Suchergebnisse

Purpose/objectives: This paper seeks to investigate whether performance management (PM) framework adopted in Portuguese local government (PLG) fit the Otley's PM framework (1999). In particularly, the research questions are (1) whether PM framework adopted in PLG (SIADAP) fit the Otley´s framework, and (2) how local politicians (aldermen) see the operation of performance management systems (PMS) in PLG (focusing on the goal-setting process and incentive and reward structures). Theoretical positioning/contributions: With this paper we intend to contribute to literature on how the Otley's PM framework can guide empirical research about the operation of PMS. In particular, the paper contributes to understand the fit between PMS implemented in PLG and the Otley´s PM framework. The analysis of this fit can be a good contribution to understand if PMS are used in PLG as a management tool or as a strategic response to external pressures (based on interviews conducted to aldermen). We believe that the Otley's PM framework, as well as the extended PM framework presented by Ferreira and Otley (2009), can provide a useful research tool to understand the operation of PMS in PLG. Research method: The first research question is the central issue in this paper and is analyzed based on the main reforms introduced by Portuguese government on PM of public organizations (like municipalities). On the other hand, interviews conducted on three larger Portuguese municipalities (Oporto, Braga, and Matosinhos) show how aldermen see the operation of PMS in PLG, highlighting the goals setting process with targets associated and the existing of incentive and reward structures linked with performance. Findings: Generally we find that formal and regulated PM frameworks in PLG fit the main issues of the Otley's PM framework. However, regarding the aldermen perceptions about PMS in practice we find a gap between theory and practice, especially regarding difficulties associated with the lack of a culture of goals and targets setting and the lack of incentive and reward structures linked with performance.