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Genocide is one of the crimes that are included in gross violations of Human Rights (Human Rights) where this crime is related to ethnic cleansing which is also included in crimes against various political groups because it is difficult to identify which causes an international problem in a country. The crime of genocide in international criminal law is an extraordinary crime and is a prohibited act which was later included in the 1948 Genocide Convention, the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 1998 Rome statute.

This book explores concepts of Cultural genocide, its definitions, place in international law, the systems and methods that contribute to its manifestations, and its occurrences. Through a systematic approach and comprehensive analysis, international and interdisciplinary contributors from the fields of genocide studies, legal studies, criminology, sociology, archaeology, human rights, colonial studies, and anthropology examine the legal, structural, and political issues associated with cultural genocide. This includes a series of geographically representative case studies from the USA, Brazil, Australia, West Papua, Iraq, Palestine, Iran, and Canada.This volume is unique in its interdisciplinarity, regional coverage, and the various methods of cultural genocide represented, and will be of interest to scholars of genocide studies, cultural studies and human rights, international law, international relations, indigenous studies, anthropology, and history.

Bangladesh is recently prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators of crimes against humanity and genocide committed in the Liberation War of 1971 via a domestically operated tribunal, namely the International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh (ICTB). Though the Tribunal is preceded under municipal law, its material jurisdiction, i.e., crimes against humanity and genocide, originated from international criminal law. Therefore, this study examines several legal obligations of the ICTB in defining crimes against humanity and genocide as the core international crimes. First, I discuss several legal flaws of the Tribunal by defining crimes against humanity and genocide under the ICTB Statute and jurisprudence. Second, I scrutinize the legal status of international (treaty and customary) laws in Bangladesh's legal system. Third, by applying international criminal law standards, I focus on the idea that it is one of the obligations of Bangladesh to apply international criminal law definitions of genocide under the treaty obligation as the contracting parties to Genocide Convention 1948, and the ICC Statute 1998. Fourthly, I also discuss whether Bangladesh has any obligation to apply customary international law definition of crimes against humanity because crimes against humanity are considered jus cogens offenses in general international law, from which no derogation is permitted. Lastly, I conclude that Bangladesh Tribunal failed to fulfill its legal obligation to define international crimes under the treaty and customary laws and forward a way to be implemented to improve the legislative system of Bangladesh and harmonize it with international legislation.

In contrast to prosecuting and punishing committed acts of genocide, the Genocide Convention is silent as to means of preventing future acts. Today it is generally accepted that the duty to prevent is legally binding, but there is still uncertainty in international law about its specific content. This article seeks to fill this gap in the light of the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention. It provides a minimum requirement approach, i.e. indispensable State actions to comply with their duty to prevent: naming and shaming situations of genocide as what they are. Even situations from times before the Genocide Convention was in force must be named and shamed today. Although the Convention is not retroactive, events from the pre-Convention era are relevant. They are necessary links to strengthen a general awareness what constitutes genocide and by that cater to the (also) legal purpose to prevent future acts of genocide.

In contrast to prosecuting and punishing committed acts of genocide, the Genocide Convention is silent as to means of preventing future acts. Today it is generally accepted that the duty to prevent is legally binding, but there is still uncertainty in international law about its specific content. This article seeks to fill this gap in the light of the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention. It provides a minimum requirement approach, i.e. indispensable State actions to comply with their duty to prevent: naming and shaming situations of genocide as what they are. Even situations from times before the Genocide Convention was in force must be named and shamed today. Although the Convention is not retroactive, events from the pre-Convention era are relevant. They are necessary links to strengthen a general awareness what constitutes genocide and by that cater to the (also) legal purpose to prevent future acts of genocide.

This article displays the idea of indigenizing international law by recognizing indigenous law as law. It is by directing indigenous jurisprudences to the framework of international law that the possibility of transforming its roots becomes possible—I call this process inverse legal anthropology. In indigenizing international law using an inverse legal anthropology, the article presents a case study on the ongoing genocide of Colombian indigenous peoples in the age of the global ecology of the Anthropocene. In this context, I explain the political consequences of valuing indigenous cosmologies regarding their territories. Indeed, mainstream representations of indigenous territories, taking into consideration the topographic and biologic dimensions of the earth's surface, have forgotten the pluriverse of organic and inorganic beings that make and negotiate their social living together with indigenous peoples' ecological and spiritual relations.

This paper analyzes the generally muted international response to the protracted plight of the Rohingya, a persecuted Muslim minority in Myanmar, from the perspective of sociology of law. The first part provides background on the Rohingya crisis and discusses relevant international legal frameworks relating to crimes against humanity and genocide. The second part adapts analytical frameworks developed by Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat on the emergence and transformation of disputes, in order to examine some of the factors that frustrate the processes of naming crimes, blaming perpetrators, and claiming rights and protection for the Rohingya minority in the international context. Work by Bumiller and Edelman concerning models of legal protection, legal ambiguity, and the mediating effects of symbolic structures of compliance augment the analysis. Ambiguity as to when to apply the terms crimes against humanity or genocide, and the legal and political implications that flow from naming such crimes, feed reluctance to act on the part of states. Related factors constraining effective responses include a lack of a clear, streamlined process for naming crimes, along with weak preventive norms mandating action in the absence of legal certainty. As a result of these conditions, authority diffuses as to which institutions or actors have the power and obligation to name crimes and determine appropriate responses. Competing political and economic considerations obfuscate states' willingness to engage the issue, and certain organizations and bodies have limited capacity to enforce their prevention and protection mandates or to submit them to external scrutiny. Together, these factors combine to portray a weak institutionalization of remedies, which Miller and Sarat have recognized serves to minimize disputing and limit the probability of success. This sociological approach thus helps to clarify fundamental constraints on and distinguishing characteristics of the international legal system in responding to atrocities.

International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary presents a comprehensive practice-oriented explanation of the development of major areas in substantive international criminal law through a selection of key illustrative cases from domestic and international jurisdictions. The book focuses on law related to individual criminal liability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression, with specific attention paid to sources of international criminal law, fundamental principles of criminal responsibility, and defences. The decisions presented in the book are helpfully accompanied by short introductions setting out the circumstances of each case and brief commentaries on the importance of the decision and principles illustrated. ; https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-books/1022/thumbnail.jpg

What is traditional for common crimes can scarcely be oppressive innovation for mass-murder. Even freedom of communication is not, furthermore, an absolute in democratic preference: security and human decency must likewise have their place. It is no little irony that argument must be made in support of a convention to suppress genocide. "The spectacle," writes a contemporary journal of opinion, "of modern man explaining his right to existence is an odd one." The Genocide Convention is but one of many interrelated measures in a world-wide program to secure peace and respect for the dignity of the individual human being. Rational appraisal of this Convention requires both a perspective of the centuries of man's long struggle for freedom and security by promulgating doctrine and balancing power and a realistic orientation in the contemporary interdependences of peoples everywhere in securing and maintaining a minimum of security and basic human rights. Even in a world where nations are feverishly inventing and creating new instruments for mass-murder of hither to unimaginable scope, it may still serve some purpose for peoples seeking survival to take this opportunity to restate their demand for fundamental human dignity, to reannounce their consensus on behalf of all mankind, and to recelebrate the identifications of all free peoples with each other. Unless this ideal is kept constantly at the focus of public attention there may be no fire in men's hearts to preserve it

La pertinence du Génocide Arménien ne peut être sous-estimée de nos jours. Mis à part son importance pour les Arméniens, le succès de la Turquie, en tant qu'État successeur de l'Empire Ottoman, à échapper à la punition pour sa responsabilité durant les 96 dernières années a été considéré comme précurseur pour les génocides subséquents, de l'Holocauste des Juifs au Génocide au Darfour. Nous examinerons les raisons pour lesquelles la règle coutumière du droit international, la Responsabilité de l'État, n'était pas respectée, et en particulier le rôle que la Realpolitik internationale a joué en exonérant la Turquie et les agents agissant pour elle. Des avenues légales et politiques viables sont proposées pour faire respecter le principe de la Responsabilité de l'État et les réparations qui en découlent en vertu des lois et des jurisprudences internationales. ; Abstract: The significance of the Armenian genocide on current affairs cannot be undermined. While it has undoubtedly made its mark on the Armenian people, this genocide has also had further reaching significance. Turkey, as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, successfully avoided responsibility for its culpability for over several generations, and its example has been considered the foreshadowing for subsequent genocides spanning from the Holocaust to the present-day genocide in Darfur. This paper begins by examining why customary international law governing state responsibility has not been applied. It also analyses the role that international Realpolitik has played in exonerating Turkey and its agents. Viable international legal and political avenues, based on current legislation and jurisprudence, are proposed as a mechanism for enforcing the principle of state responsibility and for implementing reparation.

International criminal law, as a system of legal regulations found in acts of the international community and criminal legislations of individual states, establishes criminal liability and punishments for crimes against international law. These acts represent breaches of the laws and customs of war (international humanitarian law) that violate or threaten peace among nations and the security of mankind. Penalties prescribed for these criminal offences stand for the most severe penalties in contemporary criminal legislation. In some cases, international judiciary (supranational) institutions such as The Nurnberg and The Tokyo Tribunal, The Hague Tribunal, The Rome Court etc. have primary jurisdiction over perpetrators of these criminal offences. This criminal offence means the killing of a nation or a tribe. Genocide was proclaimed as "a crime under international law, which is in contradiction with the spirit and the aims of the OUN and condemned by the entire civilized world" by UN General Assembly Resolution 96/I from 11 December 1946. Although it emerged as a "subspecies of crime against humanity", genocide rapidly obtained an autonomous status and contents as one of the most serious crimes of today. As a crime against international law, genocide is determined by three elements: a) the objective componentаctus reaus b) the subjective componentмеns rea c) the subject of the act-the group-the victim. The source of this incrimination is found in Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide from 1948, which, in paragraph 2, defines the term and the elements of this crime against international law. In legislation, theory and practice, this term can be interpreted in the broader sense, as well. In this paper the author has analyzed theoretical and practical aspects of genocide in international criminal law and criminal law of Republic of Serbia (former FR Yugoslavia).

International criminal law, as a system of legal regulations embodied in the acts of international community and criminal legislations of individual states, establishes criminal liability and punishment for crimes against international law. These acts constitute breaches of the laws and customs of war (international humanitarian law) that violate or threaten peace among nations and the security of mankind. Penalties prescribed for these criminal offences are the most severe penalties in contemporary criminal legislation. In some cases, the international judicial (supranational) institutions such as the Nurnberg and the Tokyo Tribunal, the Hague Tribunal, the International Criminal Court (etc.) have primary jurisdiction over perpetrators of these criminal offences. The criminal act of genocide is defined as the killing of a nation or a tribe. In the UN General Assembly Resolution 96/I of 11th December 1946, genocide was proclaimed as "a crime under international law, which is in contradiction with the spirit and the aims of the OUN and condemned by the entire civilized world". Although it emerged as a "subspecies of crime against humanity", genocide rapidly obtained an autonomous status and contents as one of the most serious crimes of today. As a crime against international law, genocide is established on the basis of three elements: a) the objective component - аctus reus; b) the subjective component - mеns rea; c) the object of the act - the group (the victim). The source of this incrimination is found in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which, in Article 2, defines the notion and the elements of this crime against international law. In legislation, theory and practice, this term can be interpreted in a broader sense as well. In this paper, the author analyses the theoretical and practical aspects of genocide in international criminal law and criminal law of the Republic of Serbia (including former FR Yugoslavia). Key words: international law, humanity, crime, ...

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm has spawned a lot academic literature since its formulation in 2001. The focus of these has mainly been on the responsibility to react, the second of the tri-partite continuum that makes up the R2P norm. This is undoubtedly due to the controversial nature associated with military action. This preoccupation ignores the importance of the initial step of R2P – the responsibility to prevent. This is compounded by the fact that presently prevention is mostly focused on the prevention of genocide. This is problematic because state practice in relation to the prevention of genocide usually is to ensure that genocide is occurring before prevention begins. This detracts from R2P's equal theoretical treatment of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing – vastly different crimes. It is my contention that the present level and nature of focus on prevention in international law would undermine the utility of R2P as an instrument to be used by the international community. An individual state's compliance with R2P within its borders is easy to evaluate; it is in the extra-territorial exercise of R2P that problems arise. This article aims to examine the responsibility to prevent by dissecting the component crimes of R2P and their prevention, examining prevention through the overarching lens of disciplines in international law and the various practicalities that impede prevention. The inclusion of the prevention gross human rights violations in the ambit of R2P is examined as an answer to the difficulties addressed.

This paper analyses the legal definition of the crime of genocide by means of the law of the Republic of Lithuania, criminal law literature and international legal sources. Attention is also given to the problematics of the crime of genocide as constitutionality of a legal rule. In order to discuss the crime of genocide as clearly and in as much detail as possible, its separate elements were analyzed, objective and subjective constituent elements of the crime of genocide were distinguished by means of the analysis of constituent elements of criminal acts. In analysing the case-law of Lithuanian courts, the obstacles of application of criminal liability are observed when criminal prosecution is applied to the persons whose activity is regarded as criminal by persons who are protected by international law. In the present paper, these problems are assessed with regard to the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania regarding the crime of genocide, the latest Lithuanian case-law and the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights.

This paper analyses the legal definition of the crime of genocide by means of the law of the Republic of Lithuania, criminal law literature and international legal sources. Attention is also given to the problematics of the crime of genocide as constitutionality of a legal rule. In order to discuss the crime of genocide as clearly and in as much detail as possible, its separate elements were analyzed, objective and subjective constituent elements of the crime of genocide were distinguished by means of the analysis of constituent elements of criminal acts. In analysing the case-law of Lithuanian courts, the obstacles of application of criminal liability are observed when criminal prosecution is applied to the persons whose activity is regarded as criminal by persons who are protected by international law. In the present paper, these problems are assessed with regard to the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania regarding the crime of genocide, the latest Lithuanian case-law and the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights.