Suchergebnisse

Weltweit diskutieren Wissenschaftler und Politiker sowie Vertreter von Wettbewerbsbehörden und Finanzmarktregulierern die Bedeutung indirekter Unternehmensverflechtungen über institutionelle Anleger für den Wettbewerb zwischen den verflochtenen Unternehmen. Das Risikopotenzial ergibt sich daraus, dass aus Sicht eines Miteigentümers ein Wettbewerb auf Kosten eines Konkurrenten unattraktiver wird, falls der Miteigentümer auch bei diesem Konkurrenten beteiligt ist. Die erwogenen Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung dieses Risikopotenzials mögen bislang hinsichtlich ihrer Effektivität und Umsetzbarkeit unausgereift erscheinen, die Diskussion über diese Maßnahmen ist dennoch notwendig. Steht doch nicht weniger als die Funktionsfähigkeit der wichtigsten Grundlage der sozialen Marktwirtschaft zur Disposition.

Chinese companies sometimes appoint a government official (bureaucrat) as CEO on the expectation of benefiting from the political connections of the new hire. Based on a sample of 2,454 CEO transitions our empirical findings are consistent with the implications of a simple contract model in oligopolistic markets. Firms that appoint a bureaucrat as CEO obtain more credit and subsidies. They have positive abnormal announcement returns, negative abnormal long-run returns and larger variance of long-run returns. Furthermore, they experience a deterioration in operating performances, increased rent-seeking behavior of the management and weakening of corporate governance. The results from the split share structure reform in 2005 corroborate the supportive findings for the preferential treatment hypothesis.

Die Monopolkommission kommt in ihrem aktuellen Gutachten zu dem Ergebnis, dass indirekte Horizontalverflechtungen zwischen Unternehmen desselben Marktes über institutionelle Investoren ein wettbewerbsverzerrendes Potenzial bilden. Durch Minderheitsbeteiligungen institutioneller Anleger an mehreren Anbietern einer Branche könne das Interesse an der Gesamtmarktrendite im Vordergrund stehen, was die Anreize zu wettbewerblichem Verhalten abschwächt. ; The Monopolies Commission, which advises the German government in competition policy making, warns against potential anti competitive effects of indirect horizontal links between competitors via institutional investors. Through such common ownership, the competitive conduct between suppliers could be alleviated, because their (joint) institutional shareholders interest in the overall market return may outweigh their interest in the individual fi rms' returns. Taking account of the ubiquity of such common ownership in European and global markets as well as a non consideration in current competition law, the Monopolies Commission's call for more research and vigilance appears to be appropriate.

Der "St. Tönis Tack'scher Spar- und Darlehnskassenverein eingetragene Genossenschaft mit unbeschränkter Haftung" war 1895 Teil einer Gründungswelle kleiner Spar- und Darlehnskassen. Die genossenschaftliche Bank ist mitterweile in der Volksbank Krefeld aufgegangen. 1932 war sie zahlungsunfähig. Weniger die gesamtwirtschaftlichen Umstände als eigenmächtiges, fahrlässiges und strafbares Handeln der Funktionäre und Gremien waren dafür verantwortlich. Obwohl der Reichsverband der deutschen landwirtschaftlichen Genossenschaften - Raiffeisen - e.V. die "Reichsgenossenschaftshilfe" bei der Regierung Brüning nur für Darlehnskassen einforderte,"die ohne eigenes Verschulden .sanierungsbedürftig geworden sind", war die kleine Tack'sche Kasse großer Profiteur der Staatshilfe. Denn der Staat hatte es der Agralobby überlassen, die Hilfe zu verteilen. Trotz dieser Hilfe gelang es der Bank nicht, das Vertrauen der Kundschaft wiederzugewinnen. Es dauerte fast 30 Jahre, bis ihr ein Neuanfang gelang. Die Reichsgenossenschaftshilfe hat diesen Neuanfang nicht bewirkt. Sie hat nur das Vermögen der Einleger gerettet, die nicht zur "unbeschränkten Haftung" herangezogen worden waren. Diese Rechtsform als Eigenkapitalersatz hat sich zumindest bei der Tack'schen nicht bewährt. Und Hilfen ohne Konsequenzen für die Grundsätze guter Unternehmensführung auch nicht. ; The "St. Tönis Tack'scher Spar- und Darlehnskassenverein eingetragene Genossenschaft mit unbeschränkter Haftung" was a co-operative bank that was founded in 1895 in the Lower Rhine-area as part of a wave of new banks in rural regions at that time. It has since merged with the leading co-operative bank in the region, the Volksbank Krefeld. In 1932 the institute became insolvent. This, however, was not caused by the Great Depression, but first and foremost by the failure of the leading staff, who often acted arbitrarily, negligently, even penally. Although the national association of co-operatives pushed for governmental grants only for those co-operative banks who had not become in need of redevelopment through their own fault, this small co-operative bank was a big beneficiary of state aid ("Reichsgenossenschaftshilfe"). For the state had left it to the agricultural lobby to distribute the aid. Despite the big amount of public help the rescued bank didn't regain the clients respect and reliance for nearly thirty years. The legal status as bank with unlimited liability didn't play any role. This status couldn't replace liable equity. And allocating subsidies without imposing conditions for better corporate governance ended in lost money, albeit, obviously not for the single associate. But the state aid didn't liven up the business of this co-operative bank.

Motivation: Representation of employees in corporate governance bodies is, on the one hand, an important element in the democratisation of labour relations, while on the other hand, it can bring notable positive benefits to businesses. It is standard practice in a decided majority of the old EU countries, but only to a limited extent does it function in the countries which joined the EU in 2004 and later.Aim: The author of the article has defined two important goals. The first one is to present solutions concerning employee representation in individual EU countries. The second goal is to present earlier attempts to harmonise the EU legislation on the matters of such representation and to indicate the possibility of such harmonisation under the current conditions.Results: What has been noted in the article is that as many as 10 EU countries have no legislation concerning employee representation in corporate bodies. Although such legislation exists in other countries, the implemented solutions are heavily diversified. It has also been evidenced that the past attempts aimed to harmonise this sphere have generally failed. Against such background, establishing what is commonly referred to as a European Company with employee representation in its corporate governance bodies should be considered as a success, but due to a very limited range of such companies, it is but a partial success.

Motivation: Representation of employees in corporate governance bodies is, on the one hand, an important element in the democratisation of labour relations, while on the other hand, it can bring notable positive benefits to businesses. It is standard practice in a decided majority of the old EU countries, but only to a limited extent does it function in the countries which joined the EU in 2004 and later.Aim: The author of the article has defined two important goals. The first one is to present solutions concerning employee representation in individual EU countries. The second goal is to present earlier attempts to harmonise the EU legislation on the matters of such representation and to indicate the possibility of such harmonisation under the current conditions.Results: What has been noted in the article is that as many as 10 EU countries have no legislation concerning employee representation in corporate bodies. Although such legislation exists in other countries, the implemented solutions are heavily diversified. It has also been evidenced that the past attempts aimed to harmonise this sphere have generally failed. Against such background, establishing what is commonly referred to as a European Company with employee representation in its corporate governance bodies should be considered as a success, but due to a very limited range of such companies, it is but a partial success.

A new paradigm for public management, called New Public Management, has emerged since the 1980s that is formed to confront at present problems. This model is originated from the fusion of economic theories and private sector management techniques. The most relief particulars of this model are decreasing government size, the decentralization of management authority, the emphasis on efficiency, effectiveness and economy. This paper examines how New Public Management (NPM) impacts on fulfilling different aspects of accountability in the public sector. In the Traditional Approach of Accountability, politicians and civil servants are liable to elected authorities but in this approach also, they should be liable to people. Therefore, in NPM there is a shift in accountability from the political to the managerial sphere and from input and processes to output and outcomes. The result shows under this approach, operational and managerial accountability fulfill but are not considered political and financial aspects of accountability.

Exploiting the Japanese banking crisis as a laboratory, we provide firm-level evidence on the real effects of bank bailouts. Government recapitalizations result in positive abnormal returns for the clients of recapitalized banks. After recapitalizations, banks extend larger loans to their clients and some firms increase investment, but do not create more jobs than comparable firms. Most importantly, recapitalizations allow banks to extend larger loans to low and high quality firms alike, and low quality firms experience higher abnormal returns than other firms. Interestingly, recapitalizations by private investors have similar effects. Moreover, bank mergers engineered to enhance bank stability appear to hurt the borrowers of the sounder banks involved in the mergers.