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As a figure of thought, the concept of freedom tends to shuttle between abstraction and ideal -- the first exemplified by Isaiah Berlin's contrast between negative and positive liberty, and the second by Philip Pettit's neo-republican conception of freedom as non-domination. Located within the realm of lived experience however, freedom is invariably forged from context-specific constraints, hence the title of the proposed pamphlet: degrees of freedom. The point of departure is to approach freedom as a practice which is 'conditioned' by enclosures of power/knowledge which are also enclosures of the imagination. In terms of destination, the objective is to explore the question of how to breach such enclosures, thereby opening out spaces for alternative ways of practising freedom to emerge. The analysis will encompass three fields of practice and examine how freedom is drawing inwards around the freedom to compete in a zero-sum game among winners and losers. To get to grips with the 'how' of this requires dispensing with analytical tools that operate on the basis of dichotomy (such as power/resistance, freedom/domination, top-down/bottom-up) while also stretching the analysis across distinct-yet-related fields of action. The book will thus begin with a brief discussion that sets out key concepts and ideas before putting these to work through an analysis of 1. Sport & Academia, and 2. Art.

To rescue the concept of freedom for the soc sci's, one must distinguish between its purely emotive usages & its various descriptive meanings. Operational definitions are given for freedom & unfreedom in the interpersonal sense (for expressions such as: 'A leaves B free to do either (mean - average) or y or z'; 'With respect to A, B is unfree to do x'. E.g. the latter expression is defined as follows: 'A makes it impossible for B to do x, or A would punish B if B did x'). Thus defined, statements about interpersonal freedom & unfreedom can be empirically tested. Interpersonal unfreedom is not identical with control or power; A may make B unfree to do (mean - average) without controlling B's behavior, & vice versa. The concept of freedom of action does not refer to someone's freedom, but to his ability to do something. The distinction between 'negative' & 'positive' freedom is therefore untenable. (AA - IPSA).

Freedom House's annual press freedom index, now covering 195 countries and territories, has tracked trends in media freedom worldwide since 1980. Freedom of the Press 2008 provides comparative rankings and examines the legal environment for the media, political pressures that influence reporting, and economic factors that affect access to information. The survey is the most authoritative assessment of media freedom around the world. Its findings are widely utilized by policymakers, scholars, press freedom advocates, journalists, and international institutions

Freedom is commonly recognized as the struggle for basic liberties, societies based upon open dialogue, human rights and democracy. The idea of freedom is central to western ideas of modernity, but this engaging, accessible book argues that if we look back at the history of the idea of freedom, then what we mean by it is far more contested than we might think. To what extent does freedom have a 'social' component, and how is it being reshaped by our dominant consumer society? This book represents a wake-up call to all those who thought our basic ideas of freedom were settled. Today, the West s

A policy or institution is often objected to on the ground that it interferes with freedom. Yet even where a policy is shown to have certain effects, it is frequently far from clear whether these effects constitute a diminution of freedom. To clear up the matter, many thinkers have tried to elucidate "the meaning of freedom." Most who have made such an attempt have missed the mark through including within "the meaning of freedom" other things which they regard as desirable besides freedom itself. It is notorious that many who attempt to say what art is tell us only what they regard as good art. Many who try to define "law" fail to give an account applicable to bad laws as well as good laws. Recently a few attempts have been made to avoid this sort of pitfall in elucidating what is meant by the familiar word "freedom." The latest and most ambitious attempt at this is made by F. E. Oppenheim in his book Dimensions of Freedom.If a man has freedom, he is free. Yet if someone is not free on a certain evening, we should not say on that account that he is lacking freedom. "Freedom" is not simply the substantive corresponding to the adjective "free," as "redness" corresponds to "red." We speak of a room as being free of dust, of a lawn as free of weeds, of milk as free of impurities. The adjective "free" is applicable in many contexts in which the substantive "freedom" is not. Freedom is literally asserted only of human beings, whether singly or in groups. When applied elsewhere, as in speaking of a tiger recovering its freedom or "freedom of the will," it is used only metaphorically, on analogy to its literal use. Yet "freedom" is clearly also not the substantive that corresponds to the adjective "free" whenever this adjective is applied to human beings.