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Purpose– This study aims to examine the conditions that help businesses develop confidence in their government regulators. Businesses are dependent upon governments and subject to their regulations. This study proposes that businesses and governments that confirm each other's social face have the relationship that helps businesses become confident in their government regulators. It also uses the theory of cooperation and competition to identify when they confirm social face.Design/methodology/approach– Data were collected in Shanghai, China, from government bodies and business organizations from diverse industries. One hundred forty-six pairs of government officials and business managers provided us data for our analysis.Findings– Structural equation analysis suggests that cooperative, but not competitive or independent, goals provide the foundation for mutual confirmation of social face that in turn results in business confidence that the government is competent, caring and regulates effectively.Practical implications– These findings were interpreted as reaffirming the value of relationships for collaboration between business and government and the usefulness of the concepts of social face and goal interdependence for understanding how to develop high-quality business–government relationships in China.Originality/value– This study directly investigates social face among Chinese people and explores its impact on inter-organizational government–business relationships. This study uses social face and goal interdependence to understand when business and regulators develop relationships that promote effective regulation.

Bill Maher talks about America's failure to build

"This book offers documentation for the first time of how corporations have captured Canadian government agencies set up to protect the public. Eighteen authors, experts in their fields, describe how federal agencies do their job to regulate industries -- oil, nuclear, pharmaceuticals, construction, international mining, finance and more. In virtually every case, they find that the agency has set aside the public interest to favour corporate interests. They also find that government legislation, policies limiting regulations, ongoing working relationships with "stakeholders" that often take place in secret, lobbying, financing of regulatory agencies by regulated industries, and job movement between industry and government all combine to produce these captive regulatory agencies. The result is that government continuously and often disastrously fails to protect the public interest. The results are a degraded environment, increased inequality in society, loss of trust in government, and avoidable deaths. Editor Bruce Campbell concludes the book with a set of proposals that would restore the primacy of the public interest in the work of government agencies."

AbstractThe ability to borrow is important for government survival. Governments routinely resort to policies that privilege their own debt on financial markets, exploiting their dual role as borrowers and regulators. We label such policies as borrowing privileges. These borrowing privileges nudge investors to hold the government's own debt. They share similarities with prudential regulation, but skew the market in favor of the government's debt; and they share similarities with financial repression, but are less severe and thus consistent with the growth of financial markets. Introducing the first systematic dataset documenting the use of such policies across countries and over time, we demonstrate that governments implement borrowing privileges when their interactions with the global economy heighten fiscal needs: when borrowing costs indicate tightened access to credit, when trade liberalization undercuts revenue, and where fixed exchange rates increase the value of fiscal space. Despite the mobility of financial assets and constraints from global markets, governments retain latitude in regulating domestic markets to their own fiscal benefit.

We examine the correlation between federal government activity and performance of the capital's National Football League team, the Washington Redskins. We find a positive, non-spurious, and robust correlation between the Redskins' winning percentage and bureaucratic output, measured by pages published in the Federal Register. Because the Redskins' performance is prototypically exogenous, we give this result a causal interpretation and provide a plausible, causal mechanism: bureaucrats must make "logrolling" deals to expand their regulatory power, and a winning football team offers a shared source of optimism to lubricate such negotiations. We do not find the same correlation when examining congressional activity. Adapted from the source document.

Since the 1970s, there has been a tremendous growth in government regulation pertaining to risk and the environment. These efforts have emerged quite legitimately because market processes alone cannot fully address risk-related concerns.' Without some kind of regulation or liability, for example, firms lack appropriate incentives to restrict their pollution. Similarly, when products or activities are extremely risky, if people are not cognizant of the risks they face, the firms generating the hazards may not have adequate incentives to issue warnings. To solve these problems, regulatory agencies have mounted a wide variety of efforts to improve the quality of the air we breathe, the water we drink, the products we use, and the workplaces where we toil. Notwithstanding the legitimate impetus for these regulatory activities, government agencies sometimes overstep their bounds. The presence of market failure creates a potential role for government action, but this action must be well conceived. A clearly misguided and unduly burdensome regulation certainly would not be in society's best interest even if it were intended to address a legitimate social problem. As in other policy contexts, the task is to structure regulatory efforts to promote society's welfare as effectively as possible.

An authoritative study of attempts to deregulate and roll back the state in Britain from 1979-1997. Compliance cost assessment was the new tool used by the UK government to evaluate the likely impact of legislative proposals on business. The authors analyze the system and, using case studies, evaluate its performance as a technique of economic appraisal and as a way of controlling civil servants. Comparisons are made with the European Fiche d'impact and the American regulatory impact analysis. Given the considerable importance of CCA, and the dearth of literature on it, the book makes a significant contribution to the understanding of public policy-making.

This report began with the premise that the main public service regulators should be leading exponents of sustainable development, and encourage the bodies they regulate to do the same. ; Publisher PDF

Regulatory administrations are increasingly fragmented. Regulation is produced by multi-actor multi-level constellations. Researchers have described how actors in such constellations coordinate with each other. This article explores how coordination affects the decision-making autonomy of agencies, using a case study of energy regulation in Belgium. It describes the extent of autonomy from the parent minister and explores how the regulator coordinates with other actors at multiple levels of government. The findings indicate that de facto discretion of regulators can be increased or reduced by other governmental actors besides the parent minister. This calls for the development of a 'relational perspective' on (regulatory) agency autonomy, which looks at relations with multiple actors, even when these actors have no direct principal–agent relationship with the agency.Points for practitionersIn recent decades, many Western governments have created independent regulatory agencies. The accumulation of these agencies across policy sectors and across levels of government has been associated with the creation of new coordination mechanisms. However, these trends may have certain unintended consequences. When authority is fragmented, the capacity for single actors to intervene may be reduced. Coordination may affect the de facto decision-making capacity of regulators. When agencies use inter-organizational relations to build up expertise, the autonomy vis-à-vis the parent minister may increase. However, when coordination mechanisms are based only on informal, voluntary agreements, these mechanisms may fail to compensate for all resource dependencies.