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Are international conflicts over fishery resources a growing security concern? High-profile incidences of conflict, diminishing fishery resources and climate impacts on marine systems have made the international community increasingly wary of fisheries conflict. However, we lack knowledge on conflict incidences over time, as well as the contexts in which the conflicts occur, to assess if fisheries conflict is a growing security threat. To fill that gap, this thesis aims to provide a more detailed understanding of the temporal and regional patterns of international fisheries conflict – more specifically its frequency, nature, regional occurrence over time, and its drivers. Gaining insight into these patterns can aid the development of conflict management strategies and implementation of policies to ensure future ocean security. In Paper I, I present a review of the literature on fisheries conflict, aimed at assessing to what degree existing studies have incorporated ideas from complexity and social-ecological systems theory. Making use of an initial scan of 803 relevant papers, and the subsequent intensive review of 31 fisheries conflict studies, I identify areas within the literature that would benefit from further development. First, precise definitions of fisheries conflict are lacking. Second, there is a narrowness in the methods used to assess the drivers of fisheries conflict, as the literature is largely populated by single cases of conflict assessed in a qualitative manner. Third, nonlinear and dynamic feedbacks, multiple causes, effects and intervening variables are often not explicitly recognized. Fourth, there is room for a more widespread extension of higher order concepts and associated terminology to describe complex system interactions, such as 'feedbacks' or 'adaptive capacity'. In Paper II, I present findings on the characteristics of international fisheries conflict over time drawing on a global and longitudinal database I developed that logs international fisheries conflict between 1974 and 2016. The analysis shows that the frequency of fisheries conflict increased over this time period, with substantial variation in both the type of conflict and the countries involved. Before 2000, fisheries conflict involved mostly North American and European countries fighting over specific species. Since then, conflict has primarily involved Asian countries clashing over multiple species linked to illegal fishing practices. I also consider potential response strategies for the different conflict types uncovered. In Paper III, I use a multi-model approach to test for the supply-induced scarcity hypothesis (diminishing supplies of resources increases conflict) and the demand-induced scarcity hypothesis (rising demand for resources increases conflict) on international fishery conflict data. Three alternative political and economic explanatory pathways are also tested. Overall, I find that no single indicator is able to fully explain international conflict over fishery resources. For the period 1975 to 1996, I find a relationship between conflict over fishery resources and higher levels of GDP per capita. For the period 1997 to 2016, findings support the demand-induced scarcity hypothesis, with analyses also indicating that an increase in supply of fishery resources is linked to an increase in conflict occurrence. Lastly, in Paper IV, I present four future fisheries conflict scenarios. The scenarios integrate longitudinal evidence on international fisheries conflict and expert data on fishery conflict trends and drivers. The scenarios take place in the years 2030 to 2060 in the North-East Atlantic ("Scramble for the Atlantic"), the East China Sea ("The Remodeled Empire"), the coast of West Africa ("Oceanic Decolonization"), and the Arctic ("Polar Renaissance"). The aim is to illuminate how different decisions made today can lead to dramatically diverging future paths, and to inspire policy makers to work with exploratory scenario processes to build anticipatory capacity to support future ocean security. ; At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 3: Manuscript. Paper 4: Manuscript.

This article analyses the impact of new institutional structures in global health governance (GHG) on the realization of social rights in poor countries. Focusing on the example of global HIV/AIDS politics. The article argues that new governance modes increase the participation of civil society groups and affected communities, but also that they are frequently instrumentalized by powerful actors to pursue their particular interests. In fact, increasing resources are mobilized for the fight against poverty-related diseases. The article concludes that, as the experience of HIV/AIDS politics, the conflicts around the TRIPS Agreement and the development of Global Public-Private Partnerships GPPPs suggest, GHG is characterized by a combination of moral values and material interests that does not guarantee a comprehensive realization of social rights, but which allows some progress in the fight against poverty-related diseases - a step toward realization of social rights.

Every year, BICC's Global Militarisation Index (GMI) maps the relative weight and importance of a country's military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. The Index is financially supported by Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The GMI 2021 is an anniversary edition. Its first part reflects, as usual, current developments and trends based on the latest available data. It covers 153 countries and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases, data for 2020). The ten countries with the highest levels of militarisation in the GMI 2021 are Israel, Oman, Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Armenia, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Bahrain, Singapore and Russia. These countries allocate particularly high levels of resources to the military compared to other areas of society. Besides countries primarily from conflict regions in the Middle East, three European countries can also be found here, all of which are involved in violent conflicts. A further three - Greece and Cyprus, both EU member states, and Ukraine - are among the Top 20. In the regional focus on Europe, one overall trend of the GMI 2021 becomes particularly clear: Despite the decrease in global GDP as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, countries are spending more resources on the military in absolute terms and as a proportion of their economic output. Another regional focus this time is on Sub-Saharan Africa. In West Africa, in particular, the security situation has deteriorated dramatically over the past few years. Therefore, it is particularly interesting to look at the dynamics of militarisation on that continent. Alongside relatively stable countries, such as Botswana, Namibia, Mauritania, Angola, Gabon and Guinea-Bissau, countries with current violent conflicts, such as Chad, South Sudan and Mali, can be found among the Top 10. The second part of the GMI looks at the global and regional development of militarisation over the past 20 years. This overall view of global militarisation between 2000 and 2020 shows that, except for an interim peak in 2005, it initially decreased steadily. Our resource-based concept of militarisation explains this as follows: It is due to the increase in the world's population and that of global financial resources, which cause the proportion of the military sector in the GMI to decrease from 2000 to 2018. This, however, does not imply "true demilitarisation", as is evidenced by the absolute increase in military spending over the period under review (SIPRI, 2020). Since 2019, this trend has reversed again. In the past two years, rising militarisation can be observed again across the globe, mainly because the resources allocated to the military are increasing in absolute and in relative terms.

Governing Global Trade: International Institutions in Conflict and
Convergence, Theodore H. Cohn, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002, pp. xi,
329.At a time when all eyes are riveted on the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the ups and downs associated with its current round of
negotiation initiated in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, Theodore
Cohn's latest publication provides a vivid reminder: The global
trading regime is made up of much more than the WTO. The GATT/WTO is
still pivotal in Cohn's diachronic overview of the evolution of the
global trade regime since the creation of the General Agreement on Tariff
and Trade (GATT) in 1947, but unlike several other studies on a similar
topic, the author untangles the relationship between the GATT/WTO and
other formal and informal international institutions, such as the
G7/G8, the Quadrilateral Group (Quad), the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G77, and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Each institution, as well as
the United States and the European Union, is given relatively equal
coverage in this notable study. Yet, as an indication that the
GATT/WTO is still primus inter pares, most chapters revolve
around the major negotiation rounds of the international organization.
Chapter 2 traces the origins and early period of the postwar trade regime
(1947–1962). Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on the Kennedy
(1962–1972) and Tokyo (1973–1979) rounds of the GATT
respectively. Chapter 5 details the uncertainty associated with the
survival of the GATT (1980–1986). Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the
momentous Uruguay Round of the GATT (1986–1994), and chapter 8
highlights the post-Uruguay Round period (1995–2001).

Includes 2 chapters from the work entitled Psychological aspects of global conflict, which was published by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1955 as v. 18 of The Economics of national security. ; Bibliography: p. 125. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Der Globale Militarisierungsindex (GMI) des BICC bildet alljährlich das relative Gewicht und die Bedeutung des Militärapparats von Staaten im Verhältnis zur Gesellschaft als Ganzes ab. Der Index wird durch das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) gefördert. Der GMI 2021 ist eine Jubiläumsausgabe. Der erste Teil des Berichtes reflektiert, wie gewohnt, auf Grundlage der neuesten Daten aktuelle Entwicklungen und Trends. Er umfasst 153 Staaten und basiert auf den aktuell vorliegenden Zahlen, in der Regel sind das die Daten des Jahres 2020. Die zehn Länder, die im GMI 2021 den höchsten Militarisierungsgrad aufweisen, sind Israel, Oman, Aserbaidschan, Kuwait, Armenien, Saudi-Arabien, Brunei, Bahrain, Singapur und Russland. Diese Staaten stellen dem Militär im Verhältnis zu anderen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen besonders viele Ressourcen zur Verfügung. Neben vornehmlich Staaten aus Konfliktregionen des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens, sind auch hier drei europäische Länder präsent, die jeweils in Gewaltkonflikte involviert sind. Drei weitere - die beiden EU-Mitglieder Griechenland und Zypern sowie die Ukraine - sind unter den Top 20 zu finden. Im regionalen Fokus Europa wird ein Gesamttrend des GMI 2021 besonders deutlich: Trotz des Absinkens des weltweiten BIP in Folge der Covid 19-Pandemie wenden Staaten in absoluten Zahlen und im Verhältnis zur Wirtschaftsleistung mehr Ressourcen für das Militär auf. Ein weiterer regionaler Fokus liegt diesmal auf Subsahara Afrika. Insbesondere in Westafrika verschlechterte sich die Sicherheitslage in den vergangenen Jahren dramatisch. Daher ist eine Betrachtung der Militarisierungsdynamiken auf dem Kontinent besonders interessant. So rangieren unter seinen Top 10 neben relativ stabilen Ländern wie Botswana, Namibia, Mauretanien, Angola, Gabun und Guinea-Bissau auch Staaten mit aktuellen Gewaltkonflikten wie Tschad, Südsudan und Mali. Der zweite Teil des GMI 2021 betrachtet die globale und regionale Entwicklung von Militarisierung über die vergangenen 20 Jahre. Die Gesamtbetrachtung der globalen Militarisierung zwischen 2000 und 2020 ergibt, dass diese, bis auf ein Zwischenhoch im Jahr 2005, bis 2018 zunächst kontinuierlich sinkt. Unser ressourcenbezogenes Konzept von Militarisierung erklärt dies so: Es ist das Anwachsen sowohl der Weltbevölkerung als auch der globalen finanziellen Mittel, die im GMI den Anteil des militärischen Sektors von 2000 bis 2018 geringer werden lässt. Dies bedeutet jedoch keine "echte Demilitarisierung", wie die absolute Steigerung der Militärausgaben im Bezugszeitraum belegt (SIPRI 2020). Seit 2019 hat sich dieser Trend wieder umgekehrt. In den letzten zwei Jahren ist weltweit eine steigende Militarisierung zu beobachten, was vor allem darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass die dem Militär zugewiesenen Ressourcen nicht nur absolut, sondern auch relativ steigen.