Suchergebnisse

The French army today consists of 3 separate parts, the traditional army, the technical army,& the militant army. Though the lines between them are not firm, the kind of men in each of them differ in background, upbringing & outlook. They all believe that the unity of the army must be preserved at any price, that it was the army that put de Gaulle into power, & that he & the 5th Republic have betrayed this trust. In spite of the short life of the Apr revolt, the problem of an army which thinks for itself remains. Slow steps are being taken by the gov to solve it, but the gulf remains; perhaps only time can narrow it. IPSA.

The French Army revolt of 1958 is a new phenomenon in French politics. The divorce of the Army from the State dates back to the Indochina war. The Algerian insurrection of 1954 seemed to confirm the army's strategic theories: that it was engaged in a fight against internat'l Communism. The Army took on the shape of an autonomous power & began to adopt the enemy's methods in the name of efficiency - & was contaminated by its spirit in the process. The Army demanded from the State a definition of policy & as the State was too weak, substituted itself for the State. The State helped this process by dele. gating its power. In 1958 the Army did not so much revolt as set up arbitration between the 2 factions; it provisionally replaced the State. General de Gaulle soon asserted his civilian power & began to deprive the Army of its pol'al power. Yet even today the Army continues to play a decisive pol'al role; it considers itself to be the repository & the interpreter of the nat'l interest. It is a negative role, an invisible pressure, but the Army does exercise indirect pol'al power of a new sort, though it seems unlikely that it will again intervene with force unless de Gaulle resigns or dies or unless a modern stable democracy is formed. IPSA.