Notions of the power associated with the European Union's foreign policy and its role in international relations are mostly liberal in origin. This explains the EU's special role in the Cold War era and that it has since emerged more as a moral, ethical and normative power. The EU's lack of military capability has probably been the main cause that prevents it from acting as a great or superpower. The distinction between materialistic and immaterial elements of power has been a crucial point of contention between realists and liberal thinkers. In international relations, we are also witnessing the trend of the EU increasingly using the geopolitical approach (such as in the Ukrainian crisis) besides the normative one. In the article, different concepts of EU foreign policy regarding power in the light of realism and liberalism are compared where, alongside the descriptive method, a SWOT analysis is performed. Keywords: realism, liberalism, power, European Union, Ukraine, foreign policy, international relations
The war in Ukraine is the most significant threat to the peace of the Euro-Atlantic area in decades. After 4 years of Trump's weakening of transatlantic relations, Biden's presumed foreign policy doctrine includes their quick renewal, or re-Atlantisation. The article problematises the 'new' strategy of containment given Russia's aggression, the state of transatlantic relations, and the current global order's configuration, whereby the transatlantic bond is being strengthened and the formation of Biden's foreign policy doctrine is being followed by a 'grand-strategic' shift. Four different models of transatlantic relations (mutual autonomy, strategic autonomy, strategic partnership, situational partnership) are discussed where variables include the approach taken by the USA to transatlantic relations, and the approach of Europe's EU and NATO members to transatlantic relations are addressed. The main argument is that transatlantic relations during Biden's mandate have constantly oscillated between a stra-tegic partnership, especially related to common goals of democracy promotion and containment and situ-ational partnership. Situations like the war in Ukraine have simultaneously acted to strengthen the American–European partnership based on the shared security and political interests.Keywords: transatlantic relations, reatlantisation, USA, Europe, Biden doctrine, war in Ukraine, strategic part-nership, situational partnership
One of the biggest critiques for the constructivism in international relations discipline is the accusations of abstractiveness and having little substantive to say when talking about world politics. The article asserts that constructivism is not the typical theory of international relations or foreign policy analysis. Constructivism in the discipline is what every constructivist researcher makes of it, using a few fundamental statements about the analysis of social reality. In order to show how the constructivist international relations researchers apply the fundamental principles of the constructivist analysis of social reality to form their models of analysis, firstly, the article explains the metatheoretical assumptions of constructivism and the main problems that emerge trying to apply them in empirical research. Secondly, analysing three fundamental statements of metatheoretical constructivism (on intersubjective construction of meanings, relationship of ideas and materiality, and mutual constitutive relation of structure and agency) it is demonstrated how they are transformed and applied in more particular theoretical and empirical works of international politics. In the end several recommendation are provided on the main principles of constructivist research in international relations. Adapted from the source document.
In 2004 Lithuania implemented its two most important foreign policy goals -- became the member of the European Union & NATO. However, the country will now have to assert its status & position in the Euroatlantic community of liberal democracies. Lithuania faces an arguably more complex agenda, which has no clear end-goals or deadlines. The security challenges are difficult to identify & predict. The global & European strategic environment is best characterized by an ever-growing uncertainty: the transatlantic relations continue to be tense, Russia, paradoxically, is balancing between perspective of disintegration & re-emerging as an expansionist imperial power, & the European Union is under- going one of the most severe internal crisis in decades. At the same time, the major schools of international relations theory disagree on what to make out of the current world politics. Rationalist, neorealist authors tend to give alarmist, apocalyptic accounts of the future of the nation states if they despise the iron logic of geopolitics, whereas reflectivist, constructivist authors argue that the world is "what we make of it," & thus, can be changed. These two visions of international relations inevitably lead to different policy implications. The paper consists of two parts. In the first part, the authors address the current state of affairs in the two schools of international relations: rationalism (neorealism) & reflectivism (constructivism). In the second part, the authors interchangeably explore & compare the policy options that can be derived from the two different worldviews. The article concludes that international politics for a small state are more complex than either of the schools would suggest. Although the nature of the world politics is increasingly postmodern, a lot of actors still live in a modern world of geopolitics. Lithuanian decision makers will therefore have to "play" in accordance with postmodern rules when possible, but to remember geopolitics if necessary. Grounding their view on theoretical synthesis of constructivist & realist approaches to foreign policy, The authors asserts, that Lithuania's Euroatlantism should overshadow all other interests & problems of the society. The membership in the EU will have far reaching & long term consequences on Lithuanian society -- the same cannot be said about membership in NATO, or relations with the US. Lithuania must internalize the EU as a part of its corporate identity -- Lithuania is a part of Europe's collective identity. Therefore, Lithuanian political elite should cease to consider Europe as an object of Lithuanian foreign policy, rather it should become conscious itself as a subject of European policy contributing to its formation. Adapted from the source document.
The article deals with the fundamentals of Lithuanian foreign policy. It is an attempt to evaluate its understructure, principles, advantages & shortcomings. The article proceeds to exploring a rather strenuous question: are the tensions between Lithuanian & Russia caused solely by the Russian misbehavior as Lithuanian politicians mostly claim or is the Lithuanian foreign policy also to blame. The crucial idea of the "new Lithuanian foreign policy," that of the center or leader of an unnamed & undefined region, presumably of the Eastern Europe or at least a part of it, is put under scrutiny. The author claims that (1) for a small country such a role is utterly unrealistic, (2) attempts to play that role have nothing to do with national interests the foreign policy has serve, (3) playing the chosen role complicates relations both with other EU countries & with Russia. The article ends with the conclusion that the foundation of the Lithuanian foreign policy must be its Western, not Eastern policy. Adapted from the source document.
The article seeks to explore the conception of realism in the discipline of International Relations. First, the works of the founding figures of realism are examined to extract the core set of principles intrinsic to the classical tradition. In the light of these timeless principles a research is done about the changing (mis)conceptions of realism in IR after the Cold War. The findings reveal that the latest 'realist' theories tend to break away from the genuine realistic approach to international politics. The comparison of typical 'realistic' explanations of the US foreign policy after the Cold War uncovers significant theoretical and practical implications of the recent biased thinking in the name of 'realism'. Adapted from the source document.
From the end of the Cold war there is no shortage of academic analyses & political considerations on the possible directions of foreign & security policy of Ukraine. The researches usually stress the strategic location of the country. It is asserted that its foreign & security policy is conditioned not only by domestic (political, socio-economical) factors, but also by the position of the country between "overlapping integrational spaces." Ukraine is influenced by Western "neighborhood" which has extended to the Central Eastern Europe & is manifesting itself through the Eastern policies of the EU & NATO. From the other side, Ukraine is influenced by Russia & structures backed by Russia (Commonwealth of Independent States -- CIS, Common Economical Space -- CES). Thus, Ukraine becomes the special object of contest between East & West. Sometimes this contest creates the stability & cooperation, sometimes -- the conflict. Ukraine tries to use these situations to strengthen its state identity & crystallize the geopolitical functions. Using these insights the article analyses what & how the complex of domestic & external factors influenced the foreign & security policy of Ukraine during the transformation of political regime in 2004-2005 & after the "Orange revolution." It is asserted that Ukraine met the 2004 Presidential elections in very difficult situation: the efforts of the external actors to influence the geopolitical self-determination of the country intensified its domestic problems (fragmentation of the society & the state, crisis of the oligarchic political system etc). During this pressure the strategy of Yushchenko & Timoshenko alliance that relied on the fight with the corrupt political economical system & stressed the orientation to the West was more effective. Although the victory of the alliance created the premises of the pro-Western policy, the integration of Ukraine with the West is still very murky. This integration can create the conflicts with Moscow. Whereas the West is politically not prepared to propose the quicker integration plan. Hence a lot will depend on the capabilities of Kiev to sustain the consolidated Yushchenko-Timoshenko alliance, which won the presidential elections & declared the Western orientation, & to win the parliamentary elections in spring of 2006. The victory would be signal that Ukraine is prepared to continue the liberal reforms & pro-Western foreign policy. The article also proposes the guidelines for Lithuanian foreign policy towards the Ukraine. Adapted from the source document.
The end of the Cold War showed the geostrategical transformation of the world. We could see how relations between great powers became more ethical. The main subject of the analysis is the ethical problems in realization of foreign policy. Nowadays ethical problems became more important when we see so many crises, wars, & attacks of terrorists in different places of all over the world. Especially after September 11,' 2001, international terrorism became the most threatening problem for all states. Thus, states of different geostrategy have to collaborate to reach international security. The article aims to discuss how to administrate international relations due to reach the consensus in more ethical-moral way between states with different geostrategy. The work consists of five parts, in which are discussed various aspects of ethical problems in realization of foreign policy. The analysis of different geostrategical models lets to envisage possibilities of the formation of more common global geostrategical model in the 21st century. Bargains between the greatest powers (G8) attest to the ethical reality of global policy. All states understand that security is a very important condition of reform & progress, which could be reached through the common efforts of all states. Adapted from the source document.
The paper deals with the specific features of the construction of an international identity by the EU & Lithuania. We do this by comparing the narrative of "Normative Power Europe" to that of "Lithuania, the regional center." The term "Normative Power Europe," though in use for some two years, still has no clear-cut place in the studies of European integration. So in the paper we first try to explicate its content by drawing a contrast with the more familiar concept of "civil power." We show that the term is an attempt at a new conceptualization of a problem that has been on the agenda of constructivist international relations studies for some time already, namely, that of the power of ideas in international politics. "Normative Power Europe" is defined as a discursive practice, as a narrative shaping the EU as a unique political institution which, by realizing itself via free exchange of ideas & opinions, is capable of changing the "normalcy" perception in international relations. In the EU political discourse the identity of EU as a normative power is constructed via the contrast of EU/USA politics, with America conceived as Europe's "Other." Next, in analyzing Lithuania's foreign politics in the context of the EU New Neighborhood Policy, we draw the parallels in the narratives made use of in constructing the identities of EU & Lithuania. A brief examination of the narrative "Lithuania, the regional center" shows its similarity to the narrative of "Normative Power Europe." First, the "Normative Power Europe" & the "Lithuania, the regional center" are both discursive constructions of their international identity. Second, both narratives are promoting a normative model, based on similar values & principles. Third, in both narratives regionalization is held a major instrument in spreading the values conducive to the creation of a common identity. Finally, both narratives perceive the common regional identity as a major security guarantee. The conclusion is that the narrative of "Lithuania, the regional center" is merely a nationalist replica of the "Normative Power Europe," with some peculiarities to be explained by differences in historical context & Lithuania's specifics in domestic politics. These are mainly due to Lithuania's attempt at reconciling her nation state identity & the ambitions of an active actor of the EU Common Foreign & Security Policy. Adapted from the source document.
Straipsnyje keliami du tarpusavyje susije klausimai. Pirma, kokia yra Baltijos valstybiu vieta Rusijos saugumo vaizdiniuose. Antra, kaip Balti-jos valstybes susidoroja su neigiamu Rusijos suvokimu. Siame straipsnyje teigiama, kad Rusijos ir triju Baltijos valstybiu abipusio reprezentavimo ir saveikos problemas geriausiai galima suprasti atskleidziant siu valstybiu erdves suvokima, kuris visu pirma formuoja poziuri i artimiausia aplinka, taigi ir savo kaimynus. Sis suvokimas, kylantis ir is istoriniu reprezentaci-ju, pagrindzia ir pateikia issamu, objektyvizuota saves ir 'kito' suvokima. Taigi siekiama parodyti, kaip itemptus ir nepasitikejimo kupinus Rusijos ir triju Baltijos valstybiu santykius veikia susiduriantys ir konfliktuojantys savo vietos tarptautineje politikoje apibudinimai ir is ju kylantys veiksmai. Si ide-ja straipsnyje atskleidziama, pirma, ispletojant teorines prielaidas, kad yra teritorijos, tapatybes ir sienu rysys, ir is to kylancius kaimynystes analizes principus, antra, parodant, kaip Rusija ir trys Baltijos valstybes savo uzsie-nio politika isreiskia, formuluoja ir dar karta itvirtina savo erdvini tapatybini pasaulevaizdi. Isvadose parodoma, kaip skirtingu ir vienas kita neutralizuoti bandanciu pasaulevaizdziu susidurimas formuoja dvisales The article raises two interconnected questions: first, what is the place of three Baltic States in Russia's security image, and second, how Baltic States cope with their own negative perception of Russia. The proposed idea is that the problems of mutual representation and interaction can be understood analysing the conceptualisations of space, which influences the way in which the closest environment, including the neighbours, is approached. This representation, together with historical narratives, formulates and justifies the comprehensive, consistent, and objectivised self and the other. Thus, the goal is to show how the tense relations between Russia and Baltic States, full of mistrust, can be explained as a clash between two conflicting geo-spatial views. This idea is developed, first, by presenting the theoretical assumptions on the relation among territory, identity, and borders and the principles of the neighbourhood analysis, and second, by demonstrating how the spatial representation by Russia and Baltic States is formulated and supported in their spatial identity and foreign policy practices. In the conclusions, the answer is given as to how this clash between the two different and competing understandings is reflected in the bilateral interactions and how these insights allow contributing to the analysis of the foreign policy of the states. Adapted from the source document.
There are three main geopolitical actors whose interests & specific actions may have impact on Ukraine's geopolitical drift towards the East or the West. From such actors Russia must be named first. Yet author of the article is more interested in two others -- the United States & the European Union. Although in the Huntington's scheme they represent supposedly united Western civilization their interests in Ukraine or towards Ukraine are rather different. For the United States Ukraine is quite an important country, especially for security reasons. Those reasons are related both to containment of Russia -- the USA seeks to contain not only enemies but partners as well -- and to the implementation of national security strategy which treats the Wider Middle East as likely the most important for the USA -- from security point of view -- region of the world. Ukraine borders with this region in which the USA has few reliable partners. Ukraine may became such a partner -- more reliable than Turkey. From the first view the EU is more close to Ukraine than the USA. Yet the EU is more close to Ukraine only from geographical point of view. The EU, especially its core states, so called "old" Europe, treats Ukraine as peripheral country & regards development of closer ties with it as unnecessary or even harmful. One of the many reasons -- Ukraine may become a new Trojan Horse of the USA inside the EU. Different EU countries look at EU neighborhood policy with different eyes. Most of the new members of the EU give priority to the eastern direction but many older -- rather to the southern one. Moreover, for most of the new members Ukraine is more natural candidate for EU membership than Turkey creating much less problems for the European identity of the EU. However, Ukraine's possible accession to EU & NATO will depend not only upon position of the major geopolitical players but on the will of Ukrainians themselves. Ukraine is extremely heterogeneous country. Religious, historical & cultural divides create political ones & at the moment it is not clear which way -- leading towards the East or the West -- the country may choose. In such situation an external encouragement & support is vitally needed -- development of relations with Ukraine must become a priority not only for the USA but for the EU also. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of the article was to explore the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1999 (hereinafter referred to as an A-CFE) & its positive/negative implications for the NATO-Russian relations. The A-CFE, considered to be a cornerstone of the European security paving the way to a greater conventional stability on the continent, has not entered into force for political & geo-strategic reasons. Moreover, A-CFE aims at establishing a stable & balanced overall level of conventional armed forces between NATO & Russia in Europe, thus solving NATO enlargement & security dilemmas, the bone of contention between NATO & Russia. The main question the article dealt with was whether the A-CFE could stabilize NATO-Russian relations in the anarchical international system facing the dynamics of balance of power. The article focused on analyzing conventional arms control influence on NATO-Russian interaction; a heavy emphasis was placed on A-CFE functionality to solve security dilemma problems in light of NATO enlargement, hypothetical NATO-Russian conflict, & NATO-Russian level of conventional armed forces in Europe. What's more, a concrete case -- the Baltic States possible membership in A-CFE & its influence on NATO-Russian relations has been analyzed in the context of military power disparities & geo-strategic position of the Eastern Baltic sub-region. Having analyzed it accordingly, the following conclusion has been made: A-CFE Treaty of actual text would not properly stabilize NATO-Russian relations due to the reaction of national units to the on-going redistribution of military power & the dynamic of military balance. If not revised, A-CFE will amount to a "sunset Treaty" while remaining an instrument of political process. This assumption emerges from the following factors: 1. A-CFE has asymmetrically imposed the ceilings of conventional arms in favor of Russia, reducing U.S. Army quota in Europe & setting strict limits on keeping foreign military forces on a permanent basis; new NATO members are obliged not to increase the ceilings whereas Russia's limits rise to the Flanks. 2. Asymmetrical distribution of power imposed by A-CFE has decreased NATO operational capabilities to respond to Russian offensive/defensive attacks. NATO forces have been reduced in NATO-Russian border sub-regions, which might become a conflict zone. 3. The first wave of NATO enlargement was set in a frame of arms control thus solving the security dilemma of Russia, whereas the second wave diverted the distribution of power & required a new response from arms control. With the second wave including the Baltic States, NATO has significantly improved its geo-strategic positions as a result of the possibility of establishing an offensive front against Russia from the Baltic States in which conventional arms control does not apply. 4. The Baltic States' membership in the A-CFE has had implications for its own national security could be evaluated from perspectives of defensive & offensive realism. In the world of the offensive realism, the Baltic States should avoid entering the A-CFE with low ceilings, as Russia proposed, which would diminish Baltic States' national security. On the other hand, the Baltic States are supposed to evaluate a negative effect of the security dilemma, according to defensive realists. Large & flexible ceilings the Baltics may negatively affect Russian security & it could start increasing the weapons. The Baltic States would lose the arms race with Russia due to the lack of economic recourses. 5. The research suggests two ways to revise the A-CFE to solve the security dilemma of both Russia & the Baltic States: (1) to set ceilings for the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region (at the present time, Russia's commitments in Kaliningrad & Pskov are the political ones); (2) to add the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region to Central European stability zone using the formula national ceilings = territorial ceiling. 5 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.
