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The notion that foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) are complementary sources of capital is conventional among governments and international cooperation agencies. This paper argues that the notion is incomplete. Within the framework of an open economy Solow model we show that the theoretical relationship between foreign aid and FDI is indeterminate. Aid may raise the marginal productivity of capital by financing complementary inputs, such as public infrastructure projects and human capital investment. However, aid may also crowd out productive private investments if it comes in the shape of physical capital transfers. We therefore turn to an empirical analysis of the relationship between FDI and disaggregated aid flows. Our results strongly support the hypotheses that aid invested in complementary inputs draws in foreign capital while aid invested in physical capital crowds out FDI. The combined effect of these two types of aid is small but on average positive

Issues for Oct. 5, 1925-Jan. 29, 1926 called series 1925-26, no. 1-8. ; Some vols. accompanied by supplements. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Absorbed by its Foreign policy bulletin Sept. 1951.

Entrepreneurship is a vital component of economic development through innovation, job creation and efficient allocation of resources. Hence, many governments play a proactive role in facilitating entry of new firms and nourishing an entrepreneurial culture. These objectives became more relevant in recent years since fostering entrepreneurship is viewed as the cure to the global economic slowdown. This thesis addresses an essential but neglected aspect of entrepreneurship development: the impact of capital flows in the form of FDI and foreign aid on domestic firm creation. What is common to FDI and aid is that capital, skills, technological and organizational know-how move across national boundaries, altering the balance of local resources available to prospective entrepreneurs. In Chapter 2, we exploit cross-country and cross-country-industry variation over time in FDI via M&A and entrepreneurship. Results suggest that adverse effects of FDI counterbalance positive spillovers, leaving the net impact on entrepreneurship negative—though it is economically very small—both at the aggregate and industry level. Nascent entrepreneurship is affected the most by FDI, with the size of the negative effect decreasing as new firms advance in age. In the literature, heightened competition ensuing FDI is documented as the main cause of crowding-out of domestic firms. Chapter 3 thus takes a step towards understanding factors governing the FDI-entrepreneurship nexus of which we consider industry competition (concentration) and wages. We find that FDI is positively associated with both elements in Dutch manufacturing industries, which translates into increases and reductions in entry rates, respectively. This suggests that lucrative rents in concentrated markets are accessible to both foreign and domestic firms. Findings also imply that higher industry wages attract would-be entrepreneurs into wage-employment rather than pursuing a career as a new venture owner. Once the channel effects are isolated, there is no direct ...

The assignation of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1984) and Rajiv Gandhi (1991) crushed the International Investors confidence on the unstable Indian economy. The Crises of BOP compelled India to follow the bail out conditions of IMF and to open its closed economy to the entire world, by adopting the policies of liberalization in 1991. Under liberalization the structured economic reforms were initiated in the trade, investment, deregulations, privation, tax reforms etc., these reforms encouraged the competitions and globalization was slowly embraced. The main objective of the then Govt. was to transform the Indian economic system from socialization to capitalization, so as to achieve high economic growth and industrialize the nation for its well being. However, NDA Government slows down the speed of liberalization due to coalition politics and vested political interests, but could not de-regulate the liberalization. Liberalization has changed the scenario of Indian trade and investment as many advantages are explored in these sectors. The impacts of liberalization have been seen in the foreign trade and foreign investment in India in post liberalized periods, as its imports, exports and foreign investments were reported in US$ millions 300609, 182235 and 51167 respectively in the year 2009-10, showing huge advancement from the 1991-92. Indian economy became the second largest growing economy of the world after China. Due to liberalization India reached to 124th rank out of 179th rank of economic freedom index in 2009 under PPP terms. This shows that India is stepping toward complete liberalization. This research paper tries to show the trends and interrelationship between foreign trade foreign investment, Imports Exports and FDI FPI in Post liberalized periods (1992-93 to 2009-10).The role of foreign investment in curving deficit BOT has also highlighted.

The Indian policy literature with respect to the foreign sector has been concerned primarily with issues raised by foreign aid, private foreign investment, trade and exchange rate policies. The political counterpart to such economic analysis has been the appealing notion of ultimate self-reliance; its conflict with the view that foreign aid must continue as long as the income gap between the affluent and the underdeveloped countries is not drastically reduced has not been noticed. Many economists have attributed the prevalence of excess industrial capacity since the Second Plan. India was excessively tied to projects and thus led to creation of more capacity even when the existing capacity was not fully utilized. Although private foreign investment in India, whether gross or net of the outflow of the pre-Independence British investments, has been relatively unimportant in relation to the official capital transfers, it has attracted considerable attention from the economists. Some important factors in the Indian context have made governmental restrictions on the entry of foreign capital into specific areas necessary. The Indian trade regime has worked on the principle of automatic grant of protection to domestic industries, combined with restrictions on domestic entry operated through industrial licensing, monopoly rents accrue to investments in several activities. Hence, there exists a second best case for regulating entry into areas where the monopoly rents are likely to make the returns to foreign capital exceed its social marginal product.

The article deals with the questions connected with indemnification caused by a crime in such countries as Germany, Russia, France, Great Britain, Hungary and Argentina. The author analyses the mechanism of compensation and rehabilitation of victim in criminal-procedural legislation of foreign countries in the view of possible implementation in national legislation.

Abstract: The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of four major donors of foreign aid in the Arab World. Together, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar have made substantial foreign aid contributions, frequently exceeding the United Nations' development assistance target of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI). These generous Arab donors, however, are notorious for their opaque development programs: little is publicly known about their aid activities and allocation preferences. With the establishment of its Office for the Coordination of Foreign Aid, the UAE has made a more tangible effort to increase its transparency than some of its neighbors, but information regarding its aid program is still limited. In this thesis, I will provide an overview of the UAE's aid activity. I will also examine the UAE's foreign aid program as a foreign policy tool, analyzing its adherence to two theoretical justifications for Arab foreign policy: public opinion theory and selectorate theory.

This article examines how Chinese foreign aid interacts with the quality of the host country's governance in shaping Chinese state-owned enterprises' (CSOEs') foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. By analyzing the firm-level greenfield FDI data of CSOEs between 2003 and 2014 and distinguishing between China's official development assistance and less concessional forms of Chinese foreign aid, we reveal two main findings. First, the quality of the host country's governance negatively affects CSOEs' FDI. Second, other official aid and loans from China negatively moderate the relationship between the quality of the host country's governance and FDI by CSOEs. Specifically, the tendency for CSOEs to invest in locations with weak governance increases when their investments are integrated with less concessional forms of Chinese foreign aid in the form of other official flows and loans. Our results are robust to alternative measures of the governance and different methodological approaches. The article challenges the traditional notion of institutional theory which assumes a positive relationship between governance quality and FDI attraction.

by Leung Chui Yuk, Wu Peng. ; Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. ; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 56-59). ; ABSTRACT --- p.ii ; TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii ; LIST OF FIGURES --- p.v ; LIST OF TABLES --- p.vi ; Chapter ; Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 ; Development of Banking System in China --- p.1 ; Highlighted Banking Reform --- p.5 ; History of Foreign Banks in China --- p.6 ; Foreign Banks in Old Days (1845-1955) --- p.6 ; Foreign Banks New Age (1979-Present) --- p.10 ; Chapter II. --- CURRENT STATUS OF FOREIGN BANKS IN CHINA --- p.14 ; Growing Representative Offices and Branches --- p.14 ; Nationality Distribution of Foreign Banks --- p.16 ; City Distribution of Foreign Banks --- p.17 ; Small Asset Scale --- p.19 ; Low Loan and Deposit Balances --- p.23 ; High Loan / Deposit Ratios --- p.24 ; Low Non-performing Loans --- p.26 ; High Return on Assets --- p.28 ; Better Educated Employees --- p.29 ; Chapter III. --- FOREIGN BANK LAWS IN CHINA --- p.31 ; PRC - Foreign-Funded Financial Institutions Regulations --- p.33 ; Major Changes --- p.35 ; Chapter IV. --- STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES OF FOREIGN BANKS --- p.40 ; Strengths --- p.40 ; Weaknesses --- p.42 ; Chapter V. --- CONCLUSION --- p.47 ; Roadblocks Still Exists --- p.47 ; Bigger Becomes Bigger --- p.48 ; Fight for the High-end Corporate Customers --- p.48 ; Target the Rich --- p.49 ; Win Strategic Location --- p.49 ; Branches Too Expensive --- p.50 ; Electronic Banking as Alternative --- p.50 ; M&A as Effective Strategy --- p.51 ; Expansion to Other Financial Sectors --- p.51 ; APPENDIX --- p.53 ; BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.56

Foreign Policy Association D.C. - Foreign Policy in the Coming Campaign

During the 1970s and 1980s, developing countries, skeptical of foreign investment, imposed several barriers on entry of foreign capital. However, the late 1980s and 1990s marked the onset of globalization, which integrated the whole world into a single global economy. The once-conservative developing nations, realizing the multifarious benefits of foreign direct investment (FDI), began encouraging entry of foreign firms, using various incentives, such as tax holidays, production subsidies, cash grants, labor training grants, and import duty exemptions. Gradually, FDI and foreign aid became two very important sources of foreign capital for these capital-constrained economies. This dissertation is focused on studying if there is any kind of relationship between foreign aid and private investment in recipient countries. FDI is a decision made by foreign investors on the basis of profitability of investment, whereas foreign aid is a political decision made by governments of donor countries on the basis of need for financial assistance by developing countries. We model foreign aid as an exogenous factor in allocation of foreign direct investment, along with other variables, to estimate the effect of aid on investment. Among the factors affecting FDI, infrastructure is considered to be an important one, in allocation of funds across developing countries. This dissertation is arranged as follows. In chapter 2, we introduce the term ``socioeconomic'' infrastructure and create an index, by combining several components of infrastructure, using the multivariate technique of principal components. Prior to creating the index, we employ the technique of multiple imputation to deal with missing data. Our measure of socioeconomic infrastructure contains elements of physical infrastructure, such as transportation facilities, telecommunication facilities, consumption demand for energy and electricity, as well as social infrastructure components, such as voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence and terrorism, rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality. In chapter 3, we develop a theoretical model to address the research question: Does foreign aid impede or encourage foreign direct investment in developing nations? Our theory demonstrates that foreign aid used by the recipient country in financing a public input (known as development aid) encourages foreign direct investment. We also empirically address the same issue by modeling foreign aid as a determinant of foreign direct investment, along with a host of other factors, including our computed index of socioeconomic infrastructure. Our analysis shows that public consumption aid (foreign aid used for financing consumption expenses) does crowd out private investment in current account surplus developing countries, whereas development aid crowds in private investment in the presence of sound macroeconomic, political, legal, and administrative machineries. In chapter 4, we build a panel econometric model to explain the factors underlying socioeconomic infrastructure in developing countries. Our results indicate that countries with higher per capita income, a prominently large government, high investment demand, and large government revenue tend to have better infrastructure.

Few issues in global politics are as contentious as foreign aid – how much rich countries should give, in what ways, to whom. For years, it has been a commonplace that U.S. policies are stingy. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) routinely ranks the United States far behind its industrialized peers in official development assistance (ODA), measured as a percentage of gross national income (GNI). An endless parade of critics has implored the government to do more; some suggest that the Bush Administration's support for the Monterrey Consensus, which sets a goal of increasing assistance to 0.7% of GNI, commits it to do more. Against these allegations of miserliness, executive officials and certain sympathetic scholars have begun to argue that the published statistics are misleading because they fail to account for individual and corporate philanthropy. What the OECD misses, this argument runs, is the exceptional extent of Americans' private generosity. What both sides of the debate have missed, this Article proposes, is not the role of the private sector in generating foreign aid but the role of tax expenditures in subsidizing it. Better known as tax breaks or loopholes, tax expenditures are deviations from the normal tax structure "designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class of persons." They take the form of deductions, exemptions, exclusions, deferrals, credits, or preferential rates. Economically, these "expenditures" may be seen as equivalent to direct government outlays: if U.S. taxpayers saved $70 billion last year from, say, the mortgage interest deduction, the government therefore gave a $70 billion (implicit) subsidy to homeownership. Stanley Surrey pioneered the theory of tax expenditures in the late 1960s, and the concept is now widely, though not universally, credited. Since 1974, Congress has required the annual publication of a tax expenditure budget. Although not immediately evident from the budget data, in recent years a growing amount of expenditure has gone toward foreign aid. The reason lies in America's tax treatment of nonprofit organizations. Whenever U.S. charities and foundations spend money overseas – as they have increasingly been doing – some portion of this spending can be attributed to the support they receive from numerous state and federal tax privileges. More controversially, several other domestic tax expenditures, such as the deferral granted to foreign source active business income, might also be seen as providing foreign assistance. Unlike traditional ODA, these tax expenditure funds are privately organized and distributed, yet unlike voluntary transfers they are paid for by the public fisc. This is not private aid; it is privatized aid. The basic, descriptive goal of this Article is to show, in Parts I and II, how nonprofit tax policies have shaped the content of American aid. This analysis implies that the definition of ODA should be revised, as the next Part explains. The broader goal is to begin to connect these insights, in the balance of Part III, with the literatures on tax expenditures and international development – and, in so doing, to illuminate some attractive and unattractive features of using tax expenditures in the foreign aid context. While my focus throughout is on the United States, the central argument can be generalized to any country with broadly analogous international tax policies.

Abstract: This paper interrogates certain aspects of Eritrean foreign policy making processes since independence. It analyses Eritrea's actions in the region, ranging from constructive engagement to the country's various conflicts with all its regional neighbours, including the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia, and Eritrea's wider global attempts at diplomatic and foreign policy engagement. The paper argues that while Eritrea's assertive and often rather un-diplomatic foreign policy overtures are partly to blame for the country's negative image as an international actor, any attempt at developing an independent foreign policy by Eritrea needs at the same time be understood within the wider context of the Horn of Africa and the Ethiopian ambition to act as and maintain the status as regional hegemon. Thus, Eritrean foreign policy objectives were always bound to run into problems once they diverged from Ethiopia's own interests. In addition, Ethiopia became an increasingly important actor in the global war on terror and its manifestations in the Horn of Africa, thus its interpretation of and intransigence over relations with Eritrea became the dominant representation of Eritrea as an inherently belligerent state. Such a reading ignores that ultimately Eritrea's foreign policy engagement asserts the right of every nation to defend its own interests in light of international law and global treaties, regardless of global power dynamics.

Editors: E.D. Morel, July 1919-Nov. 1924; Helena M. Swanwick, Jan. 1925- ; "A monthly digest and interpretation" (varies). ; Supplements accompany some numbers. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Continued after 1931 as supplement to: Time and tide.

학위논문(석사)--서울대학교 대학원 :사회과학대학 정치외교학부(외교학전공),2019. 8. 박종희. ; Why do many developed countries continuously provide foreign assistance to developing countries? Questioning how the international norm of foreign assistance is preserved and has become a tangible policy in donor countries, this paper presents a theory of domestic support for foreign aid in the U.S. by focusing on the role played by aid contractors or development firms in domestic politics. Development firms, the real implementer of foreign aid projects, actively lobby legislators and disseminate information, which leads to the maintenance and expansion of foreign aid in a donor country. This paper argues that this special interest group of development firms plays a significant role in facilitating legislators' continuing support for foreign aid policies. By focusing on the domestic dynamics of the United States, this paper examines a circular principal-agent (PA) relationship between the three groups of key actors in the politics of foreign aid: the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the development firms, and the legislators. Many extant researches explain this puzzle of foreign aid through countrylevel analysis. These studies perceive foreign aid as a diplomatic tool employed for aid-giving countries' own political, strategic and economic interests. More recent literature expounds the political economy of foreign aid at a domestic level. These studies show how dynamics among domestic actors within a donor country affect foreign aid policies. I sought to advance the literature of the political economy of foreign aid by probing the roles of the private development firms and NGOs. This paper particularly focuses on the political dynamics of the domestic actors in the United States, the leading donor country. This paper explores the roles of development firms in diffusing and executing international norms of foreign aid. When USAID implements foreign assistance programs, it contracts with private development firms or NGOs. They form a special interest group that has a strong preference for pro-foreign-aid policies, because foreign aid is an important source of finance. This paper suggests that as the amount of contracts allocated within a congressional district increases, the legislator in the district is more likely to support pro-foreign-aid policies. Furthermore, these aid contractors play a critical role in the principalagent relationship between legislators and USAID by disseminating information to legislators through lobbying. Analyzing district-level contract data and firmlevel lobby data from the 111th to the 115th Congress, I discuss that (1) lobby contacts by major U.S. aid contractors increase the frequency of sponsorship for pro-foreign-aid bills and (2) the district-level allocation of contracts is positively associated with the frequency of sponsorship for pro-foreign-aid bills. ; 왜 선진국은 개도국에 지속적으로 해외 원조를 조달하는가? 해외 원조는 비시민에 대한 정부 지출이다. 해외 원조의 수혜자는 국외에 있는 반면, 해외 원조의 재원은 공여국 국민의 세금으로부터 조달된다. 때문에 공여국 내에서 해외 원조는 유권자의 관심과 주목을 끄는 정책 이슈가 아니다. 그럼에도 불구하고 해외 원조는 1990년대 이후 지속적으로 확대되어 왔으며, 관련 여러 국제 제도가 구축되어 왔다. 본 연구는 공여국 내에 상당히 약한 정치적 지지를 받고 있는 해외 원조가 오랜 시간 지속되고, 확대되는 현상에 대해 질문을 제기한다. 본 논문은 개발 기업의 역할을 중심으로 국내 정치에서 주목 받지 못하는 해외 원조 이슈가 어떻게 공여국 내에서 정책화되고, 유지되었는지 탐구한다. 특히, 세계 최대 공여국인 미국의 국내 정치적 동학에 초점을 둠으로써 해외 원조를 둘러싼 주요 행위자들 간의 '순환적 주인 대리인 관계'를 살펴본다. 본 논문에서 다루는 주요 행위자는 미국의 하원 의원, 국제개발처 그리고 개발 기업이다. 국제개발처는 미국의 해외 원조를 담당하는 정부 기관이다. 정부 간의 증여나 차관의 형태로 조달되던 해외 원조가 점차 프로젝트 형식으로 바뀌며 국제개발처는 국내 개발 기업과의 계약(조달)을 통해 해외 원조 프로젝트를 실행해 왔고, 이 계약을 통해 많은 개발 기업들이 성장해 왔다. 즉, 원조 프로젝트를 수행하는 개발 기업에게 해외 원조는 중요한 성장동력이자 재원이 된다. 이 개발 기업들은 두 가지 측면에서 해외 원조에 대한 국내 정치적 지지를 도모하는 데에 중요한 역할을 한다. 첫째, 개발 기업은 한 선거구의 유권자이다. 때문에 유권자의 이익을 중시하는 의원은 본인의 지역구에 있는 개발 기업의 이익을 고려하여 지속적으로 해외 원조 정책을 지지한다. 둘째, 개발 기업은 해외 원조 관련 정책들에 대한 강한 선호를 가진 특수 이익 집단으로서 의원들에게 국제 개발의 중요성에 관한 정보를 적극적으로 공유하여 해외 원조의 유지와 확대에 기여하고 있다. 본 연구는 111대부터 115대 미의회의 원조 관련 법안 데이터, 선거구 수준 정부기관 조달 데이터 그리고 기업 수준 로비 데이터를 분석하여 다음 두 가지 결론을 제시한다. 첫째, 개발 기업이 집중되어 있는 선거구의 의원일 수록 해외 원조 법안을 더 적극 지지할 동기가 커진다. 둘째, 기업과 의원 사이의 로비 접촉은 그 의원의 해외 원조 법안에 대한 발의 빈도와 양의 상관관계를 갖는다. 본 논문은 앞서 언급한 세 가지 데이터와 논문, 뉴스기사 그리고 개발 기업이 공개한 자료를 기반으로 개발 기업이 개별적 로비를 통해 해외 원조 법안을 지지할 뿐만 아니라, 집단적으로 로비하여 의원들의 지지를 이끌어내는 데에 일조함을 추론 할 수 있었다. 본 논문은 개발 기업의 이익 추구가 단순히 개인 기업의 이익으로 끝나지 않고, 해외 원조에 대한 국내 정치적 지지를 이끌어 내는 데에 중요한 역할을 수행함을 보여준다. 본 논문은 기존 연구의 국가 수준 분석을 넘어 국내 정치적 시각에서 해외 원조 정책이 공여국 내에 유지되고 확대되는 매커니즘을 제시한다는 점에서 의의를 갖는다. 뿐만 아니라 기존 일방향의 주인-대리인 모델을 수정하여 해외 원조를 둘러싼 주요 행위자 간 새로운 구조의 대리인 모델을 제시함으로써 기존 연구가 도외시한 개발 기업의 정치적 역할을 보여준다는 측면에서 의미를 가진다. ; I. Introduction 1 1. Research Question 4 2. Argument and Method 7 3. Outlining Subsequent Chapters 9 II. Motives Behind Foreign Aid: Literature Review 11 1. Foreign Aid as a Diplomatic Tool 12 2. Domestic Politics and Foreign Aid 14 III. A Circular Principal-Agent Theory 17 1. Theories of Domestic Politics Explaining Foreign Policies 17 2. Principal-Agent Theory in Political Science 20 3. A Circular PA Theory and Foreign Aid 24 4. Theoretical Hypotheses 27 IV. Empirical Analysis 46 1. Data 46 2. Results 56 V. Conclusion 59 Bibliography 62 Appendix A. The Trend of ODA Flow 71 Appendix B. Top 10 Aid Contractors 72 Appendix C. Top 10 Aid Contract Receiving States 76 Appendix D. List of Pro-foreign-aid Bills 79 Appendix E. Statistical Summary 85 Abstract in Korea 86 ; Master