Suchergebnisse

The author seeks to show that when Germany surprised the world by signaling its disagreement with President Bush regarding the attack on Iraq, it could not be explained by Chancellor Schroder's election campaign, nor by the lack of rapport between the two leaders. At issue are differences regarding principles as well as interests in the wake of the revision of American security policy after September 11, 2001. After reunification, Germany felt freer to express its own interests regarding these & other issues such as closer European security cooperation that Washington now seems to see as a challenge to its own interests. The author concludes by suggesting that this development indicates that the disagreement between Berlin & Washington is not of a temporary nature as some would like to think. 17 References. Adapted from the source document.

Between the Second World War and the fall of the Berlin Wall Germany showed great aversion towards using military force for other purposes than territorial defense and held a multilateral balance between France and the United States with their respective ambitions EU and NATO. After the Wall fell, the German security policy started to change and German politicians increasingly argued for military use as a legitimate instrument in international politics. Among the driving forces for this process has been the change in European strategic culture as Europe is looking towards an integrated foreign and security policy, which may even go against German interest. L. Pitkaniemi

Norwegian foreign policy has historically been influenced by four factors: neutrality/isolationism, moralism, internationalism, & sector orientation, all of which can be seen in contemporary foreign policy, although the neutral/isolationist strain has been waning as the internationalist one has been waxing. There remain pronounced moralist & sector orientation tendencies. Discussed are the role played by these four factors since Norwegian independence in 1905, recognition by Norwegian policymakers of a historical triangulation of powers (first Denmark, Sweden, & Finland, then Russia, Germany, & England, followed by the USSR, the EU, & the US), the Norwegian self-image, & responses to September 11, 2001, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union & changes in Europe in the past decade. A. Siegel

The article compares the Norwegian & the German political debate on changes to the respective countries' citizenship laws. The Norwegian law will come into force in September 2006, while the German law was introduced in 2000. In citizenship laws we can find a contrast between an ethnic & cultural understanding of political community & a rights-based understanding. This contrast was hardly touched upon in the Norwegian debate. Among the Norwegian political parties there was broad agreement to carry on with the principle of ethnic decent. Moreover, all parties, with an exception of the Socialist Left Party (SV), wanted to introduce more restrictions on the established Norwegian practice to accept dual citizenship. The German debate dealt with the contrasting principles, & the conflict followed the left/right cleavages. The main difference found between the two countries refers to the left parties. Both with regard to the principle of ethnic decent/territorial principle & the acceptance of dual citizenship, the Social Democrats in Norway & Germany presented opposite standpoints. References. Adapted from the source document.