Suchergebnisse

Los fundamentos teóricos y prácticos del presupuesto como herramienta de planificación y control, tuvieron su origen en el sector gubernamental a finales del siglo XVIII, cuando se presentaban al Parlamento Británico los planes de gastos del Reino y se daban pautas sobre su posible ejecución y control. Desde el punto de vista técnico de la palabra, se deriva del francés antiguo bougette o bolsa. Dicha acepción intentó perfeccionarse posteriormente en el sistema inglés con el término budget de conocimiento común y que recibe en nuestro idioma la denominación de presupuesto Entre 1912 y 1925, y en especial después de la Primera Guerra Mundial, el sector privado notó los beneficios que podía generar la utilización del presupuesto en materia de control de gastos, y destinó recursos en aquellos aspectos necesarios para obtener márgenes de rendimiento adecuados durante un ciclo de operación determinado. En este período, las industrias crecen con rapidez y se piensa en el empleo de métodos de planeación empresarial apropiados. El papel desempeñado por los presupuestos lo destacan prestigiosos tratadistas modernos quienes señalan lo vital de los pronósticos relacionados con el manejo de efectivo. ; Universidad CES ; Especialización ; The theoretical and practical foundations of budgeting as a planning tool and control, originated in the government sector at the end of the 18th century, when Kingdom spending plans were presented to the British Parliament and guidelines were given on its possible execution and control. From a technical point of view the word is derived from Old French bougette or bag. This meaning was later refined in the English system with the budget term of common knowledge and that receives in our language the denomination budget. Between 1912 and 1925, and especially after the First World War, the private sector noticed the benefits that the use of the budget could generate in terms of control expenses, and allocated resources in those aspects necessary to obtain margins of adequate performance during a given operating cycle. In this period, industries are growing rapidly and planning methods are considered appropriate business. The role played by budgets is highlighted by prestigious writers who point out the vitality of forecasts related to the management of cash.

Afriat (1967) showed the equivalence of the strong axiom of revealed preference and the existence of a solution to a set of linear inequalities. From this solution he constructed a utility function rationalizing the choices of a competitive consumer. We extend Afriat's theorem to a class of nonlinear budget sets. We thereby obtain testable implications of rational behavior for a wide class of economic environments, and a constructive method to derive individual preferences from observed choices. In an application to market games, we identify a set of observable restrictions characterizing Nash equilibrium outcomes.

The European Union is an unprecedented institution in the world, and therefore the general budget of the European Union is a specific budget, different from the national public budgets or the budgets of different organizations. This article studies the peculiarities of the European Union general budget, its essence and role in the economic governance, as well as the position of this budget in European financial system. The article is based on a complex analysis of the revenues and expenditures of the general budget of the European Union and of the interconnections between the general budget and the budgets of the Member States, in order to ensure the sustainability of public finances in the European Union at present.

As a financial contribution harmonised among donors, general budget support
facilitates the implementation of national poverty reduction strategies
and promotes governance in partner countries. Apart from this financial
contribution to the national budget, the standard budget support package
also involves intensive policy dialogue between donors and the partner
government, as well as accompanying measures to strengthen country
systems. In the portfolio of German development cooperation, accompanying
measures to budget support have gained in importance.
This evaluation was designed to examine if, how and under which circumstances
accompanying measures to budget support can contribute to the
objectives of budget support. Questions on the relevance, effectiveness
and success factors of these measures were answered based on a literature
study, a portfolio analysis, an online survey and semi-structured interviews.
Furthermore, the interrelations between accompanying measures and other
elements of the package of budget support were analysed.

The paper discusses implications for practice and theory of the recently completed Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 2004-06 based on case studies in Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Uganda and Vietnam. The paper first looks at the extent to which general budget support, on the evidence of the evaluation, stands up to common criticisms of the effects of aid on government in low income, aid dependent countries. Allowing for much caution owing to the short period of partnership general budget support (PGBS) programmes in some countries, the finding is that there are small but positive impacts (notably reducing unnecessary transaction costs and increasing discretion of government—thereby raising allocative and operational efficiency). Net benefits are generally greater where PGBS programmes are longer established. Areas of uncertainty regarding future effects are its uncertain overall contribution to the private sector and growth, its vulnerability to changes in political relations, and the limitations to raising 'pro-poor expenditure'—the main tool it has used to leverage increases in health and education spending; long term improvements in access and quality of public services will rely on better planning, budgeting and services management. The paper then considers how the evaluation results affect the way that PGBS is understood in theory: (i) it first suggests that PGBS raises entitlements (by increasing confidence that there will be continuing flows of budget support) which encourages policy development and stable donor-government collaboration structures, to which other shorter term aid arrangements gravitate, thereby reducing previous coordination failures; (ii) relations in organizations are then identified on a spectrum from market through club to hierarchy. Applied to PGBS coordination structures this suggests they are aspirant clubs, with hierarchical features strongest where PGBS is least established, and club features stronger where government is more capable and assertive; (iii) entitlements are accompanied by rules which attempt to raise positive incentive effects of the entitlement and reduce its negative incentive effects. In PGBS arrangements rules vary from hierarchical (e.g., prior actions), through club oriented (e.g., assessment on medium term trends) to market oriented (performance payments related to achievement on specific indicators). The analysis of rules in relation to PGBS incentives and operating environments (on a spectrum from rigid/uncertain to flexible/predictable) concludes that fine tuning rules in rigid/uncertain operating environments is counterproductive. Integrating PGBS performance assessment frameworks (PAFs) into government plans and monitoring systems will serve to unify rules. – aid ; budget support ; entitlement ; rules ; club ; market ; coordination

The present paper explores the extent to which new joint General Budget Support (GBS) systems have been able to overcome the problems of aid dependency and negative fiscal incentives that can potentially result from high levels of on-budget aid. As approximately 90 percent of new joint GBS goes to sub-Saharan Africa, this analysis, which covers the period from 2000 to 2008, evaluates data from 37 sub-Saharan developing countries. According to fixed effect and system GMM estimations, joint GBS assistance - although highly discretionary - does not undermine recipients' revenue mobilization efforts. Indeed, on the contrary, while aid in general has no measurable impact on recipients' revenue performance, joint GBS programs are associated with higher revenue mobilization. This suggests that on-budget aid delivered under well-targeted conditionality successfully mitigates adverse fiscal incentives while substantially enhancing recipients' fiscal space. -- budget support ; fiscal response ; revenue mobilization ; sub-Saharan Africa

I examine impacts of general budget support in 12 countries using the synthetic control approach. First, I analyse changes in government expenditures on health before and after the introduction of budget support. Second, I look at neonatal mortality (a presumed proxy for improvements in health services), concentrating on the countries that increased their health spending following the introduction of general budget support. The results indicate that, at least in Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, and Malawi, budget support did have a positive effect on health spending and, except for Rwanda, neonatal mortality rate declined relatively faster than in the synthetic control countries.