Suchergebnisse

The article is based on the premise that a constructive vote of no confidence is an institution of a political system which provides the best assurance for the stability of government and protection from governmental crises. The conditions and formal requirements of the procedure of a constructive vote of no confidence make it possible to protect a government from the consequences of the activity of an accidental negative majority. The paper aims to present and compare this procedure in the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland in terms of three main aspects: the conditions of its establishment, the actual procedure and the political consequences. A vote of constructive no confidence was introduced in Germany as a consequence of the negative experiences of the Weimar Republic, whereas in Poland it was the rational reasoning of the authors of the Constitution that provided for the procedure. The differences between the German and Polish procedures concern, among other things, the structure of the motion, the number of obligatory signatures under the motion, and the period from submission of the motion to the vote. The most fundamental political consequences of a vote of no confidence concern the strengthened position of the government and its leader, stabilization of the political system and enabling minority governments to be established. The paper concludes with the observation that a constructive vote of no confidence influences the political system and all its fundamental elements, protects the government and makes the parliamentary system more rational.

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; The objective of the article is to indicate similarities as well as discrepancies between the Polish and German governments' stands on the crisis and conflict in Ukraine. The author tries to respond to the question: What will be the implications of the conflict in Ukraine for the "Eastern policy" of Poland and Germany? Will they result in the continuation of their current "Eastern policy", its evolution or maybe they will bring an essential change to their policy in the region? In author's opinion, taking into account significant differences between the Polish and German foreign policies towards Russia and Ukraine between 2014 and 2015 as well as before that period, the possibility for enhanced cooperation between the two governments in relation to their foreign policy towards Russia and Ukraine will continue to be remote in the upcoming years.

Artykuł zarysowuje kwestię bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Unii Europejskiej oraz państw członkowskich. Nakreślony w nim został przebieg prac w Komisji Europejskiej oraz w Parlamencie Europejskim nad dokumentami unijnymi "trzeciego pakietu energetycznego" oraz nad rozporządzeniem w sprawie środków zapewniających bezpieczeństwo dostaw gazu ziemnego. Zarysowana została również postawa RFN i RP wobec budowy Gazociągu Północnego, Południowego oraz Nabucco. Poruszone kwestie rozpatrzone zostały pod kątem ich wpływu na stosunki polsko- niemieckie, zarówno bilateralne, jak i na arenie europejskiej. ; This article outlines the issue of energy security of the European Union and its Member States. It outlines the course of work in the European Commission and the European Parliament on EU documents "third energy package" and the regulation concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply. It also outlines the German and Polish attitude to the construction of the pipelines like Nord Stream, South Stream and Nabucco. Issues raised were considered for their impact on the Polish-German relations, on the basis of bilateral and European level.

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; The aim of the paper is to present signifi cance of Germany in Polish trade in goods and services as well as investment cooperation during the Poland's membership in the European Union. The role of Germany was compared to other EU-15 countries. The research was carried out using both the traditional foreign trade statistics (in gross terms) downloaded from WITS-Comtrade database and trade statistics in value added terms calculated based on World Input-Output Database (WIOD). The foreign direct investment data came from the National Bank of Poland. The research results show that since 1990s Germany has been the main trade and investment partner of Poland. It's accession to the European Union has accelerated the Polish-German economic cooperation. One of the most important factors infl uencing this cooperation was participation of Poland and Germany in global value chains.

The Kosovo conflict posed one o f the most serious international security problems in Europe at the end o f the twentieth century and in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The failure of diplomatic attempts to solve the problem led to air raids on Yugoslavia in 1999 and then resulted in Belgrade gradually losing control over the region. The interests o f the United States, Russia and the EU overlapped in Kosovo. The paper refers to diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict in 1999, especially to Germany's activity in involving Russia in the international peace process. Subsequently, the article outlines the international efforts, especially those o f the EU, in order to attain the stabilization of Kosovo and its path to independence, initially under the supervision of the EU. The role of the EU role did not end with the abolition o f its supervision of Kosovo. The EU continued to act as a mediator in the relationship between Pristina and Belgrade, contributing to a relative normalization of relations between the two parties. ; Konflikt o Kosowo okazał się jednym z najpoważniejszych problemów bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w Europie pod koniec XX wieku i w pierwszej dekadzie XXI stulecia. Niepowodzenie dyplomatycznych prób jego rozwiązania doprowadziło do nalotów na Jugosławię w 1999 r., a następnie do stopniowego wymykania się tego regionu spod kontroli Belgradu. Wokół Kosowa splatały się interesy Stanów Zjednoczonych, Rosji i państw UE. Celem artykułu jest przybliżenie dyplomatycznych działań na rzecz rozwiązania konfliktu w 1999 r., zwłaszcza aktywności Niemiec w celu zaangażowania Rosji w międzynarodowy proces pokojowy. W dalszej kolejności zarysowane zostały wysiłki społeczności międzynarodowej, zwłaszcza UE, na rzecz stabilizacji Kosowa i jego drogę ku niepodległości, początkowo pod nadzorem UE. Rola UE nie zakończyła się po zniesieniu nadzoru nad Kosowem, Unia nadal pełniła rolę mediatora w relacjach pomiędzy Prisztinąa Belgradem, przyczyniając się do względnej normalizacji stosunków pomiędzy obiema stronami.

Celem artykułu jest analiza, czy zawieranie koalicji z Niemcami wpływa na sukces Polski w procesie legislacyjnym UE. Przetestowano dwie hipotezy: 1) jeśli preferencje Polski oraz Niemiec są zgodne, to sukces Polski jest większy; 2) koalicja z Niemcami zapewnia Polsce większy sukces w obszarach o szczególnym znaczeniu dla Warszawy, to jest: w rolnictwie, energii, środowisku, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Hipotezy przetestowano za pomocą metody ilościowej – regresji liniowej na bazie DEU II. Uzyskano następujące wnioski. Po pierwsze, budowanie koalicji polsko-niemieckiej w UE jest niezmiernie skomplikowane ze względu na wyraźną sprzeczność preferencji obu państw. Po drugie, mimo to budowanie koalicji z Niemcami jest dla Polski niezmiernie opłacalne. Analiza wykazała, że gdy Polska zawiera sojusz z Niemcami, to jej sukces w procesie legislacyjnym UE widocznie wzrasta. Po trzecie, zawiązywanie koalicji z Niemcami jest szczególnie opłacalne w politykach UE, które są kluczowe z punktu widzenia interesów Polski, czyli w rolnictwie, energii, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Jedynym wyjątkiem jest obszar ochrony środowiska. ; The purpose of the article is to analyze whether building a coalition with Germany affects Poland's success in the EU's legislative process. Two hypotheses are tested: (1) when Polish and German preferences are homogenous, Poland's legislative success is greater; (2) the coalition with Germany ensures Poland's greater success in the areas of particular significance to Warsaw, that is in agriculture, energy, environment, home affairs and the single market. The above hypotheses are tested using a quantitative method of a linear regression. Regression calculations are based on the DEU II dataset. The results are as follows. First, forming a Polish-German coalition in the EU's lawmaking is extremely tricky due to strong divergences of both countries' preferences. Second, building a coalition with Germany is particularly beneficial for Poland, nevertheless. The analysis shows that when Poland enters an alliance with Germany, its success in the EU's legislative process significantly increases. Third, building a coalition with Germany is very profitable for Poland in these policy areas which are crucial from the perspective of Poland's interests, namely in agriculture, energy, home affairs and the single market. The only exception is the environment.

The purpose of the article is to analyze whether building a coalition with Germany affects Poland's success in the EU's legislative process. Two hypotheses are tested: (1) when Polish and German preferences are homogenous, Poland's legislative success is greater; (2) the coalition with Germany ensures Poland's greater success in the areas of particular significance to Warsaw, that is in agriculture, energy, environment, home affairs and the single market. The above hypotheses are tested using a quantitative method of a linear regression. Regression calculations are based on the DEU II dataset. The results are as follows. First, forming a Polish-German coalition in the EU's lawmaking is extremely tricky due to strong divergences of both countries' preferences. Second, building a coalition with Germany is particularly beneficial for Poland, nevertheless. The analysis shows that when Poland enters an alliance with Germany, its success in the EU's legislative process significantly increases. Third, building a coalition with Germany is very profitable for Poland in these policy areas which are crucial from the perspective of Poland's interests, namely in agriculture, energy, home affairs and the single market. The only exception is the environment. ; Celem artykułu jest analiza, czy zawieranie koalicji z Niemcami wpływa na sukces Polski w procesie legislacyjnym UE. Przetestowano dwie hipotezy: 1) jeśli preferencje Polski oraz Niemiec są zgodne, to sukces Polski jest większy; 2) koalicja z Niemcami zapewnia Polsce większy sukces w obszarach o szczególnym znaczeniu dla Warszawy, to jest: w rolnictwie, energii, środowisku, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Hipotezy przetestowano za pomocą metody ilościowej – regresji liniowej na bazie DEU II. Uzyskano następujące wnioski. Po pierwsze, budowanie koalicji polsko-niemieckiej w UE jest niezmiernie skomplikowane ze względu na wyraźną sprzeczność preferencji obu państw. Po drugie, mimo to budowanie koalicji z Niemcami jest dla Polski niezmiernie opłacalne. Analiza wykazała, że gdy Polska zawiera sojusz z Niemcami, to jej sukces w procesie legislacyjnym UE widocznie wzrasta. Po trzecie, zawiązywanie koalicji z Niemcami jest szczególnie opłacalne w politykach UE, które są kluczowe z punktu widzenia interesów Polski, czyli w rolnictwie, energii, sprawach wewnętrznych oraz wspólnym rynku. Jedynym wyjątkiem jest obszar ochrony środowiska.

Celem niniejszego opracowania jest nakreślenie specyfiki gospodarczych sporów transgranicznych oraz zaprezentowanie mediacji jako metody ich rozwiązywania, alternatywnej wobec sądów powszechnych, dającej zwaśnionym stronom możliwość zarówno ich szybszego i mniej kosztownego zakończenia, jak i kontynuowania relacji gospodarczych oraz rozwijania dalszej współpracy pomiędzy przedsiębiorcami. W pierwszym kroku określone zostaną cechy konstytutywne mediacji oraz specyfika mediacji transgranicznej ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem aspektów interkulturowych. W tym kontekście przedstawione zostaną specyficzne kompetencje mediatora, niezbędne do skutecznego przeprowadzenia postępowania mediacyjnego w tego typu konfliktach oraz podstawy prawne zastosowania mediacji w odniesieniu do sporów pomiędzy podmiotami z Polski i Niemiec. Omówione zostaną zarówno regulacje prawa polskiego i niemieckiego dotyczące mediacji, jak i ramy i uwarunkowania instytucjonalno-prawne postępowania mediacyjnego w UE w zakresie sporów gospodarczych o charakterze transgranicznym. Ponadto analizie poddane zostaną dane empiryczne dotyczące zakresu upowszechnienia mediacji w obu krajach, stosunku polskich i niemieckich przedsiębiorców do mediacji jako metody rozwiązywania sporów gospodarczych pomiędzy podmiotami z obu krajów oraz trudności w jej zastosowaniu wynikające z różnic kulturowych. ; This paper aims to outline the specificities of cross-border economic disputes and to present mediation as a means of solving them as an alternative to common courts, giving the parties the opportunity to settle their dispute faster and cheaper. Mediation also allows the involved parties to continue their economic relation and further develop their co-operation. In a first step the constitutive characteristics of mediation are determined and the specificity of cross-border mediation with particular emphasis onintercultural aspects is explained. In this context, the paper presents specific mediator competences necessary for effective mediation proceedings. Furthermore the legal basis for applying mediation to disputes between Polish and German entities will be described followed by the discussion of applicable regulation in both countries as well as the institutional and legal framework for mediation proceedings in the EU on cross-border economic disputes. In addition, empirical data on the scope of dissemination of mediation in both countries, the attitude of Polish and German entrepreneurs towards mediation and the difficulties of applying it due to cultural differences will be analyzed. The conclusions of the above analysis will be presented in the final section of the paper, which will provide a model of the Polish-German mediation center which aims, besides broad information activities, to create a network of professional intercultural mediators and to promote mediation as an alternative method of conflict resolution between Polish and German business entities.

Celem niniejszego opracowania jest nakreślenie specyfiki gospodarczych sporów transgranicznych oraz zaprezentowanie mediacji jako metody ich rozwiązywania, alternatywnej wobec sądów powszechnych, dającej zwaśnionym stronom możliwość zarówno ich szybszego i mniej kosztownego zakończenia, jak i kontynuowania relacji gospodarczych oraz rozwijania dalszej współpracy pomiędzy przedsiębiorcami. W pierwszym kroku określone zostaną cechy konstytutywne mediacji oraz specyfika mediacji transgranicznej ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem aspektów interkulturowych. W tym kontekście przedstawione zostaną specyficzne kompetencje mediatora, niezbędne do skutecznego przeprowadzenia postępowania mediacyjnego w tego typu konfliktach oraz podstawy prawne zastosowania mediacji w odniesieniu do sporów pomiędzy podmiotami z Polski i Niemiec. Omówione zostaną zarówno regulacje prawa polskiego i niemieckiego dotyczące mediacji, jak i ramy i uwarunkowania instytucjonalno-prawne postępowania mediacyjnego w UE w zakresie sporów gospodarczych o charakterze transgranicznym. Ponadto analizie poddane zostaną dane empiryczne dotyczące zakresu upowszechnienia mediacji w obu krajach, stosunku polskich i niemieckich przedsiębiorców do mediacji jako metody rozwiązywania sporów gospodarczych pomiędzy podmiotami z obu krajów oraz trudności w jej zastosowaniu wynikające z różnic kulturowych. ; This paper aims to outline the specificities of cross-border economic disputes and to present mediation as a means of solving them as an alternative to common courts, giving the parties the opportunity to settle their dispute faster and cheaper. Mediation also allows the involved parties to continue their economic relation and further develop their co-operation. In a first step the constitutive characteristics of mediation are determined and the specificity of cross-border mediation with particular emphasis on intercultural aspects is explained. In this context, the paper presents specific mediator competences necessary for effective mediation proceedings. Furthermore the legal basis for applying mediation to disputes between Polish and German entities will be described followed by the discussion of applicable regulation in both countries as well as the institutional and legal framework for mediation proceedings in the EU on cross-border economic disputes. In addition, empirical data on the scope of dissemination of mediation in both countries, the attitude of Polish and German entrepreneurs towards mediation and the difficulties of applying it due to cultural differences will be analyzed. The conclusions of the above analysis will be presented in the final section of the paper, which will provide a model of the Polish-German mediation center which aims, besides broad information activities, to create a network of professional intercultural mediators and to promote mediation as an alternative method of conflict resolution between Polish and German business entities. ; nr 2/2017 ; 79 ; 98 ; Przegląd Politologiczny

Following the coup d'état of December 1926, Lithuania found itself governed by the leaders of the Lithuanian Nationalists, Augustinas Voldemaras and Antanas Smetona. The article discusses Voldemaras' foreign policy during the important for Lithuania years of 1927 and 1928. It was the period of attempted reconstruction of Polish-Lithuanian relations, mainly in the context of Vilnius region, secret negotiations with the Germans to secure additional financial support for the young Lithuanian state, and policy of détente with the USSR which made it possible for Lithuania to gain a powerful ally in the argument with Poland. ; Po zamachu stanu w grudniu 1926 r. na czele Litwy stanęli liderzy partii narodowców: Augustinas Voldemaras i Antanas Smetona. W artykule omówiono politykę zagraniczną Voldemarasa w kluczowych dla Litwy latach 1927–1928. Był to okres próby przebudowy stosunków relacji polsko-litewskich, głównie w kontekście Wileńszczyzny, tajnych negocjacji z Niemcami, mających na celu pozyskanie dodatkowego wsparcia finansowego dla młodego państwa litewskiego oraz polityki zbliżenia z ZSRR, dzięki której Litwa zyskała potężnego sojusznika w sporze z Polską.

Following the coup d'état of December 1926, Lithuania found itself governed by the leaders of the Lithuanian Nationalists, Augustinas Voldemaras and Antanas Smetona. The article discusses Voldemaras' foreign policy during the important for Lithuania years of 1927 and 1928. It was the period of attempted reconstruction of Polish-Lithuanian relations, mainly in the context of Vilnius region, secret negotiations with the Germans to secure additional financial support for the young Lithuanian state, and policy of détente with the USSR which made it possible for Lithuania to gain a powerful ally in the argument with Poland. ; Po zamachu stanu w grudniu 1926 r. na czele Litwy stanęli liderzy partii narodowców: Augustinas Voldemaras i Antanas Smetona. W artykule omówiono politykę zagraniczną Voldemarasa w kluczowych dla Litwy latach 1927–1928. Był to okres próby przebudowy stosunków relacji polsko-litewskich, głównie w kontekście Wileńszczyzny, tajnych negocjacji z Niemcami, mających na celu pozyskanie dodatkowego wsparcia finansowego dla młodego państwa litewskiego oraz polityki zbliżenia z ZSRR, dzięki której Litwa zyskała potężnego sojusznika w sporze z Polską.

The European Union undertakes numerous activities to implement a common energy policy for all Member States. However, since the countries in question have different energy resources, geographical location and terrain, unification of national policies at EU level is a particularly
arduous and difficult process. This article focuses on the analysis of energy sectors in Austria, Germany, Poland and Sweden. These countries were chosen because they offer considerable diversity, having different energy resources, geographical location, climatic conditions, as well as a different genesis of shaping their energy policy over the years. The analysis showed that the energy sectors in Poland, Germany, Austria and Sweden operate completely differently and rely on different energy resources. In Sweden, electricity mainly comes from hydropower and
nuclear energy, while energy from coal is not produced at all. In Austria, coal is also not extracted, and the production of electricity is based mainly on renewable sources, and above all on hydropower. Germany is one of the countries with the highest level of coal mining in
the world, therefore electricity is obtained mainly from this source, butalso from nuclear energy and increasingly from renewable sources, mainly wind, biofuel and solar energy. Poland is among the world's leading producers of coal, and obtaining electricity from this source accounts for as much as 80% in Poland; the rest comes from renewable sources, mainly
wind energy, then biofuels, hydro energy and natural gas.

There is a significant regulation concerning spa-towns and/or health resorts in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany and Slovakia. In federal states (i.e. in Austria and Germany), this regulation is adopted at the federal and länder (i.e. regional) level, yet the latter one is definitely more intensive. The spa-related regulation in each state considered is meant to provide public warranty as to the quality of natural features of spa-towns or health resorts. In the same time, this regulation sets significant constraints with regard to the choice of development patterns available to spas. The resulting opportunity cost can, however, be covered by price premia chargeable in spas and by special taxes levied only in spas. The tax income arising from them, however, is earmarked as it can be designated for improvements of spa-related features and functions of a given town or site. In the countries considered, there is no specifically designed subvention scheme which could be used only by spa-towns or health resorts.

The paper synthetically presents new trends and selected issues concerning Germany's stance vis-à-vis Russia in the second decade of the 21st century. It concentrates on an analysis of the following substantive issues:– draft of the essence of domestic political shifts in Germany and Russia in international context;– presentation of general assumptions featuring the new strategy in German policy vis-à-vis Russia;– showing principal challenges as well as selected problems of German cooperation with Russia in the period 2014-17;– underscoring new tendencies in Russia's impingement on Germany together with German judgments as to Russia's international role in the era of the Ukrainian crisis in light of opinion polls.Over the years 2003-17, as a result of internal changes in Germany, a multi-party system took on a shape that made it harder to create a coalition and a new government after the parliamentary election of September 24, 2017. In Russia, in turn, the authoritarian government system with president Vladimir Putin at the helm strengthened. President Putin, through the annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas, begot to the persistent destabilization of Ukraine. The above mentioned developments were accompanied by a transition from the post-Cold War, unipolar international system, with the United States on top, towards a multipolar international system with the rising significance of China and Russia. Russia transformed into a geopolitical "competitor" of its strategic partner, Germany. On the other hand, Germany – as a leading EU and NATO state – together with France attempted to solve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. It managed merely to achieve a partial armistice in Donbas within the framework of the OSCE mission (the Second Minsk Agreement from February 12, 2015). Due to the strong political and economic ties, Germany solely and temporarily suspended some forms of contact and cooperation with Russia and decided to reintroduce them in 2015. Germany engaged in hammering Western sanctions against Russia and their implementation during 2014-18. It concurrently supported Ukraine in its endeavors to achieve association with the EU in 2016. Simultaneously, Russia took advantage of its trump cards in the form of its presence in Germany ("Russian Germans", media: Sputnik and RT as well as sympathy in some political and social circles) to prop up anti-Western and populist tendencies in this country. ; The paper synthetically presents new trends and selected issues concerning Germany's stance vis-à-vis Russia in the second decade of the 21st century. It concentrates on an analysis of the following substantive issues:– draft of the essence of domestic political shifts in Germany and Russia in international context;– presentation of general assumptions featuring the new strategy in German policy vis-à-vis Russia;– showing principal challenges as well as selected problems of German cooperation with Russia in the period 2014-17;– underscoring new tendencies in Russia's impingement on Germany together with German judgments as to Russia's international role in the era of the Ukrainian crisis in light of opinion polls.Over the years 2003-17, as a result of internal changes in Germany, a multi-party system took on a shape that made it harder to create a coalition and a new government after the parliamentary election of September 24, 2017. In Russia, in turn, the authoritarian government system with president Vladimir Putin at the helm strengthened. President Putin, through the annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas, begot to the persistent destabilization of Ukraine. The above mentioned developments were accompanied by a transition from the post-Cold War, unipolar international system, with the United States on top, towards a multipolar international system with the rising significance of China and Russia. Russia transformed into a geopolitical "competitor" of its strategic partner, Germany. On the other hand, Germany – as a leading EU and NATO state – together with France attempted to solve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. It managed merely to achieve a partial armistice in Donbas within the framework of the OSCE mission (the Second Minsk Agreement from February 12, 2015). Due to the strong political and economic ties, Germany solely and temporarily suspended some forms of contact and cooperation with Russia and decided to reintroduce them in 2015. Germany engaged in hammering Western sanctions against Russia and their implementation during 2014-18. It concurrently supported Ukraine in its endeavors to achieve association with the EU in 2016. Simultaneously, Russia took advantage of its trump cards in the form of its presence in Germany ("Russian Germans", media: Sputnik and RT as well as sympathy in some political and social circles) to prop up anti-Western and populist tendencies in this country.