Suchergebnisse

The ultimate goal of game theory is to provide a theoretical model for strategic situations' analysis, i.e. for situations where one actor's choice depends on the behavior of other players in the game. As a concept, game theory is also applicable to the legal context. Legal dialectics and processes are often conducted in some form of strategic interactions. Game theory is a way to see how legal rules affect particular actors' behavior. International Economic Law has its own dynamics which makes the process similar to the analysis through the game theoretical tools. Therefore, the rules of international law are considered as the rules of the game that are taking place among different actors. Game theoretical considerations clarify the substance of the interaction and cooperation of players involved (states, international organizations and other actors). Game theory provides a basis for normative analysis of the issue of implementation of the rules of international law and improves understanding of those rules. The topic of the paper is the application of the game theory in the context of the legal framework established by the World Trade Organization. The member states' dilemma between using the advantages and liberalization options provided by the WTO on the one hand, and joining the regional trade agreements, on the other one, is strategic by nature. Therefore, game theory can contribute to understanding and resolving, using the game of 'prisoner's dilemma' as a model. It is the game which clearly shows that a group of rational egoists can end up worse than a group of actors that acts prima facie contrary to their own interests. 'Prisoner's dilemma' demonstrates why society and law has the need for coordination as well as mechanisms for co-operation. WTO member states put emphasis on the process of liberalization conducted in the framework of regional trade agreements (RTAs); at the same time, their participation in WTO negotiations is not effective and efficient enough to make a breakthrough in the multilateral framework. A solution of the game for Member States is not to cooperate: i. e, liberalization is primarily achieved through regional agreements rather than within the WTO. The rational decision of the Member States (opting for a regional approach) has resulted in a suboptimal result, which is a basic characteristic of the game model based on a prisoner's dilemma: in this case, the optimal solution would be cooperation through a multilateral framework (World Trade Organization).

The paper discusses the role of the European Parliament in the inter-institutional quest for power on the ground of the effectiveness of its control over the supra- national institutions and bodies with the intelligence function as well as in the protection of the right to privacy. The starting assumption is that, despite the Lisbon reform, the powers and jurisdiction of the European Parliament are still quite limited with a view to oversight of the EU policy implementation and the performance of the EU institutions, respectively. The author examines the following cases: the recently revealed practice of massive electronic surveillance of the EU citizens' communication, the unselective processing of personal data, and the semi-secretive set up of a supranational intelligence function out of the MEPs' reach. The analyzed cases show that the European Parliament's control powers are weak when it comes to the issues that demand a narrow technical expertise, but still can endanger civil rights. The author concludes that the protection of the right to privacy can indicate the real power of the Parliament in future dynamics of the supranational institutional framework.

The dissertation explores the causes of the Euro crisis of 2009, using the institutional explanation in social sciences and the game theory. It includes discussions on the role of fiscal and monetary policies for stabilization of the economy, a brief history of monetary unions, as well as a summary of the European monetary integration process. Key findings of the dissertation are considering strategic situations in which the Member States have been involved before and after the creation of the European Economic and Monetary Union and the euro, which can be analysed using the game theory. The institutional design of the European Communities, after the breakup of the Breton Woods system, has put the Members States in the strategic situation of prisoner's dilemma, which in turn made coordination of monetary policies and exchange rates unfeasible. The creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) made possible for the Member States to overcome the dilemma by transferring the monetary policy from national to the European level of governance. Unfortunately, the institutional design of the EMU created a specific set of the interdependence of the Member States and the institutional incentives which created a new collective action problem. The new problem can be observed as a strategic situation of the chicken game in which the Member States again does not have the incentive to act in the accordance with the rules in the same, cooperative manner. Finally, the dissertation analyses the institutional consequences of the crisis and the incentives emerged after the post-crisis reforms. The conclusion is that the reforms should prevent similar euro crisis. On the other hand, questions could be raised regarding the power shift among the main bodies of the European Union. ; Rad se bavi istraživanjem uzroka krize evra nastale 2009. godine, oslanjajući se na institucionalno objašnjenje u društvenim naukama i teoriju igara. Disertacija sadrži rasprave o ulozi fiskalne i monetarne politike za stabilizaciju privrede, kratku istoriju monetarnih unija pre Evropske ekonomske i monetarne unije (EMU), kao i sažetu istoriju evropske monetarne integracije. Ključni nalazi disertacije su tiču se strateških situacija koje su dovele do nastanka jedinstvene evropske valute i kasnije do njene krize, koje je moguće analizirati uz pomoć teorije igara. Institucionalni aranžman Evropskih zajednica nakon raspada Bretonvudskog sistema stavio je države članice u stratešku situaciju zatvorenikove dileme, što je činilo koordinaciju monetarnih politike i deviznog kursa neodrživim. Kako bi se prevazišao taj problem, formirana je EMU kojom je uveden evro, a monetarna politika prenesena na sa nacionalnog evropski nivo vlasti. Međutim dizajn EMU stvorio specifičan spoj međuzavisnosti i podsticaja iz koga je nastao nov problem kolektivnog delanja za države članice monetarne unije. Taj problem se ogleda u strateškoj situaciji igre kukavice u kojoj učesnici nemaju podsticaj da se ponašaju na istovetan, kooperativan način. Na kraju disertacije analizirani su podsticaji nastali sprovedenih institucionalnih reformi. Zaključak je će reforme najverovatnije sprečiti da nastanak slične krize u budućnosti, ali i da se mogu otvoriti nova pitanja u vezi sa promenom ravnoteže moći unutar organa EU.

In this paper, we tried to analyze the consequences of the transitional process in the societies of the South-West Balkan, primarily on the example of Serbia. The indicators that we have found by the research clearly speak in favor of the fact that the transition is the cause of peripheralization of these societies. Citizens who entered the transitional processes with hope - imagining them as the accomplishment of the best European values - soon were convinced that the transition is only another manner to place these countries in the position to be exploited by multinational capital and developed, 'old' member of the EU, as well as to serve for squaring accounts in geopolitical games of the creators of the 'new world order'. In the case of the countries of the Western Balkan, the transition had the characteristic that, among other things, it was performed in conditions of political violence: destruction of the joint state of Yugoslavia, civil and religious war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, aggression of NATO to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, destabilization of Serbia through the attempt of Kosovo secession, etc., therefore, in the conditions that were extremely antihistorical. While the Europe was uniting, the Balkan was disintegrating. At least two out of the three 'ideas that conquered the world' (Mandelbaum) have been violated: the peace and the democracy. Free market in the conditions when there was no peace and regarding democratically insufficiently consolidated societies could not bring their progress, but on the contrary, as we established, only regression. That is the reason why the destroyed and collided South-Balkan societies, contrary to the European vow of their political elites, are today de facto much further from the European aspirations than they were quarter of the century ago. With their policy, the countries of the West have contributed to De- Europeanization of the South-West Balkan and strengthening of the Euroscepticism with citizens of those countries that still have not joined the EU, like Serbia. In fact, the citizens of Serbia can hardly recognize in the policy of the EU those values that have been usually considered European and which we mentioned at the beginning of this paper.

The subject of this dissertation is the mutual relationship between institutions and economic growth and development. The analysis focuses especially on this relationship during the privatization process in Serbia, as well as the influence of institutional quality on the process of privatization. Accordingly, the theoretical framework of this thesis represents institutional economics, which as a theoretical concept, points out the role and importance of institutions for economic growth and development of each country. The institutions create the "rules of the game", that represent the normative framework of given economy, as well as the mechanisms that affect its efficiency. According to this theoretical concept, economic analysis can not be reduced to an examination of the market and market relations, but must also include the institutions that regulate the market and allow its efficient functioning. The dissertation first discusses the theoretical bases of institutional economics and provide the basic elements of its genesis (old institutionalism and new institutional economics). On this basis, the basic concepts of institutional economics are defined and their methodological meaning for the purposes of the analysis are determined in this dissertation. That is why it is specifically discussed the role of rules and contracts and property rights and transaction costs, particularly in terms of economic efficiency. Using the above basic concepts of institutional economics is analyzed and the fundamental question of this dissertation - the influence of institutional quality on the privatization process and its effects in Serbia, and consequently its economic growth and development. Different outcome of institutional reforms and attitude towards them is in transition countries resulted in different levels of their economic development and to a large extent determined by the character of the economic system and the quality of its institutions. Uneven development in these countries is due to the different institutional capacities, conditioned by the political and economic determinants. Developed countries in transition had the better of the institution, which has allowed them to implement the overall reform faster and more efficiently. On the other hand, the less developed countries find themselves in front of urgent institutional reforms that did not have adequate economic base, resulting in the potential for economic growth was much slower. There were no adequate and quality institutions. Determine what kind of economic and institutional environment did the process of privatization in Serbia is an important element of this dissertation. ; Predmet istraživanja ovog rada je međusobni odnos institucija i privrednog rasta i razvoja. Analiza se posebno fokusira na ovaj odnos tokom procesa privatizacije u Srbiji, kao i na uticaj kvaliteta institucija na sam proces privatizacije. U skladu sa tim, teorijski okvir ove disertacije predstavlja institucionalna ekonomija, koja kao teorijski koncept, u prvi plan ističe ulogu i značaj institucija za privredni rast i razvoj svake zemlje. Institucije kreiraju "pravila igre", odnosno predstavljaju normativni okvir date ekonomije, kao i mehanizme koji utiču na njenu efikasnost. Prema ovom teorijskom konceptu, ekonomska analiza se ne može svesti samo na ispitivanje tržišta i tržišnih odnosa, već mora obuhvatiti i institucije koje uređuju tržište i omogućavaju njegovo efikasno funkcionisanje. U radu se najprije razmatraju teorijske osnove institucionalne ekonomije i daju osnovni elementi njene geneze (stari institucionalizam i nova institucionalna ekonomija). Na toj osnovi se definišu osnovni pojmovi institucionalne ekonomije i određuje njihov metodološki smisao za potrebe analize koja se vrši u ovom radu. Tako se posebno razmatra uloga pravila i ugovora, te svojinska prava i transakcioni troškovi, prvenstveno sa aspekta ekonomske efikasnosti. Primjenom navedenih osnovnih pojmova institucionalne ekonomije analizira se i osnovno pitanje ovog rada – uticaj kvaliteta institucija na proces privatizacije i njegove efekte u Srbiji, a posledično i na njen privredni rast i razvoj. Različit ishod institucionalnih reformi i odnos prema njima je u zemljama u tranziciji rezultirao različitim nivoom njihovog ekonomskog razvoja i u značajnoj mjeri je odredio karakter ekonomskog sistema i kvalitet njegovih institucija. Nejednak razvoj u tim zemljama je posledica različitih institucionalnih kapaciteta, uslovljenih političkim i ekonomskim determinantama. Razvijenije zemlje u tranziciji su imale i kvalitetnije institucije, što im je omogućilo da sveukupne reforme sprovedu brže i efikasnije. Sa druge strane, manje razvijenije zemlje su se našle pred neodložnim institucionalnim reformama za koje nisu imale odgovarajuću ekonomsku podlogu, usled čega je njihov ekonomski razvoj bio znatno sporiji. Nisu postojale adekvatne i kvalitetne institucije. Utvrditi u kakvom ekonomskom i institucionalnom okruženju je tekao proces privatizacije u Srbiji predstavlja važan element ovog rada.