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KaZantip is an electronic music festival held in Crimea before having to move to Georgia after the annexation of Crimea by Russia. It is defined by its Russian creators like a giant beach rave party, which lasts 24 hours a day for a month. From 1991 to 2013, KaZantip festival has attracted a growing audience: in 2010, up to 30,000 people "lived" together on the site and, in a month, more than 150,000 people stayed in. This resulted in a frenzy of real estate not or little controlled, but also significant drugs problems before a drastic regulation over the last years. The festival had become, over the seasons, a lever for tourism development in the Crimea.According to its designers, KaZantip is not a simple festival but a 'Republic' that works with his Government, his president (OrganiZator), its constitution, its Department of Foreign Affairs for communication with the outside world deemed "imperfect", his ministers of happiness, music, dance and rave, etc., and its own laws. The most important law is "SCHASTIE" (be happy and have fun)! This raises lot of questions: 1- Would this territory, self-proclaimed symbolically "independent Republic of KaZantip" be then a "cultural" innovation? A cultural state? An "urban" space devoted to a global party, for a global world, the whole being justified in relation to new values or supposed to be? The traditional link between local authorities and the festival, or even between power and music, is to be reconsidered in the context of this type of original event.2- The concept of festival would not allow apprehending the novelty of the phenomenon since the diplomatic and geopolitical dimensions are to be taken into account, not more than its amplitude, nor the importance of the values that he conveyed. The many contradictions in the statements of the various actors (organizers, public actors .) raise the question of the complexity of the links and negotiations surrounding this kind of events.3- The difficulty of surviving for powerful events since the link to the specific land that hosted those breaks, also raises the question of the territorialisation of festivals and other events.4- Finally, the utopian dimension of the event brings back to sets of values that had been at the origin of many festivals that became mythical (Monterey, Woodstock, Goa, for example) but also massive events of other kinds than they are religious (Taizé) or political (Larzac): what this massive character, the music and the youth of the population which frequents these places raise this type of reaction which not found in other events yet also massive ( matches, political events)?This utopia, in fact mainly a big business, was responsible for its success but also its problems because of its insertion in the geopolitical issues related to progressive tensions between Ukraine and Russia.The determination to break (more than a real utopia) that mark the name of the independent Republic of KaZantip was a humorous political claim, a try to thumb its nose at the history. In fact, history caught but without destroying it before the relocation and the power of the market economy strike a bigger blow. ; UMR 5281 Art-Dev Grandeur et déclin de la République indépendante de KaZantip (Ukraine) Rise and fall of the Independent Republic of KaZantip (Ukraine) Résumé KaZantip est un festival de musique électronique organisé en Crimée avant de devoir déménager en Géorgie après l'annexion de la Crimée par la Russie. Il est défini par ses créateurs russes comme une beach rave party géante, qui dure 24 heures sur 24 pendant un mois. De 1991 à 2013, le festival de KaZantip a attiré un public croissant : en 2010, jusqu'à 30 000 personnes « vivaient » ensemble sur le site ; plus de 150 000 personnes sont passées en un mois. Cela avait entraîné une frénésie immobilière pas ou peu maîtrisée, mais aussi des problèmes de drogue importants avant une régulation drastique durant les dernières années. Le festival était devenu au fil des saisons un levier du développement touristique de la Crimée. Selon ses concepteurs, KaZantip n'est pas un simple festival mais une "République" qui fonctionne avec son gouvernement, son président (OrganiZateur), sa constitution, son ministère des affaires étrangères pour la communication avec le monde extérieur réputé "imparfait", ses ministres du bonheur, de la musique, de la danse et de la rave, etc., et ses propres lois. La plus importante est : "SCHASTIE" (sois heureux et amuse-toi) ! Cela pose un certain nombre de questions : 1-Ce territoire autoproclamé symboliquement "République indépendante de KaZantip" serait-il alors une innovation "culturelle" ? Un état culturel ? Un espace "urbain" consacré à une fête globale, pour un monde global, l'ensemble se justifiant par rapport à des valeurs nouvelles ou supposées l'être ? Le lien traditionnel entre collectivités locales et festival, voire entre pouvoir et musique, est à reconsidérer dans le cadre de ce type d'événement original. 2-Le concept de festival ne permettrait pas d'appréhender la nouveauté du phénomène puisque les dimensions diplomatiques et géopolitiques sont à prendre en compte, pas plus que son ampleur, ni l'importance des valeurs qu'il véhiculait. Les nombreuses contradictions relevées dans les déclarations des différents acteurs (organisateurs, acteurs publics…) poussent à s'interroger sur la complexité des liens et des négociations qui entouraient cette manifestation. 3-La difficulté à survivre d'une manifestation pourtant puissante dès lors que le lien au territoire qui l'accueillait se rompt, pose aussi la question de la territorialisation des festivals et autres événements. 4-Enfin, la dimension utopique de la manifestation ramène à des jeux de valeurs qui avaient été à l'origine de beaucoup de festivals devenus mythiques (Monterey, Woodstock, Goa, par exemple) mais également des événements massifs d'autres natures qu'ils soient religieux (Taizé) ou politiques (Larzac) : en quoi ce caractère massif, la musique et la jeunesse de la population qui fréquente ces lieux suscitent ce type de réaction qu'on ne retrouve pas dans d'autres événements pourtant également massifs (matchs, manifestations politiques) ? Cette utopie, au fond très commerçante, fut à l'origine de son succès puis de ses problèmes à cause de son insertion dans les enjeux géopolitiques liés aux tensions progressive entre Ukraine et Russie. La volonté de rupture affichée comme utopie que marque la dénomination de République indépendante de KaZantip se voulait une revendication politique humoristique, un pied de nez à l'histoire. De fait, l'histoire l'a rattrapée mais sans la détruire avant que la délocalisation et la puissance de l'économie de marché lui porte un coup plus grave encore.

The crisis of authority in the U.S.S.R. (1988 - July 1991).
After a preliminary reference to the ideological options open to Mikhail Gorbachev, initiator of the break-up of Stalinism, and the mistrust which be inspires, both among some of his opponents as well as among right-wing conservatives, the author considers the recent evolution of the Soviet Union, from the monopoly of Party rule to the difficult birth of a pluralistic regime.
He first raises the question of the Party's attitude to perestroika. Article 6 of the Constitution of 1977, which aknowledges the leading role of the Party, was reluctantly annulled by Gorbachev, but annuled it was, thus leaving the way open for pluralism. Condemnation of factionalism within the body of the Party has not prevented the emergence of various "tendencies" (particularly the democratic Platform and the marxist Platform) which find official expression. Similarly, political and social groupings, independent of authority, began to proliferate : from groupings moved by a common principle, for example tne Safeguarding of the national heritage, or the defense of the environment, they rapidly became popular fronts, lending the system a de facto pluralism which would only later enjoy a de jure existence.
This spontaneous development took shape first of all in the Baltic countries, and then with increasing momentum spread to all the republics. In parallel with this, the communist Party leadership initiated a reform of the political system, which found expression in the semi-free elections of March 1989, marked by the defeat of various party and State notables. This was the beginning of a multi-party system, there having been two major opposing tendencies during the campaign for the regional elections in the spring of 1990 : the democratic Russia bloc (liberal) and the patriotic Russian bloc (conservative), surrounded by a multiplicity of organizations of the most diverse and constantly evolving tendencies. The charge levelled against them is that they have no autonomous ideas or initiative, and have only one single programme : mass rejection of the Party apparatus. Some observers are of the opinion that a deep schism will develop within the CPSU, and that this will give rise to a real multi-party system. The first stage of this development has just begun, with the movement for democratic reforms, which was launched in July 1991 by frontline reformers.
The other major problem which arises is that of the preservation or the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The authority of the Center is in question, and already six republics have decided to leave the union, proclaiming their sovereignty loud and long (the three Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia). But although the right of scission is officially acknowledged, its implementation is a vast battleground (see the law of 3rd April 1990). The upsurge of centrifugal forces has led the republics, one after the other,
to proclame their sovereignty (primacy of republican laws over federal laws, economic autonomy, ownership of the soil and mineral deposits, etc.) or their outright indépendance. Autonomous Republics and territories followed suit, opposing the authorities of the republics to which they belonged. Inter-ethnic conflict broke out all over.
The dispute over federal authority led to a "way over laws", setting the Centre at odd with republics resolved to insist on recognition of their rights (ownership of all the ressources found on their territory, freedom to exploit these resources, etc.). In this context, the question of finance and the budget had pride of place, together with that of material and technological supplies. The entire supply system was disorganized, with the republics refusing to carry out the orders of the State, or to deliver consumers' goods outside of their frontiers, in order to avoid a worsening of their own shortages. The Soviet government tried to combat the supply problems, at least in part, by setting up commodity markets. A series of economic programms was worked out, including V. Pavlov's anti-crisis plan (April 1991) which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but it is not entirely clear how the economic responsabilities will be apportioned among the Central authorities, the republics and the lower-rank administrative bodies, and what will be the share of the state and private sectors. Also, it is not known how he proposes to overcome the present crisis, and how long this will take.
Another major source of discord is the army and the police. The republics demand the right to raise armed forces, and to assume the responsability for maintaning order within their territory. Certain of them, who have been the victims of attacks by the special forces of the Ministry of Interior, the OMON, have organized militias and defense groups, wich are virtually republican armies in embryo.
In the end, there was an overriding necessity for redefining the Union, and the first version of the new Union Treaty was adopted by referendum on the 17th March 1991. A slightly modified version of it was published on the 19th June, but neither the one nor the other gives a very clear idea of the respective areas of competence and the common areas of competence of the Centre and the constituent republics of the Union (and still less of the fate in store for secessionist republics). On the other hand, one can be sure that the Treaty will be the source of innumerable controversies and disputes, especially on the particularly explosive issue of the budget, taxation and the distribution of ressources. In the final part, the author ventures some thoughts on the future. He sets perestroika in the continuing context of the history of the Russian empire, recalling that the demands made (individual freedoms and democracy, self-determination and decolonization) were already those of the protagonists of the Russian democratic revolution of February-March 1917, which was "taken over" by the Bolshevik coup d'Etat. Now that the empire has fallen victim to its contradictions and weaknesses, and finally disintegrated, what will take its place ? The cure prescribed by the Union Treaty seems ill-adapted to the task, and several outcomes are possible : a resolute commitment to the way of democracy and decolonization, a return to an authoritarian régime but one establishing a market economy, the option of passivity while waiting for a solution "which will come of itself, or a return to thorough-going, tough dictatorship accompanied by a blood bath. If Gorbachev does not once more take his courage in both hands, and proceeds to decolonize the empire, however slow and piecemeal the process, others will do it for him. And in that case, we may fear the worst.

Fitting the European integration process into the history of the Cold War and post-Cold War and more generally in European history longer than the "short" twentieth century, this thesis explores the history of relations between the European Commission and the South-Eastern outskirts of the continent. The long period studied allows to highlight the "deep forces" that stand behind the actions of the executive of the EEC / EU in such a critical region for Europe. To do so, we relied on the archives of the European Commission, the Council, the U.S. State Department, the British and French Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the library of Cluj-Napoca University in Romania and interviews.Divided into four parts, each focusing on a period of time, this work analyses the actions of the Commission to address the changes that have transformed the region between 1960 and 2010. The continuous adaptation of the policy of the Commission, from the "doctrine of Association" to the Black Sea Synergy, led us to develop the idea of a Süd-ost politik that was already designed in the early 1960s. However, unlike the Ostpolitik of Bonn, Brussels did not go toward the communist states of South-Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, but rather prevent their influence. The Community' Süd-Ost politik was clearly anti-communist and anti-Russian.This is the main continuity: the European Community had to block Moscow by extending the model of capitalist liberal democracy in the area around the Straits. The particular strategic situation of Athens, Ankara and later Tbilisi or Kiev is never forgotten by Brussels. In this, the Commission is part of a longer history, its action echoes the struggle between Paris, London and St. Petersburg for the control of the Turkish Straits, attempts by states in the region to copy Western European domestic models and the Eastern policy of the Western powers after the First World War.However, the Commission had to deal with the Member States that constantly reminded Brussels that its actions should remain within the framework of the Treaties. The Opinion on Greece in 1976 marks the culmination of the debate between the Council and Commission. Meanwhile, during the 1970s, the EEC executive carefully took care to stop the emergence of organizations in its periphery that could compete with the Community. This will be the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Mediterranean component but also the Balkan Cooperation.In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the Commission was uncertain of what to do with South Eastern Europe and its new extension to the Caucasus and the former Soviet republics. The Commission quickly returned to its systematic policy of extending the European model. However, the centre of community concerns was not Greece or Turkey. With the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the scope of the Community –became Union- expanded to the entire Black Sea region.However, the failure to resolve the Cyprus problem, the financial instability of Greece that threatens the entire euro zone, political crises in Turkey, the decision to keep out of Schengen space Romania and Bulgaria are examples of the difficulties faced by the Community in the region.The war in Georgia and the annexation of Crimea by Russia following the revolution in Kiev illustrate that the "soft" inoculation process of the values of the Rome Treaty does not come by itself as long as it meets a "hard" opposition.We conclude our discussion by asking the question of the capacity of the Union and its Commission to absorb eventually the whole Black Sea basin, which would put Mesopotamia and Central Asia in direct contact with the European integration process.The question is now whether the Black Sea will eventually become a "European lake ; Réinscrivant le processus d'intégration européenne dans une Histoire de la Guerre froide et post-Guerre froide et plus généralement dans une histoire européenne plus longue que le seul XXe siècle, cette thèse explore l'histoire des relations de la Commission européenne avec la périphérie sud-orientale du continent. La longue période chronologique étudiée permets de mettre en exergue les « forces profondes » qui se tiennent derrières les actions de l'exécutif de la CEE/UE dans une région critique pour l'Europe. Pour se faire, nous nous sommes basés sur les archives de la Commission européenne, du Conseil, du Département d'État américain, des Ministères des affaires étrangères français et britannique, de la bibliothèque de Cluj-Napoca en Roumanie et d'entretiens.Divisée en quatre parties, chacune se centrant sur une période chronologique, ce travail analyse l'action de la Commission face aux changements qui ont bouleversé l'Europe du Sud-est entre 1960 et 2010. L'adaptation constante de la politique de la Commission, de la « doctrine de l'Association » à la Synergie de la Mer Noire, nous ont amené à développer l'idée d'une Süd-ost politik qui se met en place dès le début des années 1960. Cependant, contrairement à l'Ostpolitik de Bonn, il ne s'agit pas pour Bruxelles d'aller vers les États communistes du Sud-est européen ou l'Union soviétique, mais plutôt de lutter contre leur influence. La Süd-Ost politik communautaire est clairement anticommuniste et antirusse.La Communauté fait barrage à Moscou en étendant le modèle de la démocratie libérale capitaliste dans la zone autour des Détroits. La situation stratégique d'Athènes, d'Ankara et plus tard de Tbilissi ou Kiev n'est pas oubliée par Bruxelles. Ainsi, la Commission s'inscrit dans une plus longue histoire, son action fait écho à la lutte entre Paris, Londres et Saint-Pétersbourg pour le contrôle des Détroits, aux tentatives des États de la région de copier les modèles nationaux d'Europe de l'Ouest et à la politique orientale des Puissances occidentales après 1918.Cependant, la Commission doit ménager des État membres qui lui rappellent sans cesse que ces actions doivent rester limitées aux traités. L'Avis sur la Grèce en 1976 marque le point culminant de ce débat entre Conseil et Commission. Parallèlement, au cours des années 1970, Bruxelles veille à ne pas laisser émerger dans sa périphérie des organisations qui pourraient la concurrencer. Il en sera ainsi de la Conférence pour la coopération et la sécurité en Europe et de son volet méditerranéen mais aussi de la Coopération Balkanique.Si la chute de l'Union soviétique fait naitre des hésitations sur la conduite à suivre vis-à-vis de l'Europe du Sud-est et sa nouvelle extension vers le Caucase et dans les anciennes républiques soviétiques. Bien vite la Commission revient à sa politique d'extension du modèle européen. Cependant, le centre des préoccupations communautaire n'est plus la Grèce ou la Turquie. Avec l'effondrement de l'Empire soviétique, le champ d'action de la Communauté -devenue Union- s'est élargi à l'ensemble de la Région Mer Noire.Pourtant, la non résolution du problème de Chypre, l'instabilité financière de la Grèce, les crises politiques turques, le maintien hors de Schengen de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie sont des exemples des difficultés rencontrées par la Communauté dans la région.La guerre en Géorgie et l'annexion de la Crimée par la Russie à la suite de la révolution à Kiev illustrent que le processus « doux » d'inoculation des valeurs du Traité de Rome ne va pas de soi du moment que celui-ci rencontre une opposition « dure ». Nous achevons notre réflexion en nous posant la question de la capacité de l'Union et de la Commission à absorber à terme l'ensemble de la Mer Noire ce qui mettrait la Mésopotamie et l'Asie centrale en contact direct avec le processus d'intégration européenne.Il s'agit maintenant de savoir si la Mer Noire deviendra un " lac Européen".