Suchergebnisse

Simitis examines the European debt crisis with particular reference to the Greek case. He investigates its spillover from a Greek-specific problem to a Eurozone-wide crisis and chronicles the policy responses to combat it. His central argument is that the main cause of the Eurozone's problems was, and still remains, the indecisiveness of European elites to tackle its underlying deficiencies. Leading Eurozone countries have been unwilling to commit to a common long-term plan which could deal convincingly with complex and inter-related problems affecting both its 'core' and its 'periphery'

This paper aims to explain the changes that occurred in the Galician innovation policy during the last two decades. We note that this policy emerged as an innovation policy, not only focused on S&T, at the end of the 1990s. In a way, there was a pattern of continuity until 2009, in which the changes came to a large extent to be determined by processes of imitation and learning. Interactions with other levels of government are particularly relevant. Thus, the Spanish innovation policy has been very influential in regard to the institutional and governance structure, particularly at the beginning. The influence of the European level has been gradually increased, especially in the field of the selection of priorities and instruments, until reaching the highest point at present with the RIS3. Even so, the Galician innovation policy has gradually consolidated its own dynamics, due to the internal processes of accumulation of experiences and learning. Starting in 2009, certain changes have been made, largely due to the economic crisis. This crisis did not only mean a decrease in the public budget for innovation, but also made possible a scenario for changes in ideological orientation and in the instruments of this policy. ; El objetivo de este artículo es explicar los cambios acontecidos en la política gallega de innovación durante las dos últimas décadas. Observamos que esta política surgió como una política de innovación, y no solo de ciencia y tecnología, a finales de los años 90. En cierto modo, existe un patrón de continuidad hasta el 2009 en que los cambios vinieron determinados en buena medida por procesos de imitación y aprendizaje, siendo particularmente relevante las interacciones con otros niveles de gobierno. Así, la política de innovación española fue muy influyente en lo que se refiere al organigrama institucional de gobierno, particularmente al inicio. La influencia del nivel europeo fue aumentando gradualmente, sobre todo en el campo de la selección de prioridades e instrumentos, hasta llegar al punto culminante en la actualidad con la RIS3. Aún así, la política gallega de innovación fue poco a poco consolidando una dinámica propia, debido a los propios procesos internos de acumulación de experiencias y de aprendizaje. A partir del año 2009 se producen cambios de cierto calado, en buena medida debido a la crisis económica. Esta crisis no solo significó una disminución del presupuesto público para la innovación, sino que también posibilitó un escenario para que pudieran aplicarse cambios en la orientación ideológica y en los instrumentos de esta política. ; O obxectivo deste artigo é explicar os cambios acontecidos na política galega de innovación durante as dúas últimas décadas. Observamos que esta política xurdiu como unha política de innovación, e non só de ciencia e tecnoloxía, a finais dos anos 90. En certo modo, existe un patrón de continuidade ata o 2009 en que os cambios viñeron determinados en boa medida por procesos de imitación e aprendizaxe, sendo particularmente relevante as interaccións con outros niveis de goberno. Así, a política de innovación española foi moi influente no que se refire ao organigrama institucional de goberno, particularmente ao inicio. A influencia do nivel europeo foi aumentando gradualmente, sobre todo no eido da selección de prioridades e instrumentos, ata chegar ao punto culminante na actualidade coa RIS3. Aínda así, a política galega de innovación foi pouco a pouco consolidando unha dinámica propia, debido aos propios procesos internos de acumulación de experiencias e de aprendizaxe. A partir do ano 2009 prodúcense mudanzas de certo calado, en boa medida debido á crise económica. Esa crise no só significou unha diminución do orzamento público para a innovación, senón que tamén posibilitou un escenario para que puideran aplicarse cambios na orientación ideolóxica e nos instrumentos desta política.

Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of August The Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views. ; Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of AugustThe Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views.