Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper draws upon the five other papers presented in this volume, along with other presentations made at the 2009 Development Studies Association Conference, to reflect on the relationship between development studies and the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. It first analyses antecedents to the crisis by relating the papers presented by Gore (on long waves of capitalism) and Fischer (on China's integration into the world economy) to a Polanyian analysis. It then considers immediate policy responses with particular reference to India (based on the conference presentation by Mehrotra), China (based on the paper by de Haan) and the 2009 DFID White Paper. Third, it considers two possible additional sources of finance for developing countries: South Korean aid (discussed by Chun et al.) and new forms of international money (discussed by Hudson). The paper concludes that while the crisis is a reminder of structural global economic interconnectedness a challenge for development studies is to combine this fact with analysis that is also interdisciplinary, multi‐tiered and policy relevant. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

When the problems in the United States housing sector mushroomed into a global financial crisis by September 2008, it was assumed that Arab countries would remain immune: the oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries because of their massive financial reserves, and the resource-poor countries because of their limited linkages to the global economic system – in particular, the global financial markets. However, this assumption has proven to be false. The US subprime mortgage collapse not only pushed the advanced economies into recession, but also it shattered global economic confidence, resulting in a massive financial contagion around the world. What explains the Arab World's vulnerability to the crisis? How has the crisis impacted both the resource rich and the resource poor? How have Arab countries responded to the crisis, and what must they do to insulate their economies better from the vagaries of global financial markets? This paper addresses these questions.

What began as a downturn in the US housing sector in summer 2007 mushroomed into a global financial crisis by September 2008—the most severe since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Initially, Western European governments, including the Russian government, blamed the crisis on US financial excesses and felt that their economies would remain immune from the contagion. However, this proved to be a false comfort. The subprime-induced contagion spread to Europe with unprecedented ferocity, rapidly engulfing the entire continent. This essay explains why Russia, deemed to be the most immune, succumbed so quickly to the contagion, and includes lessons policymakers can learn from the Russian experience to better insulate their economies from the vagaries of the global financial markets.

Main factors and development of the global financial crisis-2008 are generally discussed in the paper. The downturn in one of the local sectors of the US economy has caused major threats to functioning global financial markets. Structural problems of the Russian financial sector ("illusion of adequacy") have greatly enhanced negative consequences of the global crisis for the Russian economy. On the global level, main steps to minimize the costs of the crisis should deal with limiting protectionism growth, coordinating measures of economic policy and preventing a hard landing of a large group of economies.