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AbstractIn this paper, I want to discuss how particular conceptions of academic freedom can overshadow issues of justice for racialized members of the academy. In particular, the question I will explore is how we can begin to think of academic freedom in relation to, and not against, freedom from structural racial discrimination. I will explore this question in relation to presentations made at a conference on academic freedom, and through the examination of a few notable cases (both historical and contemporary) of academic freedom and racism in the classroom as well as in the blogosphere and social media.

When speaking of freedom, La Bruyère's word comes to mind—that everything has been said and that we come too late to add anything. Yet an analysis of the concept of freedom may be warranted for the very reason that it is being used by everyone to refer to whatever he considers valuable, from obedience to law (positive or natural) to autonomy and economic abundance. I believe that it is possible to assign to "freedom" in its different aspects meanings which are emotively neutral and operationally testable, and thereby to rescue for the social sciences generally and for political science in particular an important set of concepts, closely related as they are to those of power and control.One would have to start with disentangling the widely different senses in which "freedom" is being used indiscriminately. I shall deal with freedom in only two of its many meanings, interpersonal freedom and freedom of action. One of the difficulties will be to steer a middle course between the vagueness of conversational language and the awkwardness of a precise terminology; but I hope to demonstrate that such an endeavor is no idle exercise in semantics but a necessary prerequisite for the fruitful investigation of social and political phenomena.

AbstractFreedom from fear, expressly recognized in the foundational human rights treaties, has been forgotten in human rights discourse. Fear can have profound behavioural impacts. Without recognition of the importance of freedom from fear, the fulfilment of many human rights is compromised, particularly physical security. Politico-legal thought, from Montesquieu and Blackstone, has long identified the significance of security of the person and the tension between liberty and security. Comparative exploration of contemporary case law reveals disparate approaches to the recognition of security of the person as an individual right which the State is obliged to protect. Increasing the salience of security of the person and the dimension of freedom from fear in human rights decision making raises the difficult issue of balancing conflicting rights.

Freedom in the World, the Freedom House flagship survey whose findings have been published annually since 1972, is the standard-setting comparative assessment of global political rights and civil liberties. The survey ratings and narrative reports on 195 countries and 14 territories are used by policymakers, the media, international corporations, civic activists, and human rights defenders to monitor trends in democracy and track improvements and setbacks in freedom worldwide.