This study aims to point out the shortcomings of international legislation on the use of religious rights and was conceived as a wake-up call to the most relevant institutions for the defense of human rights, in favor of a fair, globalized legal system accessible to all vulnerable minorities, specifically people and their theological convictions, including respect in the absence of it. It describes in a coherent and critical way those international norms related to religious freedoms, in their drafting, practice and execution; determining the degree of responsibility of each actor, whether it's from State or society, in the use of religious rights; proposing new ways to improve freedom of religion in regions with historically poor human rights records. ; Este estudio pretende señalar las falencias de la legislación internacional sobre el uso de los derechos religiosos; texto concebido como una llamada de alerta a las instituciones más relevantes de defensa de los derechos humanos, en pro de un sistema jurídico justo, globalizado y asequible a todas las minorías vulnerables; específicamente, a las personas y sus convicciones de fe, incluyendo el respeto ante la ausencia de ésta. En él se describe de manera crítica las normas internacionales relacionadas con las libertades religiosas, en su redacción, práctica y ejecución; se determina el grado de responsabilidad de cada actor, sea Estado o sociedad, en el uso de los derechos religiosos; y proponen las nuevas formas de cultivar la libertad de religión en regiones con récords de derechos humanos históricamente pobres.
Senegal es un país laico pero con el islam como religión mayoritaria. La libertad religiosa es un derecho reconocido constitucionalmente y muy protegido y valorado. Este trabajo analiza el desarrollo legislativo de la libertad religiosa, como es la relación entre el Estado y las distintas confesiones religiosas, y sobre todo como se comporta una sociedad de mayoría musulmana aplastante, más del 90% de la población, respecto a la respeto y tolerancia religiosa. Para ello empezaremos realizando un estudio de la cobertura constitucional de la que goza la libertad religiosa en ese país, discutiremos la laicidad del Estado, las injerencias del Estado en los asuntos de las organizaciones religiosas, examinaremos si se puede considerar la sharia como una ley estatal y finalizaremos con la percepción que tiene la sociedad y los organismos internacionales de la libertad religiosa en Senegal. ; Senegal is a secular country but with Islam as a majority religion. Religious freedom is a constitutionally recognized right and highly protected and valued. This paper analyzes the legislative development of religious freedom, such as the relationship between the State and the various religious confessions, and especially as it behaves an overwhelming Muslim-majority society, more than 90% of the population, with respect to the Respect and religious tolerance. To do this we will begin by conducting a study of the constitutional coverage of the religious freedom in that country, discuss the secularity of the state, the interference of the State in the affairs of religious organizations, examine whether you can Consider sharia as a state law and we'll end with the perception of society and the international organizations of religious freedom in Senegal. ; Máster Universitario en Acceso a la Profesión de Abogado (M155)
El derecho a la libertad religiosa ha sido abordado con diferente intensidad por el Tribunal Europeo de Derecho Humanos y por las instituciones protectoras del Sistema Interamericano, la Comisión y la Corte. Sin embargo, las diferencias entre ambos ámbitos de protección de los derechos humanos no son solo cuantitativas porque responden a realidades históricas, políticas y sociales distintas. Aun así, también se dan puntos de encuentro en los sujetos titulares y obligados, en la perfilación de su contenido y en sus límites. Lo más llamativo del Tribunal europeo es el recurso constante al margen de apreciación nacional ante la diversidad de posturas de los Estados miembros del Consejo de Europa; y, en el Sistema Interamericano, la vinculación del derecho a la protección de los más vulnerables, bien a través de la cosmovisión de los pueblos indígenas, bien por su relación con el trabajo de muchos activistas de la sociedad civil con los más pobres ; The right to religious freedom has been approached with different intensity by the European Court of Human Rights and by the protective institutions of the Inter-American System, the Commission and the Court. However, the differences between the two protective spheres of human rights are not only quantitative, because they respond to different historical, political and social realities. Even so, there are also meeting points in the titular and obligated subjects, in the outline of their content and in their limits. The most striking aspect of the European Court is the constant recourse to the margin of national appreciation in the face of the diversity of positions of the member states of the Council of Europe; and, in the Inter-American System, the linking of the right to protection of the most vulnerable, either through the worldview of indigenous peoples, or because of its relationship with the work of many civil society activists with the poorest
The right to religious freedom has been approached with different intensity by the European Court of Human Rights and by the protective institutions of the Inter-American System, the Commission and the Court. However, the differences between the two protective spheres of human rights are not only quantitative, because they respond to different historical, political and social realities. Even so, there are also meeting points in the titular and obligated subjects, in the outline of their content and in their limits. The most striking aspect of the European Court is the constant recourse to the margin of national appreciation in the face of the diversity of positions of the member states of the Council of Europe; and, in the Inter-American System, the linking of the right to protection of the most vulnerable, either through the worldview of indigenous peoples, or because of its relationship with the work of many civil society activists with the poorest. ; El derecho a la libertar religiosa ha sido abordado con diferente intensidad por el Tribunal Europeo de Derecho Humanos y por las instituciones protectoras del Sistema Interamericano, la Comisión y la Corte. Sin embargo, las diferencias entre ambos ámbitos de protección de los derechos humanos no son solo cuantitativas porque responden a realidades históricas, políticas y sociales distintas. Aun así, también se dan puntos de encuentro en los sujetos titulares y obligados, en la perfilación de su contenido y en sus límites. Lo más llamativo del Tribunal europeo es el recurso constante al margen de apreciación nacional ante la diversidad de posturas de los Estados miembros del Consejo de Europa; y, en el Sistema Interamericano, la vinculación del derecho a la protección de los más vulnerables, bien a través de la cosmovisión de los pueblos indígenas, bien por su relación con el trabajo de muchos activistas de la sociedad civil con los más pobres.
Secularity in the sense of a social imaginary, an appreciation for the differentiation between religious and political authority, and the acknowledgement of religious plurality surely exist. While, like Senegal and Turkey, Indonesia is a Muslim state that is in the process of translating democracy into its own institutional legacies and of crafting its own brand of democratic religion-state relations, it is probably unique as a case where, although religious and political authority is separated, citizenship is tied to religion. This implies that one's declared religious affiliation determines the type of religious education and personal law one will be subject to. And there is more: religions are in some ways highly regulated by the state. As the author will argue in the following, in an effort to subsume all social and civic life in the two post-independence authoritarian regimes (1945-1965 and 1965-1998) to the twin goals of political order and economic growth, state bureaucrats sought to 'modernize' religion and thereby highly bureaucratized it. Religion in post-independence Indonesia was not only made 'manageable' but also put into the service of government policy. ; La laicidad, como imaginario social, como atención hacia la diferenciación entre autoridad religiosa y política y reconocimiento de la pluralidad religiosa, en la Indonesia de la post-independencia sin lugar a dudas existe. Si, por una parte – tal como Senegal y Turquía – Indonesia es un Estado islámico a punto de introducir la democracia en su sistema institucional tradicional y de elaborar un modelo propio de las relaciones religión-estado en sentido democrático, por otra parte es el único Estado en el que la ciudadanía está relacionada con la religión, aunque religión y autoridad política estén separadas. Esto implica que la pertenencia religiosa determina el tipo de educación religiosa y el "derecho de la persona" al cual uno está sometido. Además, las religiones están, pues, fuertemente reglamentadas por el Estado. Tal como subraya la autora en este artículo, con la intención de englobar toda la vida social y civil en los dos regímenes autoritarios de la post-independencia (1945-1965 e 1965-1998) para llegar al objetivo del orden político y del crecimiento económico, los burócratas estatales han intentado "modernizar" la religión, burocratizándola profundamente. En la Indonesia de la post-independencia, la religión no solo ha sido convertida en "manejable", "accesible", sino también ha sido entregada al servicio de las políticas del Gobierno.
Courts and Legislative bodies in Europe have to deal very frequently with the delicate task of defining the notion of religion for legal purposes, since this term is involved in all kind of legal sectors related to freedom of religion and to legal relationships between the State and religious groups. We often hear about legal disputes concerning new religious movements which demand to be recognized as a religion by the law. In this presentation the author analyzes different systems for defining religion in the Law.
The article develops the theme of freedom of religion and cults in Colombia and its evolution from the judgments of the Constitutional Court between 1991 and 2015, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Political Constitution of 1991. Methodologically, the investigation was conducted in a deductive and historical-critical way, through the analysis of the right to freedom of religion and cults in the Inter-American and international system of human rights, ratified by the Congress of the Republic, as well as the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court around the right to religious freedom as an individual and collective expression. The results of the investigation showed that the evolution of these rights in the Colombian legal system is aligned with the legal and democratic transformations of the Constitution, and with the requirements of international organizations of human rights. ; El artículo desarrolla el tema de la libertad religiosa y de cultos en Colombia y su evolución a partir de las sentencias de la Corte Constitucional entre 1991 y 2015, con ocasión de los 25 años de la Constitución Política de 1991. Metodológicamente la investigación se realizó de manera deductiva e histórico-crítica, mediante el análisis del derecho a la libertad religiosa y de cultos en el sistema interamericano e internacional de los derechos humanos, ratificado por el Congreso de la República. Al igual que la jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional en torno al derecho a la libertad religiosa como una expresión individual y colectiva. Los resultados de la investigación evidenciaron que la evolución de estos derechos en el ordenamiento jurídico colombiano, está en consonancia con las transformaciones democráticas y jurídicas de la Constitución, y con los requerimientos de organismos internacionales de derechos humanos. ; O artigo desenvolve o tema da liberdade religiosa e de cultos na Colômbia e sua evolução a partir das sentenças da Corte Constitucional entre 1991 e 2015, por ocasião dos 25 anos da Constituição Política de 1991. Metodologicamente a pesquisa foi realizada de maneira dedutiva e histórico-crítica, mediante a análise do direito à liberdade religiosa e de cultos no sistema interamericano e internacional dos direitos humanos, ratificado pelo Congresso da República. Igualmente que a jurisprudência da Corte Constitucional ao redor do direito à liberdade religiosa como uma expressão individual e coletiva. Os resultados da pesquisa evidenciaram que a evolução destes direitos no ordenamento jurídico colombiano está em consonância com as transformações democráticas e jurídicas da Constituição, e com os requerimentos de organismos internacionais de direitos humanos.
The article develops the theme of freedom of religion and cults in Colombia and its evolution from the judgments of the Constitutional Court between 1991 and 2015, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Political Constitution of 1991. Methodologically, the investigation was conducted in a deductive and historical-critical way, through the analysis of the right to freedom of religion and cults in the Inter-American and international system of human rights, ratified by the Congress of the Republic, as well as the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court around the right to religious freedom as an individual and collective expression. The results of the investigation showed that the evolution of these rights in the Colombian legal system is aligned with the legal and democratic transformations of the Constitution, and with the requirements of international organizations of human rights. ; El artículo desarrolla el tema de la libertad religiosa y de cultos en Colombia y su evolución a partir de las sentencias de la Corte Constitucional entre 1991 y 2015, con ocasión de los 25 años de la Constitución Política de 1991. Metodológicamente la investigación se realizó de manera deductiva e histórico-crítica, mediante el análisis del derecho a la libertad religiosa y de cultos en el sistema interamericano e internacional de los derechos humanos, ratificado por el Congreso de la República. Al igual que la jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional en torno al derecho a la libertad religiosa como una expresión individual y colectiva. Los resultados de la investigación evidenciaron que la evolución de estos derechos en el ordenamiento jurídico colombiano, está en consonancia con las transformaciones democráticas y jurídicas de la Constitución, y con los requerimientos de organismos internacionales de derechos humanos. ; O artigo desenvolve o tema da liberdade religiosa e de cultos na Colômbia e sua evolução a partir das sentenças da Corte Constitucional entre 1991 e 2015, por ocasião dos 25 anos da Constituição Política de 1991. Metodologicamente a pesquisa foi realizada de maneira dedutiva e histórico-crítica, mediante a análise do direito à liberdade religiosa e de cultos no sistema interamericano e internacional dos direitos humanos, ratificado pelo Congresso da República. Igualmente que a jurisprudência da Corte Constitucional ao redor do direito à liberdade religiosa como uma expressão individual e coletiva. Os resultados da pesquisa evidenciaram que a evolução destes direitos no ordenamento jurídico colombiano está em consonância com as transformações democráticas e jurídicas da Constituição, e com os requerimentos de organismos internacionais de direitos humanos.
Abstract: It is necessary to define the meaning, scope and range of the concepts of freedom of religion or belief and freedom of conscience, and moreover, to distinguish them from other related notions. Both fundamental rights are of the utmost importancein plural societies and are acknowledged by Human Rights International Law as well as by the Uruguayan legal system.Addressing these rights implies a high valuation of human dignity, upon which these are grounded. It is important to consider the protection granted by the State, both when they are exercised by the individual or in community with others, as well as the means toprevent eventual abuse without infringing liberties.The case of Uruguay deserves special attention, due to the development of a theoretical trend which "gives its back" to religious and conscientious phenomena, undermining positive secularity. On the contrary, this emerging form of excluding neutrality assimilatessecularity to "prescidence" (disregard, abstentionism) from religion to an anti-religious posture; denying by fact what was held as main principles.A debate on secularity – secularism and religion stands as necessary, overcoming rigid and perished postures. Democracy and an inclusive approach of secularity are the main guarantees for individuals and communities to attain full exercise of these essential rights. ; Resumen: Es necesario definir el significado, alcance y extensión de los conceptos libertad religiosa y libertad de conciencia, y a su vez distinguirlos de otros conceptos afines. Ambos derechos fundamentales revisten gran importancia en la sociedad pluralistay son reconocidos por el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos y por el ordenamiento jurídico uruguayo.Referirnos a estos derechos supone valorar la dignidad de la persona humana, en la que se sustentan. Importante es considerar la tutela que de ellos realiza el Estado, tanto cuando se ejercen en forma individual como colectiva, y el modo cómo deben evitarseabusos sin herir libertades.Merece una atención especial lo sucedido en Uruguay, donde se ha verificado una postura jurídica de espaldas al hecho religioso y de conciencia, que no favorece una laicidad positiva. Por el contrario, se ha dado una neutralidad excluyente, que identifica laicidad con prescindencia o a-religiosidad; no concretizándose en la realidad lo plasmado a nivel de principios. Es necesario un debate sobre laicidad y religión, que permita abandonar posturas rígidas y anacrónicas. La democracia y una laicidad inclusiva son las principales garantías, para que las personas y los grupos puedan acceder al pleno ejercicio de estos derechos fundamentales.
"This sweltering summer of the Negro's legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality. Nineteen sixty-three is not an end, but a beginning…I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal…"And if America is to be a great nation, this must become true."Martin Luther King Jr." I have a dream speech" (March on Washington, August 28, 1963)On Wednesday August 27th, at the Pepsi Center in Denver, Colorado, before a crowd of 20,000, Barack Obama became the first biracial man to be officially nominated as presidential candidate by a major party. When the turn came for the delegates from the state of New York to vote, Obama had received 1,549 and Hillary Rodham-Clinton 231. Hillary then made a motion to suspend the roll call vote and select him by acclamation:"With eyes firmly fixed on the future in the spirit of unity, with the goal of victory, with faith in our party and country, let's declare together in one voice, right here and right now, that Barack Obama is our candidate and he will be our president."The night before, Hillary had made a gracious and persuasive speech in support of Obama, calling on her supporters to vote for the man that would bring health care to all Americans and restore the country's standing in the world, thus tacitly acknowledging that their platforms are one and the same. She had also reminded the audience that the (presidential) "glass ceiling now had 18 million cracks", a reference at the number of votes she received and a reminder of how close women had come this time around to win the Presidency, a white male domain until now. That was her way to give comfort to her female supporters, some of which have avowed to vote for McCain in the Fall. Then on Wednesday night it came up to Bill Clinton to put the proverbial final nail in the coffin of the bitter conflict that had bitterly divided the party up to then. He did it with a masterful, authoritative speech, in which he reassured the audience that Obama was just as ready for the Presidency as he himself had been in 1992. The clarity of his ideas and the perfect delivery reminded us all of why he will go down as one of the greatest Presidents in this country's History.Already by Wednesday night there was a sense of fulfillment and relief, since the unification of the Democratic Party was perceived by most Democrats as the Convention's main objective. The party had been divided since the 1970s, when the moderate, blue collar workers and Southerners became disgruntled with McGovern's socially liberal platform and voted for Nixon. Ten years later they would become known as the Reagan democrats, and the label would stick. Bill Clinton was able to bring them all back to the fold by focused policies and his ability to connect both with white and black blue-collar workers. But in the last eight years the divisions have reappeared, as it became plain during the primary: Obama appeals strongly to the black community and to white college educated youth but has been unable to extend that appeal to older women and white workers. That is why Hillary got 18 million votes. That is also why Obama's choice of Vice President is a solid one. Senator Joseph Biden, with his Catholic, blue-collar background, his toughness and his 30 years of experience in the Senate, and his wisdom and knowledge of foreign affairs, has added weight and credibility to the ticket. The expectation is that this formula will reunite the fractured party once again.This has been a historic Convention in more ways than one: the first African-American to win the nomination, the first woman to come so close to winning it, the passing of the torch to a new generation of Americans by Ted Kennedy, the brilliant speech by Bill Clinton which by all measures restores his stature within the party. But more than anything else, this Convention is historic because, as Clinton said, Barack Obama is "the twenty first century incarnation of the American Dream", and a reaffirmation of Ted Kennedy's proclamation on the first day of the Convention, that "the Dream Lives on" in Obama.The climax came on Thursday night with Obama's long awaited acceptance speech at the closing of the Convention. It was a carefully choreographed affair, overlaid with symbolism. Delivered before a crowd of 75,000 at the INVESCO open-air stadium at Mile High, against a background evoking the pillars of the Lincoln Memorial, it was watched by a TV audience of around 40 million and ended with fireworks across the Colorado sky. Barack Obama is also the first candidate since John F Kennedy to choose an open-to-the public venue to deliver his acceptance speech. There were some risks to this venue, from security to climactic. But more than anything else, his greatest challenge on this historic night was to communicate to his huge audience and the American nation at large, that he is not just a great orator but that he understands their woes and has the fortitude to fight for them; that he is ready to battle ahead and bring about the change he so brilliantly articulates in his speeches, and that this young man standing before them, half preacher, half professor, is also a practical politician, able to back his ideas with concrete and feasible plans. As Richard Haas says in his latest article on the Foreign Affairs Journal, the next president must confront "the reality of the country's expectations" and he must do so by "identifying meaningful yet achievable goals and lay them out before the nation…and then achieve them through leadership skills that will be tested by pressures unimaginable to anyone who has not held he job." Obama passed this difficult test on the first two requirements. The third is awaiting him, if elected in November.By most accounts, the speech was an overwhelming success. Obama presented a complete blueprint on how he will govern if elected. He first listed all the issues Americans are dissatisfied with, starting with the economy and ending with Iraq. He then outlined his specific policies to solve these problems. He subsequently gave examples of how McCain is closely aligned with George W. Bush's failed policies, thus demolishing his opponent's claims of independence from the incumbent. Finally, he presented himself as open-minded and pragmatic, willing to find middle ground on the so-called culture wars issues (gays, guns, abortion) that are frequently framed as false choices to elicit emotions, not rationality, from the part of the voters. He re-introduced himself to the public as a common man, with personal accounts of his childhood as son of a single mother, who raised him with the help of her parents and at times had to use food stamps to take care of him; of his admiration for his grandfather, a WWII veteran who went to college on the GI bill and taught him hard work, pride and love of country. Looking straight into the cameras, he humanized his message and connected with people. He was able to turn the tables on John McCain, who he presented as elitist, out of touch and thus, less trustworthy. His move to the middle ground on cultural issues ("We can withhold the Second Amendment and still get AK 47s out of the hands of criminals") and his calls for greater civic and parental responsibility ("Government cannot replace parents in educating their children…") gave consistency to his claim of post-partisanship.By asserting that America is the best hope for the world, he rejected the notion that only Republicans are patriotic ("Democrats can own that, too."). He also defied the fallacy that Democrats are weak on foreign policy ("We are the party of FDR and JFK, so don't tell us Democrats that we cannot defend the country…and restore the moral standing for all who fight for freedom."). And he did all this not so much with the soaring rhetoric of his earlier speeches, but with a tone of strength and defiance. He took the fight to John Mc Cain, promising to debate him not on petty issues but on who has the "judgment and the temperament" to be Commander-in-Chief. He thereby injected the question of McCain's short temper into the Fall campaign. The speech ended with an evocation of Martin Luther King's I have a dream speech delivered on this same day forty-five years ago at the Lincoln Memorial, and a pledge to once more "March forward together."Memories of the Democratic National Conventions and the momentum created by this brilliant speech were not, however, destined to linger for long in the American psyche. They were shattered by two events, one man-made, one natural. On Friday, August 29th, John McCain made an announcement that caused quite a stir in the media and public alike. He chose as his Vice president Mrs. Sarah Palin, the little-known first-term female governor of Alaska, a no exceptions pro-lifer who believes that Creationism should be taught in the schools alongside Evolution, and whose thin political résumé is startling to most observers. After they recovered from the initial shock, some pundits were able to articulate the intriguing yet-to be-answered question: was this the brilliant decision of a crafty tactician or the insane choice of an impulsive, overly ambitious politician? Is this a masterful stroke or a risky gamble? Only time will tell.That same day, Mrs. Palin had to share the limelight with Gustav, an impervious hurricane that was making its way toward the Gulf Coast at vertiginous speed and strength. Plans for the Republican National Convention to start on Monday had to be scrapped, while McCain and Palin made their way to Mississippi, turning this into an opportunity to distance themselves early on from Bush's fiasco during hurricane Katrina two years ago. Most Convention events were suspended for Monday and Tuesday and replaced by a bare-bones schedule of committee meetings, while the crucial events (vice-presidential speech and nomination vote) start this Wednesday and culminate Thursday with McCain's acceptance speech. This could turn out to be a blessing in disguise for Republicans. Courtesy of Gustav, now downgraded to a grade one hurricane, speeches by Bush and Cheney were cancelled. The President, who hastily made his way to New Orleans, may still speak for a short time via satellite on Wednesday, which will give him an opportunity to amend the terrible legacy of Katrina by replacing those images in the minds of the public with a much improved disaster relief response to Gustav.Palin is expected to give a good speech at the Convention. As a young political reformer who has fought corruption in her home state, she has energized the campaign. As a social conservative with deep convictions against abortion she has galvanized the conservative Evangelical base of the party. She is attractive and warm, and connects easily with the public, one of the few advantages of her political experience in Alaska, a sparsely populated state that requires extensive face-to-face contact with voters. An active hunter and life-long member of the NRA, she may be able to connect with the kind of independent blue-collar and rural voters that Obama has not been able to appeal to. But Palin has never been under the extreme national scrutiny that the next few months will bring, nor has she had to answer any unscripted questions about a wide variety of topics from the often vicious national press. Mc Cain picked her over men with extensive experience in economic matters (Mitt Romney) and in homeland security (Tom Ridge), both of whom had been extensively vetted. His choice of Palin as running mate is even more surprising if we consider that his main campaign theme against Obama was the latter's lack of executive experience. In contrast with Palin, Obama has had his trial-by-fire in the primary debates and through 18 months of campaigning. He has run against formidable candidates in the Primary, has been repeatedly tested by the media, and has emerged as the choice of Democratic voters. Palin, on the other hand, has one year of executive experience and a gaping lack of foreign policy knowledge. She is the choice of one man, John McCain, who has only met her twice. What will be the public's perception of Palin's credibility and readiness to step in as President should something happen to McCain? Did McCain, always the maverick, abdicate in his duty to the people by not choosing someone manifestly ready for the presidency? We may have some answers to these questions in a week or two.For those that expect Hillary's women to flock to the Republican side just because of McCain's Vice-presidential pick, think again. If there is one principle those women activists care about is the protection of the Roe v Wade Supreme Court decision, so they would be loath to vote for a strongly anti-abortion candidate such as Palin. Nevertheless, Obama does need to worry about the white blue-collar workers' vote. He has been consistently ahead in the polls but the margin has narrowed somewhat. He is now 6 percentage points ahead in the polls (47% to 41%) but so far has been unable to break the 50% barrier. Given the byzantine workings of the Electoral College in a presidential election, even a sliver of independents and Reagan democrats here and there (especially in Ohio, Pennsylvania and Michigan) can win this election for McCain. The long-awaited Autumn of Freedom would then become for many, the Winter of Discontent.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
Tras la victoria del Frente Popular en febrero de 1936, la Iglesia debió asumir el fracaso de su intento de reformar la Constitución española y aquellas leyes que le resultaban más perjudiciales. Se materializaron entonces nuevos retos y peligros que amenazaban su posición. Nuestro análisis pretende abarcar el modo en que la Santa Sede trató de posicionar a la Iglesia en la España de aquella nueva etapa. Para ello hemos usado las fuentes archivísticas vaticanas y el fondo de la Embajada española ante la Santa Sede con el propósito de estudiar detenidamente los meses que mediaron entre las elecciones de febrero y el golpe militar de julio de 1936. Su análisis nos ha revelado una posición lo suficientemente ponderada del Gobierno central de la Iglesia respecto de las grandes cuestiones que se planteaban en el país en aquellos meses que contrasta con algunas interpretaciones tradicionales. Junto a las protestas por los ataques sufridos y los deseos de modificación de las normas que le resultaban más hostiles, la Santa Sede intentó acercar posturas en materia social con los elementos más moderados de la izquierda rehusando de la actitud de la CEDA en este aspecto. La defensa de sus intereses también la hizo apelar a los derechos que le reconocía la legislación, en un primer gesto de adaptación a los procedimientos democráticos. ; After the victory of the Popular Front in February 1936, the Church needed to accept its failure to get the Spanish Constitution and all harmful laws amended. A new threatening period of time full of risk had risen. This paper analyzes how the Holy See managed the position of the Church in Spain during that period. The study of the diplomatic documents between Spain and the Holy See revealed a balanced position of the central government of the Church about the main issues debated in Spain, which may differ from some traditional beliefs. Beside protesting the attacks received and claiming the amendment of those hostile laws, the Holy See wanted to get closer to the moderate left in social politics, rejecting the CEDA position in this sense. In search of guarding its interest, the Church was claiming their legitimate rights and this would be an evidence of its adaptation to the democratic procedures.
After the victory of the Popular Front in February 1936, the Church needed to accept its failure to get the Spanish Constitution and all harmful laws amended. A new threatening period of time full of risk had risen. This paper analyzes how the Holy See managed the position of the Church in Spain during that period. The study of the diplomatic documents between Spain and the Holy See revealed a balanced position of the central government of the Church about the main issues debated in Spain, which may differ from some traditional beliefs. Beside protesting the attacks received and claiming the amendment of those hostile laws, the Holy See wanted to get closer to the moderate left in social politics, rejecting the CEDA position in this sense. In search of guarding its interest, the Church was claiming their legitimate rights and this would be an evidence of its adaptation to the democratic procedures. ; Tras la victoria del Frente Popular en febrero de 1936, la Iglesia debió asumir el fracaso de su intento de reformar la Constitución española y aquellas leyes que le resultaban más perjudiciales. Se materializaron entonces nuevos retos y peligros que amenazaban su posición. Nuestro análisis pretende abarcar el modo en que la Santa Sede trató de posicionar a la Iglesia en la España de aquella nueva etapa. Para ello hemos usado las fuentes archivísticas vaticanas y el fondo de la Embajada española ante la Santa Sede con el propósito de estudiar detenidamente los meses que mediaron entre las elecciones de febrero y el golpe militar de julio de 1936. Su análisis nos ha revelado una posición lo suficientemente ponderada del Gobierno central de la Iglesia respecto de las grandes cuestiones que se planteaban en el país en aquellos meses que contrasta con algunas interpretaciones tradicionales. Junto a las protestas por los ataques sufridos y los deseos de modificación de las normas que le resultaban más hostiles, la Santa Sede intentó acercar posturas en materia social con los elementos más moderados de la izquierda ...
Resumen: Este trabajo explora coincidencias entre dos autores que rara vez han sido puestos en relación: Erik Peterson y Augusto Del Noce. Desde la teología y la filosofía respectivamente, alcanzan ambos a ver en la sacralización del poder la degeneración de la política, alejada de cómo debería ser entendida cristianamente. Acuden a San Agustín para servirse de la distinción entre las dos ciudades para no caer en una inmanentización de lo escatológico y en un avasallamiento de la libertad de la persona. La reflexión sobre el martirio y el testimonio en el juego democrático ofrecen una sugestiva cooperación, respetuosa de la búsqueda y de la adhesión personal a la verdad, sin concebir a la política como una intrínseca confrontación. ; Abstract: This work explores coincidences between two authors who have rarely been connected: Erik Peterson and Augusto Del Noce. Departing from theology and philosophy respectively, they both discover in the sacralization of power the degeneration of politics, far from how it should be conceived in a Christian way. They reach out to Augustine to apply his distinction between the two cities, in order to prevent an immanentization of the eschatological and a subjugation of personal freedom. The reflection on martyrdom and testimony in the democratic game offer a suggestive cooperation, respectful of the search and personal attachment to the truth, not conceiving politics as an intrinsic conflict.
The "gunpowder conjuration" allowed Jacob I to justify the English Catholics Oath of Fidelity. His reflection about it is introduced through the narrow paths of the theological and political thought. In fact, the sentence given to Suárez by the French parliament in 1614 is considered, in the British and the French contexts, as a meddling of the institution in the interests of the State. Suárez aims to create a dialogue between the King's Defence and the situation British Catholics would have to face, as well as the Pope's negative response to it. In this way, two opposite views are intertwined: one, of a political nature, and the other with a broader character and sustained in the thought of the Pope. Far from defending the Pope's position, Suárez tries to settle the bases of what later would be known as freedom of conscience. ; La "conjuración de la pólvora" sirvió a Jacobo I para argumentar el Juramento de fidelidad de los católicos ingleses. La reflexión al respecto se introduce, a un mismo tiempo, por los vericuetos de la reflexión teológica y del pensamiento político. En concreto, la condena de Suárez por parte del Parlamento de París, en 1614, es vista -desde el contexto inglés y francés-, como una intromisión de este en los intereses del Estado. Suárez, por su parte, pretende hacer dialogar la Apología del rey con la situación a la que tendrán que enfrentarse los católicos ingleses y la negativa por parte del papa a la misma. Se entrecruzan dos visiones y comprensiones opuestas: una de índole político, frente a una posición de carácter más amplio, sustentada en un pensamiento, que será la del Doctor Eximio. Suárez, lejos de defender simplemente la postura del papado, intenta poner las bases de lo que más tarde podrá denominarse como libertad de conciencia.
