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After the collapse of Soviet Union in Central Asia geopolitical vacuum formed where the major powers of the world, including neighbors of republics of Central Asia, tried there to increase their influence. Interests in gaining influence in Central Asia were determined not only by common interest spheres of realism, as increasing geopolitical power or power restriction of possible rivals, but also aspects of neorealism like energy security and economical influence, which are even more important. In that way, pipelines of energetic resources are not only in sphere of economical interest, but also is the way of gaining geopolitical power. Russia, as the dominant power in Eurasian continent, tries to regain its lost impact on Central Asia after collapse of Soviet Union. After 1991 it started to plan the ways of expansion its economical and political power to Central Asia through development of oil and gas transportation pipelines which pass its territory. After gaining independence, republics of Central Asia didn't have clear vision of their foreign policy, and their ties with Russia were still very strong and determined by common history and political culture, so Russia could do stronger impact on gaining beneficial pipelines routes, in that way eventually, strengthening its influence in world market of energy resources and also international politics. The President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin greatly influenced Russian foreign politics based on energy resources and transportation routes, which helps Russia to regain influence in all other spheres. Western countries, and United States in the first place, acting on their own and through their partners, mainly Turkey, tied to gain greater influence in Central Asia through diversifying pipelines routes, and avoiding routes through Russian territory.[.].

After the collapse of Soviet Union in Central Asia geopolitical vacuum formed where the major powers of the world, including neighbors of republics of Central Asia, tried there to increase their influence. Interests in gaining influence in Central Asia were determined not only by common interest spheres of realism, as increasing geopolitical power or power restriction of possible rivals, but also aspects of neorealism like energy security and economical influence, which are even more important. In that way, pipelines of energetic resources are not only in sphere of economical interest, but also is the way of gaining geopolitical power. Russia, as the dominant power in Eurasian continent, tries to regain its lost impact on Central Asia after collapse of Soviet Union. After 1991 it started to plan the ways of expansion its economical and political power to Central Asia through development of oil and gas transportation pipelines which pass its territory. After gaining independence, republics of Central Asia didn't have clear vision of their foreign policy, and their ties with Russia were still very strong and determined by common history and political culture, so Russia could do stronger impact on gaining beneficial pipelines routes, in that way eventually, strengthening its influence in world market of energy resources and also international politics. The President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin greatly influenced Russian foreign politics based on energy resources and transportation routes, which helps Russia to regain influence in all other spheres. Western countries, and United States in the first place, acting on their own and through their partners, mainly Turkey, tied to gain greater influence in Central Asia through diversifying pipelines routes, and avoiding routes through Russian territory.[.].

After the collapse of Soviet Union in Central Asia geopolitical vacuum formed where the major powers of the world, including neighbors of republics of Central Asia, tried there to increase their influence. Interests in gaining influence in Central Asia were determined not only by common interest spheres of realism, as increasing geopolitical power or power restriction of possible rivals, but also aspects of neorealism like energy security and economical influence, which are even more important. In that way, pipelines of energetic resources are not only in sphere of economical interest, but also is the way of gaining geopolitical power. Russia, as the dominant power in Eurasian continent, tries to regain its lost impact on Central Asia after collapse of Soviet Union. After 1991 it started to plan the ways of expansion its economical and political power to Central Asia through development of oil and gas transportation pipelines which pass its territory. After gaining independence, republics of Central Asia didn't have clear vision of their foreign policy, and their ties with Russia were still very strong and determined by common history and political culture, so Russia could do stronger impact on gaining beneficial pipelines routes, in that way eventually, strengthening its influence in world market of energy resources and also international politics. The President of Russian Federation Vladimir Putin greatly influenced Russian foreign politics based on energy resources and transportation routes, which helps Russia to regain influence in all other spheres. Western countries, and United States in the first place, acting on their own and through their partners, mainly Turkey, tied to gain greater influence in Central Asia through diversifying pipelines routes, and avoiding routes through Russian territory.[.].

Middle and Eastern European region is both historically and politically complicated. The effect of this we can also detect in countries understanding security. In order to countries to collaborate and reach mutual relations, and not only via international agreements, but also in bilateral relations, security priorities should be as identical as possible. It seems reasonable that same region should have same or identical security strategies. Purpose of research – analyse four different Middle and Eastern European countries, in particular – Lithuanian, Latvian, Polish and Hungarian – national security strategies. Research countries are part of defensive alliances such as NATO, and on surface of it, this means same basic principles regarding making national security strategies. However, during research it was discovered that same region – Middle and Eastern European – countires prioritise different risks, main difference being identifying Russia, as a risk, between Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. In a meantime, Hungary prioritises risk coming from illegal migration, and Russia is left further down in priorities. More over, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland carefully sees possibility for relationship improvement with Russia, but Hungary is rather warm in that regard. This means that Hungary's different perspective may lead to diffucult relations in both format as bilateral and international, especially then topic changes to Russia.

Middle and Eastern European region is both historically and politically complicated. The effect of this we can also detect in countries understanding security. In order to countries to collaborate and reach mutual relations, and not only via international agreements, but also in bilateral relations, security priorities should be as identical as possible. It seems reasonable that same region should have same or identical security strategies. Purpose of research – analyse four different Middle and Eastern European countries, in particular – Lithuanian, Latvian, Polish and Hungarian – national security strategies. Research countries are part of defensive alliances such as NATO, and on surface of it, this means same basic principles regarding making national security strategies. However, during research it was discovered that same region – Middle and Eastern European – countires prioritise different risks, main difference being identifying Russia, as a risk, between Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. In a meantime, Hungary prioritises risk coming from illegal migration, and Russia is left further down in priorities. More over, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland carefully sees possibility for relationship improvement with Russia, but Hungary is rather warm in that regard. This means that Hungary's different perspective may lead to diffucult relations in both format as bilateral and international, especially then topic changes to Russia.

Straipsnyje poeto, mistiko, diplomato Oskaro Milasiaus (1877-1939) palikimas nagrinejamas is politiniu ideju perspektyvos. Keliamas klausimas, kaip autorius supranta Europos vienybe, siekiama vienijimosi prielaidas isvesti is publicistiniu rastu politinemis temomis bei metafiziniu poemu 'Ars Magna' ir 'Slepiniai'. Milasiaus izvalgos galimo Europos saliu susivienijimo klausimu analizuojamos to meto idejiniame lauke, pabreziant bendrumus ir isryskinant Milasiaus savituma. Svarstoma, ar ir kokiu laipsniu poeto, rasiusio apie Jungtines Europos Valstijas, idejos galetu buti priskiriamos kuriai nors tarpukariu egzistavusiai federalistu stovyklai - liberalams paneuropistams ar katalikams. Milasiaus Europos vienybes samprata analizuojama trimis aspektais - tikslo, budo ir pagrindo. Daroma isvada, jog Milasius kritikuoja faktine Europos bukle po Pirmojo pasaulinio karo ir kaip alternatyva siulo vienybe ir dvasiniu, ir politiniu poziuriu. Teigiama, kad poetas siekia atsakyti i savo epochos klausimus savitu budu, pasitelkdamas ne tik geopolitinius, bet ir mitologinius bei mesianistinius argumentus The article examines the heritage of poet, mystic and diplomat Oscar Milosz (1877-1939) from the point of politically significant ideas. The aim is to grasp the understanding of the unity of Europe from the selected political articles 'Deux messianismes politiques' as well as metaphysical poems 'Ars Magna' and 'Les Arcanes'. The premises of Milosz are situated in the intellectual context of European unity ideas of his contemporaries. The analysis shows that Milosz is critical about the situation of interwar Europe that he faces. As an alternative to this he suggests the unity in spiritual and political sense. It is argued in the paper that poet tries to capture the main questions of his epoch, although in a very exclusive manner, by lumping together geopolitical, mythological, messianistic arguments. Adapted from the source document.

In 2004 Lithuania implemented its two most important foreign policy goals -- became the member of the European Union & NATO. However, the country will now have to assert its status & position in the Euroatlantic community of liberal democracies. Lithuania faces an arguably more complex agenda, which has no clear end-goals or deadlines. The security challenges are difficult to identify & predict. The global & European strategic environment is best characterized by an ever-growing uncertainty: the transatlantic relations continue to be tense, Russia, paradoxically, is balancing between perspective of disintegration & re-emerging as an expansionist imperial power, & the European Union is under- going one of the most severe internal crisis in decades. At the same time, the major schools of international relations theory disagree on what to make out of the current world politics. Rationalist, neorealist authors tend to give alarmist, apocalyptic accounts of the future of the nation states if they despise the iron logic of geopolitics, whereas reflectivist, constructivist authors argue that the world is "what we make of it," & thus, can be changed. These two visions of international relations inevitably lead to different policy implications. The paper consists of two parts. In the first part, the authors address the current state of affairs in the two schools of international relations: rationalism (neorealism) & reflectivism (constructivism). In the second part, the authors interchangeably explore & compare the policy options that can be derived from the two different worldviews. The article concludes that international politics for a small state are more complex than either of the schools would suggest. Although the nature of the world politics is increasingly postmodern, a lot of actors still live in a modern world of geopolitics. Lithuanian decision makers will therefore have to "play" in accordance with postmodern rules when possible, but to remember geopolitics if necessary. Grounding their view on theoretical synthesis of constructivist & realist approaches to foreign policy, The authors asserts, that Lithuania's Euroatlantism should overshadow all other interests & problems of the society. The membership in the EU will have far reaching & long term consequences on Lithuanian society -- the same cannot be said about membership in NATO, or relations with the US. Lithuania must internalize the EU as a part of its corporate identity -- Lithuania is a part of Europe's collective identity. Therefore, Lithuanian political elite should cease to consider Europe as an object of Lithuanian foreign policy, rather it should become conscious itself as a subject of European policy contributing to its formation. Adapted from the source document.

Alienated fragmented identity in case of the state and nation is analyzed through cultural identity, selfidentification in historical, geopolitical, and political contexts. The main question is how a nation should stay as it was when all around there are huge political, economic, and social changes? What is the influence of internal and extern al structures in shaping the relationship between perceptions of national identity, culture, "foreign"? And what are the manifestations and consequences of real policy (that is based on mythical thinking) on the process of state and nation formation? One of the most interesting and important objects of analysis of alienated identity in the context of states and nations is Russia. This multicultural, multireligious giant constructed by coincidences, wars and aggression and having a unique cultural and historical heritage lacks only one thing – clear autoidentification.

Alienated fragmented identity in case of the state and nation is analyzed through cultural identity, selfidentification in historical, geopolitical, and political contexts. The main question is how a nation should stay as it was when all around there are huge political, economic, and social changes? What is the influence of internal and extern al structures in shaping the relationship between perceptions of national identity, culture, "foreign"? And what are the manifestations and consequences of real policy (that is based on mythical thinking) on the process of state and nation formation? One of the most interesting and important objects of analysis of alienated identity in the context of states and nations is Russia. This multicultural, multireligious giant constructed by coincidences, wars and aggression and having a unique cultural and historical heritage lacks only one thing – clear autoidentification.

In the article, the EU and Russia relations are analyzed as paying specific attention to the conceptual and practical weight provided for the conjunction "and" when EU-Russia relations are interpreted and practically constructed in the West. The answer which is in common use -- these relations are intellectually based and practically shaped according the engagement doctrine -- is known well. However, the common answer does not eliminate the problem why the perspective of the practical application of engagement toward Russia is still under dispute in the West? The article proceeds to revealing the specifics of the Western attitudes in regard to engagement with Russia and their correlation with the cultural-political identities of engagement's participants. The conjunction "and" emphasizing the EU-Russia relations is interpreted in three ways: optimistically, equably and skeptically. The diversity of interpretations is stimulating by the nodus of factors (history, values and pragmatic interests) which is still affects the EU and Russia relations as well as different attitudes toward the perspectives of co-operation in the future. The very important source of the diversity is the difference in disparity of position regarding the geopolitical development of Eurasia. The article ends with the conclusion that the direction of the EU and Russia engagement will be strongly influenced by the reciprocal attempts to define their own cultural-political identities. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of this article is to review & evaluate the condition & the development perspectives of the relations between the EU & its Eastern neighbors. The problem is analyzed in the context of the recent discussion on the "Broader Europe" concept. The current dominant model of the relations between the EU & Eastern Europe countries is described in the article using the "circular discourse" & "circular interaction" terms. This article is aimed to reveal the initial theoretical & geo/political preconditions that helped this model to become the dominant theoretical & practical approach in the field of EU -- East Europe relations, to uncover the logics of its functioning & the implications of its realization to Lithuania & the other new EU member states. Adapted from the source document.

In the sphere of construing regional identity, political science can accomplish less than philosophy. Common regional identity can never be derived from scientific cultural studies conducted in certain countries. A new cultural & philosophical meaning can never be devised on the basis of political science. It can only be the end result of philosophical imagination. Scientists can present facts which bear proof of merely cultural & political affinity. However, so far they have failed to propose any more significant concepts or images for the future of Central Europe. Mere knowledge of empirical facts cannot be treated as a philosophical discovery. Both politicians & scientists can be aware of & handle an abundance of facts, & yet a philosophical idea is needed to bind all these facts into one coherent whole. In construing the identity of Central Europe, there is no need whatever to get involved in discussions about certain given objective facts, similar to objects studied by natural sciences. There are no natural characteristics, which could predetermine the perception of regional identity, irrespective of a moral awareness of its citizens. Morality is an independent motive of human conduct, which can exert influence on the perception of regional identity. Nevertheless, today it is one of the most unpopular subjects of geopolitical discussions. Geopoliticians claim that cultural & political identity of a region must be objectively predetermined, be it by geography, economy or military power. Political philosophers seem to be the only ones who can take a stand against such a naturalist perception of regional identity. Adapted from the source document.

The primary aim of this article is to analyze how the interpretation of "universal" geopolitical ideas, especially those related to images of US power, depend on national, publishing & rhetorical interests. By comparing various predominant intellectual stances, one can see that even after the end of the Cold War its' rhetorical tropes still propel further disputes. As a result, national interests & ambitions of some politicians merge & the lines between political realism & ideologies become blurred. For example, phrases such as "the new world order," but even more often, "the new world disorder" are used indiscriminately in hundreds of titles promising accounts of the international system & its events. Thus instead of seeing rhetoric & reality as mutually exclusive opposites (which happens whenever the rhetoric is relegated to the field of myths & lies), new studies of the Cold War now generally recognize the rhetorical component of reality. This article uses Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "cultural fields" & his theoretical focus on the international circulation of ideas to discuss the rhetoric of "soft power.". Adapted from the source document.