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This paper draws attention to Foucault's genealogy of critique. In a series of inquiries, Foucault traced the origins and trajectories of critical practices from the ancient tradition of parrhesia to the enlightenment and the (neo)liberal critique of the state. The paper will elucidate the insights of this history and argue that Foucault's turn to the genealogy of critique also changed the valence of his theoretical assumptions. Foucault developed a more affirmative practice of genealogy that not only discredits truth claims by tracing them back to their inglorious origins. Rather, he presents a politics of truth as a complex interaction of (governmental) power-knowledge and critique that questions the power effects of truth and rationality. This genealogy of critique contributes to current problematizations of critique by thinkers like Boltanski, Latour and Rancière in highlighting the role of epistemological and technical critique of social rationalization and political reason.

In this paper, Vaccaro aims to interrogate the political value of truth. Moving from Hannah Arendt and the debate between modernity and postmodernity, the paper focus the Will to truth according the elaboration of Nietzsche, but also the first Collège de France course by Foucault in the '70s. The thesis is a etho-politics of telling the truth, that to say the parrhesia, as an antidote either to the nihilation of truth in the post-truth, or to the enforcement of truth as the One in politics. ; En este artículo, Vaccaro pretende interrogar el valor político de la verdad. Partiendo de Hannah Arendt y del debate entre modernidad y posmodernidad, el artículo se centra en la Voluntad de verdad según la elaboró Nietzsche, pero también en el primer curso de Collège de France de Foucault en los años 70. La tesis es una etopolítica de decir la verdad, es decir, la parresia, como antídoto tanto contra la aniquilación de la verdad por parte de la posverdad, como para el fortalecimiento de la verdad como lo Uno de la política.

Foucault saw the notion of parrhesia (truth-telling) as the most important factor for how governments could and should communicate with their people and vice versa. This important collection compiles and analyses Foucault's views on parrhesia to shed new light on his ideas on the importance of truth-telling in democracies.

The late Foucault's discussions of truth-telling (parrhesia) revolve around freedom of speech and the quality of democracy: citizens' courage to speak truth to power as well as political authorities' courage to speak truthfully as to what must be done. The notion of parrhesia held particular interest for Foucault as a result of its focus on the ground for exercising political authority. It connotes truthful and trustworthy speech, which goes hand in hand with the accountability and capability of democratic government. With parrhesia we get a political take on truth, for which personal integrity, frankness, timing, courage and resolve are defining features. Foucault's discussions of parrhesia are vital for getting at his political triangulation of power, knowledge and ethics, alias techniques of governmentality, truth-telling and the shaping of the relationship to self. These ideas provide the basis for approaching his discussions on the autonomy of politics and democratic political authority.

Contemporary interest in free speech and in Plato's relationship with Athenian democracy has led scholars to explore Plato's thought on frank speech in relation to political contexts as well as philosophical ones. In the form of parrhesia has been elevated to a central concept, not least through Michel Foucault's focus on it, along with the depiction of Plato's character Socrates as a prototypical free speech martyr. The ambiguity of Plato's various references to frank speech is amplified in Foucault's complex account, and this paper argues that Socrates, if a parrhesiast, acts as one from a position of power rather than weakness. The publication of a final 'official' set of Foucault's papers on the topic provides an opportunity to revisit both Plato's thought and Foucault's analysis.

Foucault underlined, throughout his whole intellectual activity, the question of truth as an effect of power-knowledge. There are not properly truths as substances, but effects of truths as incorporeal practices of discourse, that change slowly, but inevitably, the limits of our knowledge. We can say then that he has always been a pragmatist, unbeknown to him. However, it was during the last two courses delivered at the Collége de France, recently published with the title of The Government of Self and Others and The Courage of Truth, that he recognized explicitly his pragmatic vein. I will show two specific points of his philosophical testament (as we can consider the two courses). Commenting Plato's Seventh Letter, he said the philosophy coincides with "its practices" (pragmata). Philosophy is an ergon, a work, a labor, a practical and "real" activity, that must undergo the test of praxis (and of politics). Secondly, commenting Platos' Lachetes and the Cynical attitude, he referred to the Greek Parrhesia, the will to speak freely. It has evidently a pragmatist imprint: the philosopher who serves to find the truth must manifest in his way of life a congruence, a tuning between bios and logos, gestures and meanings, between the body, with its bearings and manners, and the truth conveyed. The real correspondence is not between words and facts, but between words and actions. It is not, therefore, sufficient a truth be expressed by words: it must be acted. It must transform into habits, take form in a corporeal life, in an existence, in a praxis: this is the teaching not only of the pragmatist school, but also of the hermeneutical one starting from Nietzsche to the last Foucault. Philosophy must return to be a form of life, and to witness in practice its ideas.

During the 1980s, a controversy known as «the silence of intellectuals» broke out in France. In this article, we will address the unique position of Michel Foucault. In order to do this, we will move in two directions. Firstly, we will argue the following hypothesis: the foundation of his ideas in this polemic can be found in his analysis of parrhesia from the 1980s onwards. Secondly, we will look at authors such as Lyotard and Blanchot, who took part in the argument with well-known analysis, in order to point out the particularity of Foucault's reflection. In this way, we attempt, not only to highlight his original contribution to the problem, but also to indicate the differences between this approach and his previous critique of the intellectual from the 1970s. ; A principios de los años 80 se desató en Francia una polémica conocida como «el silencio de los intelectuales». En este texto abordaremos la singular postura de Michel Foucault al respecto. Para ello realizaremos una doble operación. Por un lado, planteamos la hipótesis siguiente: se pueden encontrar los fundamentos que sostienen su posición en los análisis que realizó sobre la parrhesía a partir de los años 80. En segundo lugar, realizaremos un recorrido por autores como Lyotard y Blanchot, quienes intervinieron en dicha polémica con conocidos escritos, para mostrar las particularidades de la apuesta de Foucault. De esta manera, pretendemos, no solamente mostrar su original aportación al problema, sino señalar los desplazamientos respecto a la crítica del intelectual que había elaborado durante los años 70.

Berbeda dengan para filosof sejarah yang lazimnya membahas watak perkembangan sejarah, teori sejarah, arah dan kecenderungannya, kubu-kubu kekuatan di balik peristiwa sejarah dan sebagainya, Foucault sama sekali berbeda. Foucault tidak menulis "tentang sejarah" tetapi menulis banyak hal "dalam sejarah". Setiap persoalan selalu dilihatnya dalam hubungan yang rumit dengan pelbagai unsur sosial lain—politik, kekuasaan, kepentingan, gender, pemikiran, ideologi dan sebagainya—segagai sistem keseluruhan berpikir masyarakat yang disebut "episteme". Apa yang kita pandang sebagai kebenaran dalam pelbagai diskursus (penalaran melalui bahasa), baik itu diskursus ilmiah, rapat-rapat, pidato politik, diskusi, dst. tidaklah lepas dari pengaruh episteme ini. Tulisan ini memperlihatkan bagaimana berbagai diskursus dalam setiap masyarakat melahirkan pengetahuan, kuasa, dan kebenaran dalam suatu hubungan sirkular, sebuah rezim kebenaran/kekuasaan tertentu yang berkembang dalam suatu periode dan berubah atau berganti secara total dalam tahapan periode lainnya.

El presente trabajo acomete el análisis de las complejas relaciones entre verdad y democracia a partir de la noción de parrhesia, tal y como esta fue rescatada por Michel Foucault durante sus últimos trabajos. La propuesta foucaultiana predica una vinculación constitutiva, no exenta de tensiones, entre ambas: no puede haber democracia sin referencia a una cierta idea de verdad, pero la emergencia de tal verdad presupone la existencia de un espacio democrático. La construcción de ese espacio se realiza sobre la crítica a todo intento de monopolizar la capacidad de decir la verdad. En este sentido, el concepto de injusticia epistémica nos ayuda a entender cómo se imbrican lo político y lo epistémico en el proceso democrático ; The present paper attempts to analyse the complex relationship between truth and democracy from the notion of parrhesia, as Foucault treated it during his last works. The Foucauldian approach establishes a stressing linkage on one another: there can be no democracy without appealing to certain idea of truth, but the emergence of such truth involves the existence of a democratic space. Such space is constructed through the critic of every attempt to monopolize the capacity of saying the truth. In this sense, the concept of epistemic injustice helps us to understand how political and epistemic dimensions are interwoven in the democratic process.

Foucault's discussions of parrhesia provide fertile ground for raising a number of classical and pertinent issues in political theory related to critique, citizenship, and political authority. Foucault situates parrhesia in his analytical grid of power/knowledge/ethics, which maps political participation and experience, and he looks at how those who pursue or contest political power articulate and integrate these three facets of politics, which might well pull in opposite directions. Power concerns the ability and the audacity to face up to important political tasks and to take action at the right time authoritatively and with resolve. Knowledge is vital for telling the truth from a partisan viewpoint and for making informed and balanced decisions. Ethics concerns the trustworthiness of those who either exercise or criticize political power and touches upon their dedication, sense of judgement, and personal integrity. The personal integrity of the citizen acting politically as well as his or her responsibility to the political community are among the main issues to be raised in relation to these themes. The same goes for the issues related to the nature of the political community, its institutional set-up and its culture, and whether it is authoritarian and marked by hierarchy and obedience or democratic and egalitarian. Thus, parrhesia captures some of the most vital dimensions of political life of how to exercise the political power of authority in a way that is both truthful and trustworthy. Foucault's discussions of parrhesia shed light on the democratic challenges and possibilities related to political power as governmentality.

El presente trabajo acomete el análisis de las complejas relaciones entre verdad y democracia a partir de la noción de parrhesia, tal y como esta fue rescatada por Michel Foucault durante sus últimos trabajos. La propuesta foucaultiana predica una vinculación constitutiva, no exenta de tensiones, entre ambas: no puede haber democracia sin referencia a una cierta idea de verdad, pero la emergencia de tal verdad presupone la existencia de un espacio democrático. La construcción de ese espacio se realiza sobre la crítica a todo intento de monopolizar la capacidad de decir la verdad. En este sentido, el concepto de injusticia epistémica nos ayuda a entender cómo se imbrican lo político y lo epistémico en el proceso democrático.Palabras clave: parrhesia, democracia, verdad, Foucault, injusticia epistémica.AbstractThe present paper attempts to analyse the complex relationship between truth and democracy from the notion of parrhesia, as Foucault treated it during his last works. The Foucauldian approach establishes a stressing linkage on one another: there can be no democracy without appealing to certain idea of truth, but the emergence of such truth involves the existence of a democratic space. Such space is constructed through the critic of every attempt to monopolize the capacity of saying the truth. In this sense, the concept of epistemic injustice helps us to understand how political and epistemic dimensions are interwoven in the democratic process. Key words: parrhesia, democracy, truth, Foucault, epistemic injustice.

In the beginning of 1980's Michel Foucault lectured on «παρρησία» at the Collège de France. Foucault's lectures have become an important new way to interpret the parrhesía notion, from the political and philosophical point of view. Basically, Foucault distinguishes between a political parrhesía of democratic nature and a philosophical parrhesía whose origin can be traced to Plato. In this paper I focus my analysis on the political parrhesía, and I try to prove that Foucault's definition of this concept is not in accordance with the Democratic Thinking of Ancient Athens. According to Foucault, parrhesía is a «une parole d'au-dessus», a discourse spoken from above. However, an alternative interpretation of ancient sources can prove that in reality the parrhesía is a discourse spoken from below. Contrary to what Foucault maintains, the works of Euripides, Demosthenes, Isocrates, and other authors contribute toward finding a popular root in the parrhesía, that it should be defined as the dignity of the popular speech. ; A principios de los años ochenta, Michel Foucault impartió unas lecciones sobre la «παρρησία» en el Collège de France. Las lecciones de Foucault se convirtieron en una importante nueva interpretación de la noción de parresía. Básicamente, Foucault distingue entre una parresía política de naturaleza democrática y una parresía filosófica cuyo origen podría ser trazado hasta Platón. En este artículo concentro mi análisis en la parresía política, e intento demostrar que la definición de Foucault de este concepto no se corresponde con el pensamiento democrático de la antigua Atenas. Según Foucault, la parresía es «une parole d'au-dessus», una palabra de arriba. Sin embargo, una interpretación alternativa de las fuentes antiguas puede demostrar que en realidad la parresía es una palabra de abajo. Al contrario de lo que sostiene Foucault, las obras de Eurípides, Demóstenes, Isócrates y otros autores contribuyen a encontrar una raíz popular en la parresía, que debería ser definida como la dignidad de la palabra del pueblo.