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Book reviewed in this articleGREAT BRITAINHenry Cleere and David Crossley (Eds.). The Iron Industry of the Weald. (Leicester: Leicester University Press. 1985. Pp. xvi + 395. 74 figs. £47‐50.)C. G. A. Clay. Economic Expansion and Social Change: England 1500‐1700. (Cambridge, 1984. Vol. I, Pp. xiv + 268. 6 tables, 4 figs. 6 maps; Vol II, Pp. xii + 324. 15 tables, 4 figs. 5 maps. £20 each vol.; paperbacks £6‐95 each vol.)Bernard Rudden. The New River: A Legal History. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1985. Pp. xiv + 335. 2 plates. 18 figs. 9 appendices. £20‐00.)Norma Landau. The Justices of the Peace, 1679‐1760. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, and London: University of California Press. 1984. Pp. xv + 422. £35‐40.)Robin D. Gwynn. Huguenot Heritage: The History and Contribution of the Huguenots in Britain. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1985. Pp. xii + 220. 8 Plates. 4 Tables. 10 Maps. £15‐95.)David Ormrod. English Grain Exports and the Structure of Agrarian Capitalism, 1700‐1760. (Hull: Hull University Press. 1985. Pp. xii + 145. £8.95.)N. F. R. Crafts. British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1985. Pp. 193. £19.50.)Maxine Berg. The Age of Manufactures: Industry, Innovation, and Work in Britain,M. E. Rose (Ed.)‐ The Poor and the City: The English Poor Law in its Urban Context, 1834‐1914. (Leicester: Leicester University Press. 1985. Pp. xi + 175. 1 fig. 5 tables £22‐00.)Neville Kirk. The Growth of Working Class Reformism in Mid‐Victorian England. (Beckenham: Croom Helm. 1985. Pp. xiii + 369. £22.50.)Derek J. Oddy and Derek S. Miller (Eds.). Diet and Health in Modem Britain. (London: Croom Helm. 1985. Pp. vi + 326. £22.00.)Roger Middleton. Towards the Managed Economy: Keynes, the Treasury and the Fiscal Policy Debate of the 1930s. (London: Methuen 1985. Pp. xii + 244. £25‐00.)GENERALPeter Clark (Ed.). The European Crisis of the 1590s. (London: George Allen & Unwin. 1985. Pp. xiv + 324. £25‐00.)L. A. Clarkson. Proto‐Industrialization: The First Phase of Industrialization? (London: MacMillan. Studies in Economic and Social History. 1985. Pp. 71. £395.)Tommy Bengtsson, Gunnar Fridlizius and Rolf Ohlsson (Eds.). Pre‐Industrial Population Change: The Mortality Decline and Short‐Term Population Movements. (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell. 1984. Pp. 419. S.Kr.280.)Richard Smith (Ed.)‐ Land, Kinship, and Life‐cycle. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. Pp. xiii + 547. £40‐00.)David Levine (Ed.). Proletarianization and Family History. (London: Academic Press. 1984. Pp. xii + 315. £38‐50.)Robert R. Locke. The End of Practical Man: Entrepreneurship and Higher Education in Germany, France, and Great Britain, 1880‐1940. (Greenwich, Connecticut and London: JAI Press. 1984. Pp. xii + 363. 31 tables. £46.50.)Harold James. The Reichsbank and Public Finance in Germany, 1924‐1933: A Study of the Politics of Economics during the Great Depression. (Frankfurt am Main: Fritz Knapp Verlag. 1985. Pp. 426. n.p.)Joseph Harrison. The Spanish Economy in the Twentieth Century. (London: Croom Helm. 1985. Pp. 207. 27 tables. £1995.)Ivan T. Berend and Gyorgy Ranki. The Hungarian Economy in the Twentieth Century. (London: Croom‐Helm. 1985. Pp. 316. £25.)HUGH BROGAN. Longman History of the United States of America. (London: Longman. 1985. Pp. viii + 470. £19‐95.)C. Cochran. Challenge of American Values: Society, Business, and Religion. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1985. Pp. 147. $13.95.)Hasia R. Diner. Erin's Daughters in America: Irish Immigrant Women in the Nineteenth Century. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1983. Pp. xvi + 192. $2000; paperback $9‐95.)Humbert S. Nelli. From Immigrants to Ethnics: The Italian Americans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1983. Pp. viii + 225. £19‐50.)Martin V. Melosi. Coping with Abundance: Energy and Environment in Industrial America. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1985. Pp. xii + 355. $1095.)Carole Haber. Beyond Sixty‐Five: The Dilemma of Old Age in America's Past. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985. Pp. ix + 181. Paperback, £6‐95.)Ruth Schwartz Cowan. More Work for Mother: The Ironies of Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave. (New York and London: Harper & Row. 1983. Pp. xiv + 257. 46 plates. £19‐75; paperback £8‐75.)Christopher L. Tomlins. The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880‐1960. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985. Pp. xvi 4‐ 348. £30; paperback £1095.)Gary A. Puckrein. Little England: Plantation Society and Anglo‐Barbadian Politics, 1627‐1700. (New York and London: New York University Press. 1984. xxiv + 235. $51.50.)Kenneth F. Kiple. The Caribbean Slave: A Biological History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. Pp. xiii + 274. £27.50.)Linda Alexander Rodriguez. The Search for Public Policy: Regional Politics and Government Finances in Ecuador, 1830‐1940. (Berkeley & London: Univ. of California Press. 1985. Pp. xv + 281. $32.50.)K. N. Chaudhuri. Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985. Pp. xiv 4‐ 269. 18 maps. 23 plates. £25; paperback £895.)Christopher John Baker. An Indian Rural Economy, 1880‐1955: The Tamilnad Countryside. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1984. Pp. xvii + 616. 9 maps. 30 tables. 16 graphs. £28‐00.)David K. Wyatt. Thailand: A Short History (New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1984. Pp. xviii + 351. £27‐50.)Joseph Needham (Ed.)‐ Science and Civilisation in China, Volume VI, Biology and Biological Technology: Part II: Agriculture by Francesca Bray. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. Pp. xxvii + 724. £50.)William D. Wray. Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K., 1870‐1914: Business Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (Harvard East Asian Monographs No. 108). 1984. Pp. xx + 672. £21‐95.)Raymond W. Goldsmith. The Financial Development of Japan, 1868‐1977. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1983, Pp. xv + 231. £27.00.)Raymond W. Goldsmith. The Financial Development of India, Japan, and the United States: A Trilateral Institutional, Statistical, and Analytic Comparison. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1983. Pp. xiv + 120. £1095.)Tsunehiko Yui and Keiichiro Nakagawa (Eds.). Business History of Shipping: The International Conference on Business History 11: Proceedings of the Fuji Conference. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. 1985. Pp. xxix + 330.£ 6000.)David Mackay. In the Wake of Cook: Exploration, Science & Empire, 1880‐1801. (London: Croom Helm. 1985. Pp. vi + 216. £18.95.)D. C. M. Platt and Guido Di Tella (Eds.). Argentina, Australia, and Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, 1870‐1965. (London: Macmillan. 1985. Pp. xi + 237. 25‐00.)Charles Lipson. Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Ninteteenth and Twentieth Centuries. (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press. 1985. Pp. xvii + 332. 13 tables, 3 figs. £3325; paperback £11‐25.)Bill Albert and Adrian Graves (Eds.). Crisis and Change in the International Sugar Economy, 1860‐1914. (Norwich and Edinburgh: ISC Press. 1984. Pp. xii + 381. £12‐00.)Michael D. Bordo and Anna J. Schwartz (Eds.). A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821‐1931. (London: University of Chicago Press. 1984. Pp. xi + 681. £59‐80.)E. J. Hobsbawm. Worlds of Labour: Further Studies in the History of Labour. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1984. Pp. x + 369. £15.95; paperback £7‐95.)

SummaryThe Social Democrats displayed a stronger cohesion than the non‐Socialist parties; the difference in comparison with the Center party, however, was not significant in 1964. The cohesion of the non‐Socialist parties was not significantly different in 1964. In 1966, however, the Conservatives had a stronger cohesion than the middle parties; these two parties did not differ from each other. The Communists had a stronger cohesion than all the other parties.Party cohesion seems to have been intensified from 1964 to 1966. The Communists were, however, an exception; the trend here appears to have been the opposite.On politically important issues, cohesion was subsxantially greater, During divisions on party proposals and government bills the parties closed their ranks. During divisions on a party proposal, members of the party sponsoring the proposal have nearly unanimously supported it.Divisions where sharp splits occurred in a party (2 25 O/o of the votes against the party line), concerned almost invariable issues of minor significance. Of the few exceptions, one or two had some political importance but did not constitute a major issue of political importance.Issues causing sharp splits ≥ 25 % of the votes against the party line) fall within several policy areas. Among such areas with a relatively high frequency are issues concerning culture, education, youth and traffic.With regard to the cohesion of various subgroups, it can be pointed out: The youngest age group (49 years and under) in the different parties often exhibited stronger cohesion than the remaining party members, while, on the contrary, the oldest age group (60 years and over) did not form such cohesive subgroups in the respective parties. Similarly, the MPs with the shortest tenure (those serving their first term) as a rule exhibited a stronger cohesion. On the other hand, MPs with the longest tenure (those serving their fourth term or more) as a rule had a weaker cohesion than the rest of the party. The women MP's cohesion was generally stronger than that of the other members. As far as the Christian group is concerned, the Social Democratic members had a stronger cohesion than the remaining Social Democrats. The picture is more varied for the non‐Socialist parties. The Liberal members seem to have been more united, the Conservative and Center party members less united. Members of the temperance groups exhibited only in some instances a stronger cohesion.The analysis of the subgroups' voting behavior across party lines sheds additional light on the findings mentioned above. The youngest age groups and above all the groups with the shortest tenure, in a comparison between the Social Democrats and the non‐Socialist parties, generally had a more dissimilar voting behavior than the older groups and groups with longer tenure. The opposite was true for the Liberals‐Center party. The voting behavior of women subgroups did not differ from that of the complementary groups. The non‐Socialist members of the Christian group had a more similar behavior than the other non‐Socialists. As for the Social Democratic members of the Christian group their voting behavior tended to be more dissimilar to that of the non‐Socialist members of the group than was the case for the complementary groups. We obtain a similar picture for the temperance groups. The similarity in the voting behavior of the subgroups in the Liberal and Center parties was greater than for the complementary groups. However there was no significant difference for the Soc.—Lib. and Soc.—Cent.2. Party CooperationThe most frequent two‐party‐ combination of joint voting was Soc. + Com.; the most frequent three‐party combination was Cons. + Lib. + Cent. On the other hand, it ought to be stressed that the cases when a strict division between the Socialist and non‐Socialist parties occurred constituted a minority of the total number of divisions. If we exclude the Communists, we find that the Social Democrats voted alone during 43% (1964) and 37% (1966) respectively of the divisions, The Liberals and the Center party in toot voted together considerably more times than either did with the Conservatives: 265 times against 214 for the Cons, + Lib. and 193 for the Cons. + Cent. in 1964, and 289 times against 172 for the Cons. + Lib. and 156 for the Cons. + Cent. in 1966. Cooperation between the middle parties increased from 1961 to 1966, while the Conservatives increasingly voted alone. The Liberals were the non‐Socialist party‐ exhibiting the lowest frequency of total joint voting with the Social Democrats, the Center party the highest frequency. The difference between the Liberals and Conservatives, however, is negligible. The Conservatives, relatively more frequently than the middle parties, were the only non‐Socialist party to vote in the same way as the Social Democrats.With respect to non‐Socialist cooperation during the divisions on non‐Socialist party proposals, it can be said: The Conservative party proposals received the support of both the Liberals and the Center parry in about one‐fifth of the cases, and in about three‐fifths of the cases the Conservatives voted alone; this is true for both years. The Liberal party proposals received the support of the Conservatives in about one‐third (1961) and one‐half (1966) respectively of the cases and the support of the Center party in about one‐half and two‐thirds respectively of the cases. The Center party proposals received the support of the Conservatives in about one‐half and one‐fifth of the cases respectively and the support of the Liberals in about three‐fourths and one‐half of the cases respectively, The proposals, initiated by the leaders of the middle parties (1966) received the support of the Conservatives during only 8 of the 25 divisions.As far as the government bills are concerned, there is a very high degree of agreement between the percentages of joint voting on the bills and the corresponding figures for the total number of divisions.The comparisons of the scores of indices of likeness reveal the following: The Social Democrats and Conservatives exhibited during both years a more similar voting behavior than the Social Democrats and Liberals. At the same time the Social Democrats and the Center party had a more similar voting behavior than the Social Democrats and Conservatives. Thus the voting behavior of the Liberals differed most from that of the Social Democrats. The Conservatives in 1964 but not in 1966 were significantly more similar to the Liberals than to the Center party in their voting behavior.The analysis of the joint voting of individual MPs discloses that there are some minor groups, as a rule regional groups, in the parties with a high frequency of voting jointly with a corresponding group in another party or with that party in general.