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tag=1 data=Local Government Policy tag=2 data=Hickey, Maggie tag=3 data=Territory Labor - Party Policy tag=6 data=^d ^mJune ^y1997 tag=8 data=POLITICAL PARTIES-ALP%LOCAL GOVERNMENT tag=10 data=Local Government Policy for election 1997. tag=15 data=POL ; Local Government Policy for election 1997.

Abstract. It has long been thought that government antitrust policy has an effect on aggregate merger and acquisition activity, but the empirical support for this hypothesis has been weak and inconsistent. This paper uses a new empirical specification and a new dataset on mergers and acquisitions to provide support for this conjecture. Regression analysis shows that government policy has a significant influence on mergers and that the nature of the effects depends on the type of merger. Fitting the time series into a two-state Markov switching model shows that conglomerate and horizontal time series follow different dynamics for the last half century, which is most likely caused by the dissimilar treatment of the two types of merger by the government. Only the conglomerate merger and acquisition time series is well described by a two-state Markov switching model. In contrast, the horizontal time series has a break in the early 1980s that may be attributed to the dramatic change in government policy. I am indebted to Professor Frank Gollop, Professor Christopher Baum, and Dr. Robert

The intergenerational impact of public transfers on the economic and social outcome in a society is discussed ambiguously. A considerable amount of research generally found that parental welfare participation may encourage the welfare dependency of future generations and thus perpetuate generational poverty cycles (Gottschalk 1992, Vartanian 1999, Pepper 2000, Page 2004). Public transfers prevent persons from developing their resources or to take advantage of existing opportunities. Human capital such as education and work experience is not valued, and there is little motivation to pursue full-time employment (Hill and Duncan 1987, Mayer 1997, Corak and Heisz 1999). At the other side public transfers are said to result in an overall improvement in the living standards of the poor (Ellwood and Summers 1986). In this view, public transfers and redistributive taxes might be dedicated to narrow the gap between the income of the parents so that the incomes of the children converge to the mean more quickly (Corak 2006). The paper aims to analyze the implications of public transfers on the intergenerational income inequality and poverty trends in Germany and the United States, two countries differing concerning welfare policy regimes, labor market settings and family role models. We analyze the pre- and post-government income of parent-child pairs in different time windows to address to non-linearities in the intergenerational income mobility (Hyson 2003

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. While SWF investment objectives to some extent reflect inherent characteristics, notable differences in strategic asset allocation (SAA) exist even amongst SWFs of similar types. Even so, this paper shows that the global crisis may have changed SWF’s asset allocations in ways that may not be ideal or justified in all cases and that a review of investment objectives may be warranted. It also argues for regular macro-risk assessments for the sovereign, the continued importance of SWFs as a stabilizer in international capital markets, as well as the active role they could play in international regulatory reform.

Contents are grouped under the headings: Resource management; Social policy; The impact of urban growth; Finance and regulatory reform.

This article reports on a survey of IT use by English language panel chairs (heads of department) in Hong Kong secondary schools. An initial overview is first presented of HKSAR Government policy where it has been stated that, by 2002, 25 % of all classroom teaching must be supported by IT. Participants referred to in the article were enrolled on a brief refresher course at a local university; they completed a questionnaire in which they reflected on their attitudes and beliefs about successful IT practice in the English language classroom. As the article illustrates, the first necessity in any IT policy involves access to computers; while a number of schools have good facilities, not all do. More telling, however, are participants ’ views on what constitutes successful IT-based teaching. While resources exist for hardware and software, little provision has been made for curriculum development, or for coordination of IT-based teaching. Consequently, integration of IT into the English language curriculum is generally quite ad hoc. The article concludes with a warning that stipulating 25 % of class time to be delivered by IT may perhaps be encouraging IT practices in the English language classroom that are less than conducive to the good teaching and learning of English.

This paper asks: What is the effect of government policy on output and inequality in an environment with education and labor-supply decisions? The answer is given in a general equilibrium model, consistent with the post 1960s facts on male wage inequality and labor supply in the U.S. In the model, education and labor-supply decisions depend on progressive income taxation, the education system, the social security system, and technology-driven wage differentials. Government policies affect output and inequality through two channels. First, a policy change leads to an asymmetric adjustment of working hours and savings of schooled and unschooled individuals. Second, there is a redistribution of the workforce between schooled and unschooled workers. Using a battery of proposed government policies, we demonstrate that skill redistribution dampens the response of wage inequality to a policy change and amplifies the response of output by an additional 1 to 2 percent.