je u svoju energetsku politiku uvrstila koncepte solidarnosti i suvereniteta, a visoki predstavnik za zajedničku vanjsku i sigurnosnu politiku Europske unije traži od nje da "ponovno nauči jezik moći". ; In the 21st century the European Union is adapting to the politicization of its gas trade with the Russian Federation with a hybrid model: a mixture of different measures. In order to prevent, or at least to mitigate, Russian use of gas trade in a realistic power politics, the EU is responding with measures which are digressing from the economic perspective, especially free-market one, and getting closer to the political perspective. Non-market responses have become unavoidable primarily due to bringing the political element into a foreign trade relationship. Based on the analysis of the EU's responses to the threat, which has originated from the Russian politicization of gas trade, it is possible to follow the incremental transformation of the EU liberal-economic identity into an increasingly geopolitical one in a world that is becoming increasingly realistic, both in the energy field and in international affairs in general. The European Union has included concepts of solidarity and sovereignty in its energy policy, yet according to the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU has to "learn to use the language of power again".

The Belt and Road Initiative proclaimed by President Xi in 2013, a strategy developed by the Chinese government, is very important to China but is not confined to China. In order for the initiative to be successful it needs to be embraced by the countries on the terrestrial and maritime route indicated in the plan. In the late 1980s Deng Xiaoping proposed to integrate Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi,中国特色社国主国) into global capitalism and in the 1990s the Jiang Zemin leadership initiated the Going out policy (Zouchuqu Zhanlue, 走出去国略) – the current Belt and Road Initiative is China's continuation in implementing those policies into actual deeds. China's accession to WTO in 2001 marked China's full integration into the global economy and since then the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become the largest trading partner for more than 180 countries. The Xi-Li administration has been extremely proactive since it was established in 2012; from that year on, Chinese behavior in international affairs has gained an ever-growing role as a forger of economic and diplomatic ties between countries. The primary example of this behavior is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As every serious foreign policy plan, the BRI is an accumulation of various other initiatives. For example, the cooperation mechanism "16+1", with which the PRC has approached Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), can be integrated under the BRI. This paper analizes the "16+1" China-CEEC cooperation mechanism in the context of the bigger BRI initiative, and tries to comprehend the economic and political factors intertwined with its implementation. ; The Belt and Road Initiative proclaimed by President Xi in 2013, a strategy developed by the Chinese government, is very important to China but is not confined to China. In order for the initiative to be successful it needs to be embraced by the countries on the terrestrial and maritime route indicated in the plan. In the late 1980s Deng Xiaoping proposed to integrate Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi,中国特色社国主国) into global capitalism and in the 1990s the Jiang Zemin leadership initiated the Going out policy (Zouchuqu Zhanlue, 走出去国略) – the current Belt and Road Initiative is China's continuation in implementing those policies into actual deeds. China's accession to WTO in 2001 marked China's full integration into the global economy and since then the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become the largest trading partner for more than 180 countries. The Xi-Li administration has been extremely proactive since it was established in 2012; from that year on, Chinese behavior in international affairs has gained an ever-growing role as a forger of economic and diplomatic ties between countries. The primary example of this behavior is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As every serious foreign policy plan, the BRI is an accumulation of various other initiatives. For example, the cooperation mechanism "16+1", with which the PRC has approached Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), can be integrated under the BRI. This paper analizes the "16+1" China-CEEC cooperation mechanism in the context of the bigger BRI initiative, and tries to comprehend the economic and political factors intertwined with its implementation.