Suchergebnisse

Die Expansion der Libysch-Arabischen Streitkräfte Khalifa Haftars im Süden Libyens verändert die Kräfteverhältnisse im Land und untergräbt die Bemühungen der Ver­einten Nationen (VN), den gewaltsamen Konflikt politisch zu lösen. Indem Haftar an Macht gewinnt, schwindet seine Bereitschaft für Zugeständnisse. Zentrale Akteure in Westlibyen sehen ihn nun als existentielle Bedrohung an. Bisher hat sich die Einheitsregierung in Tripolis Haftar gegenüber ambivalent verhalten, obwohl er sie offen ab­lehnt. Verbündete wie auch Gegner Haftars werden sie jetzt dazu drängen, Position zu beziehen. Die neue Konstellation birgt erhöhtes Eskalationspotenzial. Ohne eine sta­bile Kräftebalance wird es keine Verhandlungslösung geben können. (Autorenreferat)

Mit erheblicher Geschwindigkeit und Intensität erweitert sich das Spektrum von luftbasierten Bedrohungen. Grund dafür ist vor allem die Weitergabe von Technologien und Waffensystemen. Deutschland könnte bei der notwendigen Anpassung der Rüstungskontrolle und beim Aufbau von Luftverteidigungsfähigkeiten eine Führungsrolle übernehmen. Dazu sollte Deutschland ein PESCO-Projekt zur Kurzstreckenluftverteidigung und einen Fähigkeitscluster "Luftverteidigung" in der NATO initiieren.

Die Umsetzung des Friedensabkommens zwischen der kolumbianischen Regierung und den FARC-EP-Rebellen kommt nur schleppend voran. In viele Regionen sind neue bewaffnete und kriminelle Gruppen eingedrungen. Dort häufen sich die Morde an demobilisierten Angehörigen der Guerilla sowie an Personen, die sich für den Friedensprozess einsetzen. Wichtige Bestimmungen des Abkommens werden bislang nicht wirksam angewendet, weil sie den Interessen des Präsidenten Iván Duque zu-widerlaufen. Zudem belastet die Migrationskrise mit Venezuela die öffentlichen Kassen und erschwert den Weg zu einem friedlichen Zusammenleben in den besonders konfliktsensiblen Grenzregionen. Von "Frieden" kann daher nicht die Rede sein, denn zu ungleich ist die Umsetzung des Abkommens und zu instabil die Sicherheitslage in der Breite des Territoriums. Das Engagement der internationalen Gemeinschaft ist ein wichtiger Beitrag für die Fortsetzung des Friedensprozesses. Es sollte sich aber noch mehr auf die Absicherung von Friedensaktivisten richten. (Autorenreferat)

The recent decision by The Gambia to file a genocide case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has directed international attention again towards Rakhine State in western Myanmar, where the Rohingya people have faced discrimi­nation and persecution for decades. What took many observers by surprise was the announcement by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi that she would be travelling to The Hague to personally "defend the national interest" and thus, by extension, the actions of her former nemesis. After all, she had enjoyed broad international support precisely for her role as leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and her democratic, non-violent opposition against the military dictatorship. These develop­ments, we argue, must be understood against a wider rollback of the democratisation process. The rollback is at least partly being orchestrated by Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, and it could bode ill especially for the ethnic minorities in the country. (author's abstract)

Libya's longstanding political deadlock reached breaking point with the fighting between rival militias in Tripoli in September 2018. Throughout the preceding two years of political stalemate, the UN-led approach to negotiations remained vested in defunct institutions that blocked any progress. As a result, there was no prospect for the formation of regular security forces under government control, let alone the unification of Libya's divided security institutions. Addressing these security chal­lenges requires a new push for a transitional power-sharing agreement with a road­map towards elections. Negotiations need to involve actors with influence on the ground, including representatives of armed groups. Such a push should also include talks over new security arrangements in Tripoli, as well as efforts at reunifying eco­nomic institutions. (author's abstract)

Sweden and Finland obtain a special position within NATO strategy towards neutral states. The purpose of the paper is to analyze the background and perspectives for Sweden and Finland to join NATO in the 1990s - 2000s. This issue appeared on the top of agenda after these countries had entered the EU, and right after the Baltic states became members of NATO. Finland started to distant itself from Russia in 1990-1992, right after recognizing itself free from military and technical limitations set in the Peace treaty signed in 1947 and gaining an ability to arrange political and military alliances with other countries. Joining the Alliance has first appeared on the Finnish political agenda in the first half of the 1990s, though the political elite of Finland defining its practical relations with NATO also took into consideration the position of Russia since both countries had a long joint terrestrial border and close economic relations. Sweden started revising its foreign policy vector in 1991. The governing elite had an active discussion which ended with a compromise decision on preserving the neutral status of the country alongside with enforcing its defensive capacities. Since 1992, Finland and Sweden became participants of various agreements with NATO. Their armed forces and armaments systems have adopted the NATO standards, and have been working out their practical interaction during the joint military maneuvers and within Partnership for Peace program. In 2009 Nordic defense cooperation emerged, including three NATO participants - Iceland, Norway and Denmark. In April 2014 they signed an agreement on close military cooperation. Results: We can state without any doubt that Finland and Sweden would join NATO only when they face a real threat towards themselves. Russian policy in the region can be a trigger for that. After Crimea annexed Russia, the amount of advocates of joining NATO increased. Nevertheless, they still remain a minority. In this situation a referendum on joining NATO appears to have no perspectives. On the contrary, we should mark that both countries became involved into "crawling" integration into NATO structures: alongside with official Partnership for Peace program it takes place in the official European integration institutions. After joining the EU in 1995 Sweden and Finland are obliged to obey the joint European security and foreign policies, i.e. arranging their military and foreign policies with basic principles and directives developed jointly with other EU members, who are also participants of NATO. Thus, neutrality of these two states becomes a phantom, especially towards Russia.

The author examines the process of Soviet military involvement in the events that took place in Afghanistan from the viewpoint of the United States. This topic is poorly studied, and the author makes an attempt to fill this gap. The main goal of the paper is to consider the process of increasing involvement of the USSR in the interior Afghan affairs from the U.S. position and to trace how this position changed during 1979. Methods and materials: The author mainly relies on the document 'The secret correspondence of the foreign policy agencies of the United States on Afghanistan' and also draws documents from the U.S. Congress and a monthly bulletin from the U.S. State Department. Analysis. The special attention is paid to the period from the beginning of the spring of 1979 to the end of 1979, since it was during this period of time that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan continued to grow. Results: The author concludes that throughout 1979 and earlier, the U.S. closely followed the events in Afghanistan and Soviet actions there. However, the U.S. position on possible Soviet military involvement was expectant, and the USSR was not given strong protests, which could promote the Soviet decision on military intervention in the civil war in Afghanistan.

Kuwait has expelled fifteen Iranian diplomats and submitted a formal letter of protest to the Lebanese government as the fallout from the 'Abdali affair' reverberates around the state. Fourteen members of the suspected terror cell, charged with stockpiling large quantities of weaponry in Kuwait and receiving training from Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), disappeared in mid-July. The supreme court in Kuwait had overturned an earlier acquittal and sentenced them to between five and fifteen years' imprisonment. The diplomatic rift marks a turnaround from Emir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah's early 2017 outreach to Iranian President Rouhani, when the Emir sought to identify the parameters of a possible strategic dialogue that could dial down tensions in the Gulf. In addition to impacting the bilateral relationship between Kuwait and Iran, the affair underscores Kuwait's vulnerability to external fissures that connect domestic Kuwaiti politics with broader regional upheaval.

Die Europäische Union und die USA verfolgen zunehmend unterschiedliche Ziele und Strategien im Umgang mit Iran. Auf seiner ersten Auslandsreise im Mai 2017 rief US-Präsident Trump in Saudi-Arabien dazu auf, die Islamische Republik zu isolieren. Mit seiner Rede in Riad wurde deutlich, dass die US-Administration die Atomvereinbarung mit Iran als politisches Druckmittel sieht, um dessen regionale Aktivitäten einzudämmen. Die EU hingegen begreift den Gemeinsamen umfassenden Aktionsplan (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) als nichtverbreitungspolitischen Fortschritt und als langfristige Chance für bessere regionale Kooperation mit Iran. Diese divergierenden Perspektiven gefährden die bisher erfolgreiche Umsetzung der Vereinbarung. Daher sollte die EU Voraussetzungen dafür schaffen, sie auch dann am Leben zu halten, wenn Washington sie nicht mehr unterstützt. (Autorenreferat)

Scholars of international communication recognize that strategic narratives are important for policymaking (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, & Roselle, 2013) and scholars studying alliances suggest that communication is central to the formation and maintenance of alliances (Weitsman, 2010). This essay addresses how strategic narratives affect US alliance behavior—and hence international order—in two specific ways. First, alliance behavior can be affected by other allies' narratives as demonstrated in the case of military intervention in Libya in 2011. Here the evidence suggests that the UK and France were able to use strategic narratives to influence the decision of the US to agree to military intervention in Libya by using narratives that could evoke a fear of abandonment. Second, alliance cohesion can be affected by narrative contestation by non-allies as demonstrated in the case of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. Russia has used strategic narratives in a new media environment in an attempt to elicit a fear of entrapment to counter the US attempts to coordinate alliance support for economic sanctions. In both cases, distinguishing between system, identity, and policy narratives give us a deeper understanding of narrative contestation today. This analysis adds to our understanding of the factors that affect alliances set within a new media environment characterized by a proliferation of sources and outlets and thus a more horizontal structure of information exchange.

Since 1990s, the number of states conflicts decreased and they started saying that the classical wars disappeared but at the same time, the number of internal conflicts increased dramatically. The end of colonial regime in Africa didn't bring peace to the region - the new wave of internal conflicts and civil wars overwhelmed the region. In the given article the authors analyze political and complicated socio-economic situation in the Tropical Africa, describe the conflicts in this zone, their typology, results and factors. The authors attempt to analyze internal and external causes of conflicts in the studied region, taking into account all elements of each conflict and their interdependence. The subject of the article is the conflict as the social element presenting the important part of international reality. It is noted that the crisis in the region influences every part of economic, social, and political spheres, so the solution is not possible without structural changes. In this connection, conflicts are the logical results of regional crisis as well as uncertain activity of international society. This situation provokes the large wave of migrants from the region and inside it. The countries the Tropical Africa can't guarantee any suitable level of life for the citizens, and the situation can't be resolved without active role of international community.

Mehr als 3 Million Menschen sind seit dem Jahr 2014 vor der Gewaltherrschaft des sogenannten "Islamischen Staates" innerhalb des Irak geflohen. Trotz der fast vollständigen Rückeroberung besetzter Gebiete bleibt über die Hälfte der Binnenvertriebenen auf der Flucht. Was verhindert ihre Rückkehr? Aktuelle Umfragedaten zeigen, dass eine dauerhafte Rückkehr mehr erfordert als nur die Stabilisierung der Sicherheitssituation. Sicherheit ist eine Grundvoraussetzung, aber keine hinreichende Bedingung für die Rückkehr von Vertriebenen. Umfrageergebnisse aus dem Irak zeigen, dass viele Familien den sozialen und ökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen in ihrer Heimatregion eine ähnlich hohe Bedeutung beimessen: Nur wenn sie davon überzeugt sind, dass hier zumindest eine humanitäre Grundversorgung sichergestellt werden kann, steigt die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer dauerhaften Rückkehr. Viele Familien fürchten soziale Konflikte in ihren Heimatgemeinden. Lokale Spannungen werden vielerorts dadurch verschärft, dass sich die ethnisch-konfessionelle Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung zwischenzeitlich verändert hat. Eine dauerhafte Rückkehr ist nur dann wahrscheinlich, wenn neben der physischen Sicherheit auch ein Mindestmaß an lokalem sozialem Frieden (wieder) hergestellt werden kann. Die irakische Verwaltung ist mit der Abwicklung der Rückkehrprozesse überfordert. Auch wenn es gelingt, die politischen und sozio-ökonomischen Voraussetzungen für eine Rückkehr zu schaffen, besteht das Risiko, dass die Wiedereingliederung von hunderttausenden Vertriebenen durch fehlende amtliche Identitätsdokumente und Besitzurkunden für Land und Gebäude behindert wird. Die Rückkehr von Binnenvertriebenen ist ein zentrales Element, wenn es um die langfristige Stabilisierung des Irak geht. Die Regierung und ihre internationalen Partner - darunter auch Deutschland - können die Rückkehr unterstützen, wenn sie neben Sicherheit und Wiederaufbau zentrale Bedarfe nicht aus den Augen verlieren: die Förderung der sozialen Kohäsion und die Stärkung der Lokalverwaltung.

From 2003 to 2013, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen benefitted politically from promoting nationalism through the Preah Vihear dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. In contrast, Thai conservatives had mixed results when they laid claim to Preah Vihear and tried to use the temple to bolster their political positions. When it came to media coverage of the temple and border issue, Thailand's domestic and foreign politics, rather than Cambodia's, dominated the narrative. As a result, both countries engaged in a war of words and several military clashes between 2008 and 2013. Thailand was widely viewed as the instigator and Cambodia as the victim. However, a closer look at Cambodia's reactions to Thailand's provocations reveals an important part of the story. These quarrels and conflicts seemed to arise before major elections in Cambodia. Behind the front lines, Hun Sen used Preah Vihear and a conflict with a historical adversary to build political prestige, nationalism, and anti-Thai sentiments, co-opting it as a part of his political platform. Hun Sen employed the temple and the border dispute in his rhetoric and created public relations events celebrating the government's protection of Cambodia's sovereignty and national prestige. Among other factors, Preah Vihear helped Hun Sen win elections and maintain political power by vilifying Thailand and using nationalism. The temple became a powerful nationalistic symbol.

The conflicts in the South China Sea have come to dominate debates on Southeast Asian security and specifically on how boundary disputes have been managed within the region. Yet, the case is not necessarily exemplary for the way Southeast Asian countries have dealt with territorial disputes generally. The article gathers three common perceptions about conflict management that are strongly informed by the South China Sea case, but have lesser relevance when looking at other territorial conflicts in the region. I offer a critical reading of the who, why, and how of territorial conflict management and provide tentative guidelines on what to expect in the future.