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This paper critically evaluates the argument that all government spending is, from the perspective of economic theory, simply consumption spending. The argument is questionable because it assumes that for investment to be meaningful, it must be directed toward consumer satisfaction, where "consumers� are a group mutually exclusive from government officials. Further, it assumes that government officials can be neither future- or consumer-oriented in their behavior. Related to these points, the argument also contains terminology structured so as to rule out objections simply by definition. In addition, the consumption theory of government spending also potentially incorporates hidden value judgments. Finally, the argument actually overlooks important facts about government production which would otherwise go unnoticed.

An entirely standard economic analysis is that government should be doing some part of the investing in a country. A lot is resting on that qualifier "some" there. Even we would agree that investment in the rule of law - as an example - is something government should be doing. But others take this much further. The argument does become that as government can borrow more cheaply then and therefore government should be doing the building of all large projects. This doesn't convince for a number of reasons but the most obvious is this: Thurrock's plight echoes recent insolvencies at Croydon, Slough, and Woking councils, each of which fell into difficulty after borrowing hundreds of millions of pounds to pump into ill-starred commercial investment and regeneration schemes.Those local councils were able to borrow at lower than market rates via a special scheme at the Treasury. They should, therefore, have been making super-profits. If your financing costs are lower than anyone else can possibly achieve then you really should be making higher profits than anyone else - the very definition of super-profits.As we can see it hasn't worked out that way. And no, we can't then turn around and say central government would do it better - not with HS2 staring us in the face we can't.The problem here is that people not used to thinking in commercial terms just aren't any good at investing even on better than commercial terms. So, in order to hoard and save societal resources we shouldn't allow the non-commercial world to be deciding upon investments. Not for any moral or ideological reasons but just because they're so damned bad at it. That local councils go bust left, right and centre even with the use of lower than market price money just shows that we shouldn't be using local councils to do any investing. QED.We can now define that word "some" to a useful level of accuracy in this application of it. Government may be the investor where only government can be the investor. Government may not be the investor where government may or could be the investor.That this entirely puts the kibosh on Mariana Mazzucato's ideas of modern corporatism is just one of those pieces of collateral damage that we'll all have to put up with.

This report provides an overview of a pattern of historic inequities in funding that led to federal recognition and support for Hispanic Serving Institutions HSI, explains the current revenue streams available to these institutions, and examines trends in government investment during and immediately following the recent recession that could threaten their long-term viability ; American Council on Education ; Center for Policy Research and Strategy

Infrastructure development in Indonesia is in the development stage. The movement of economic growth rate in a country cannot be separated from the availability of infrastructure. Infrastructure in Indonesia is budgeted in the State Expenditure Budget (APBN), taking into account the amount of these funds obtained from loans made by the State. Where usually, the StateState guarantees the negotiable instruments owned by the StateState. Loans made by the StateState are intended to finance infrastructure development in Indonesia. In budgeting funds for financing infrastructure development, the government can only bear one-third of the total funding needed to build infrastructure. This study aims to provide an alternative concept of infrastructure financing with a sharia financial system using government infrastructure development financing with Sukuk. This research was conducted by analysis using the AMOS 23 application. The variables used were Sukuk investment returns), Sukuk Risk, Sukuk Investor Satisfaction and Government Investment in Infrastructure. The results obtained that these variables affect the Government investment in the Infrastructure Sector.

AbstractA critical issue for many governments is boosting the adoption rates of products or technologies that enhance consumer surplus or total social welfare. Governments may, for example, pay subsidies to producers or to consumers to stimulate the manufacture or consumption of specific products, for example, energy‐efficient appliances or more effective drugs. This research proposes a strategic government investment policy, namely, share acquisition, and demonstrates its effectiveness in reaching societal objectives. We consider a Cournot quantities‐choice market comprised of homogeneous firms where the government intervenes to buy shares, and turning private firms into state‐owned enterprises. We recognize that purchasing a single private firm is the optimal policy for the government to reach its societal objectives. Additionally, taking into consideration financial constraints, we find that the optimal stake increases with the budget. Compared with the optimal output‐based subsidy policy, when the budget is low, the optimal government investment policy induces a higher consumer surplus. In addition, in differentiated Cournot competition, under which firms compete in selling substitutable products, we find that when the budget is sufficient, the optimal stake purchased first decreases and then increases according to the substitutability level among products.