Suchergebnisse

One of the biggest problems of game management is game damage which goes to great expense. It has been increasing since 1994 countrywide. In the last hunting year more than 1600 million HUF were paid nationwide for it. Nearly 10% of it was paid by the largest game manager company the SEFAG Inc. in Somogy county. According to various literary sources the reason of forest- and agricultural damage is the increasing number of deer and wild boar. In spite of it we suppose that game damage is influenced by other factors. We set examining these factors as an aim with the help of the methods of statistic and operative research. We have the basic pieces of information from the data base of the two forestries of SEFAG Inc. In the two forestries the amount of game damage, the number of the cases and the amount of missing crop grew. The quantity of damaged fields shows a downward tendency in the case of Kaposvár Forestry. There is a strong connection between the game damage cases and the amount of game damage. Per capita the game damage rose in the Kaposvár Forestry while in Zselic Forestry it fell. Examining the measurement of the fields we came to the conclusion that in most cases the majority of game damage falls to the areas with less than 5 ha. While the amount of game damage and the missing crop – depending on the forestries – are the largest in the cases of the areas with more than 10 ha. There is an inverse relationship between the plot size and the number of the cases, a medium inverse relationship between the plot size and the amount of game damage and a weak inverse correlation between the plot size and the missing crops. ; A vadgazdálkodás egyik legnagyobb problémája a nagy kiadásokat jelentő vadkár, amely 1994 óta országos szinten nő. Az elmúlt vadászati évben az országosan kifizetett összes vadkár több mint 1,6 milliárd Ft volt. Ennek közel 10%-át fizette Somogy megye legnagyobb vadgazdálkodója a SEFAG Zrt. Több irodalmi forrás szerint az erdei- és mezőgazdasági kár oka a túlszaporodott szarvas- és vaddisznóállomány. Ennek ellenére feltételezhető, hogy a vadkárt más tényezők is befolyásolják. Ezek vizsgálatát tűztük ki célul, a statisztika és az operáció kutatás módszereinek segítségével a SEFAG Zrt. Kaposvári és Zselici erdészeténél. Mindkét erdészetnél nőtt a vadkár összege, az esetek száma és a vadkár által kiesett termény mennyisége. A károsított parcellák mennyisége azonban a Kaposvári Erdészet esetében csökkenő tendenciát mutat. A vadkár esetek és a vadkár összege között szoros összefüggés van. Az egy hektárra vetített vadkár (q/ha, Ft/ha) a Kaposvári Erdészetnél nőtt, míg a Zselicinél csökkenő tendenciát mutat. A parcellaméret nagyságát vizsgálva arra a következtetésre jutottunk, hogy a vadkár esetek többsége az 5 hektárnál kisebb területekre esik, míg a vadkár összege és a kiesett termés mennyisége – erdészettől függően – a 10 hektár feletti területeken a legnagyobb. A parcellák nagysága az esetek számával ellentétes kapcsolatban van, a vadkár összegével közepes, míg a kiesett termény mennyiségével gyenge ellentétes kapcsolatot mutat.

Nowadays, the optimal usage of exhausting natural resources is a serious economic, social and political question. For this reason, in this paper we examine how the optimal sustainable use and allocation of these resources can be achieved in a sustainable way using different game theoretic models. As the proper solution needs the cooperation of national economies, the optimization driven by own interest should be completely changed. In this examination, we use the tools of cooperative game theory to describe ecomomies' strategic behaviour and their interactions. Moreover, we describe different well-known game theoretic solution concepts (e.g. Core, Shaply-value, Nucleolus) with special focus on their required fairness properties. The fairness properties, detailed in this paper, can ensure stable and acceptable allocations for the player at individual and coalitional level as well. Besides the theoretical descriptions, we give some practical example related to games defined on different water supply management problems (e. g. urban water management, irrigation problems, hydro power licensing etc.).

The EU is bound to respect the national identities of Member States. States might, at occasions, define their national identities in ways that breach inclusive constitutional values (e.g. equality) protected under TEU Article 2. The assumption behind the recognition of diverse constitutional identities is the peaceful coexistence of both, which is challenged by illiberal national developments. Instead, we see a zero-sum game between the constitutional recognition of exclusive values (e.g. dominant ethnicity or religion) and inclusive constitutional values; every gain by the proponents of emergent authoritarianism translates to a loss on the side of constitutional democracy. While exclusive norms appear in virtually every constitutional system, a critical mass of exclusive values can lead to the hollowing out of a democratic order, both on the national and on the supranational level. To try to draw the line where this shift happens, we are relying on the limits of toleration, and recognition, of exclusive norms and identity elements of minority communities in liberal theories of multiculturalism (e.g. Raz, Taylor, Kymlicka). We think that the case of illiberal minorities raise structurally similar theoretical questions, insights, and experiences than the dilemma defined above, the challenge of illiberal Member States undermining EU fundamental values.