Suchergebnisse

The aim of this study is to present the main events in the Hungarian-Serbian economic relations during the last two decades by summarizing the most important moments, their causes and consequences. After the fall of Milošević, it was necessary to re-establish the contractual relationship between the two countries and the corporate relationships terminated during the embargo. After the very promising start, the assassination of the Serbian prime minister, the constant domestic political crises, the government unwilling to make closer contacts, and according to the European standards the closed society of Serbia at that time, hasn't become a political or economic ally of Hungary. In the time when the world economic conditions were in favour of overall development of bilateral economic relations. However the global economic crisis and recession has brought back not only the willingness to invest in Hungary, but also the bilateral trade. The historic reconciliation following the slow political rapprochement in 2014, has made the breakthrough, and contributed not only to the better enforcement of the Hungarian economic interests, but also to the prosperity of Hungarians in their native country, in Serbia. The Hungarian government is supporting Serbia's EU integration process and in all foreign policy issues. As the result of this approach, there are no open questions between Budapest and Belgrade. The preconditions for the constant evolution of the economic relations without special support were the political gestures and friendly attitude of the two governments regarding the earlier sensitive questions and the national issues.

Introduction: Contexts of Gypsy/Roma identity and history -- On the sources of Gypsy/Roma history -- Who (what) is (was) Hungarian or Gypsy/Roma? -- "Comrades, if you have a heart" : the history of the Gypsy issue, 1945-1961 -- The construction and spread of the state socialist system -- Policy and Gypsies -- Modernization and Gypsy communities -- Disciplinary state -- The impossibility of self-organization -- Minority issue -- Discourses on social policy and equality -- "Life goes on" : the Hungarian party-state and assimilation -- Social policy and the Gypsies -- Wage work -- Housing -- Social system -- Education -- Scientific approaches -- Gypsy images -- The transformation of discourse -- Disciplinary power, disciplinary society -- Police and agents -- "Health supervisors" -- The national minority issue -- National movement -- The "ethnic interpretation" of history -- Roma policy after the regime change -- Minority issue -- Prospects for multiculturalism -- Minority (self-)government? -- Divide at Impera : the opportunities and impossibilities of self-organization -- Movement -- National minority culture, national culture -- Questions of equal treatment and equal opportunity -- Anti-discrimination -- Equal opportunity -- Roma programs -- Education -- Employment -- Social policy and the Roma -- Aid -- Segregation -- Disciplinary society -- The transformation of discourses -- Research methods -- Panopticon : Roma policy, 2010-2015 -- The Hungarian National Cooperation System -- The anti-egalitarian character of the system -- Changing minority legislation -- New social policy? -- Violence -- The shift -- Summary: Decades of exclusion

A magyar politikai és katonai vezetés és 1920-ban még reális lehetőséget látott az békefeltételek, módosítására. Az elképzelés részben a csehszlovák állam komoly belső problémáira épített. Másrészt szovjet-orosz Vörös Hadsereg Közép-Európát veszélyeztető sikerei teremthettek a régióban válsághelyzetet. Mindkét esetben számítani lehetetett arra, hogy a nyugati hatalmak kedvezően fogadnák a Magyar Nemzeti Hadsereg fellépését, a szovjetek által fenyegetett Lengyelország megsegítésére, a térség stabilizálására, a bolsevik veszély elhárítására. Ehhez azonban a magyar csapatoknak be kellett volna vonulniuk a Felvidékre. A magyar kormány titkos tárgyalásokat folytatott francia személyiségekkel, melyek hajlottak volna arra, hogy a magyar segítségért cserébe Felvidék, vagy annak legalább a keleti része ismét magyar fennhatóság alá kerülhessen. A katonai tervek (Ébredés, Pirkadás, Árpád) végül a politikai feltételek hiánya miatt nem valósulhattak meg. A szovjet előretörést a lengyelek megállították, Csehszlovákiában pedig nem került sor bolsevik fordulatra. In 1920, the Hungarian political and military leadership still saw a realistic opportunity to modify the peace conditions. The idea was partly built on the serious interior problems of the Czecho-Slovakian. On the other hand, a crisis situation might have been created in the region by the success of the Soviet-Russian Red Army that was pushing forward towards the West. In both cases, it could have been possible to count on the Western powers' favourable receipt of the act of the Hungarian National Army in order to help Poland that was threatened by the Soviets, to stabilise the region, and to eliminate Bolshevik threat. However, in order to do that, the Hungarian troops had had to march in the Highlands. The Hungarian Government held confidential negotiations with French personalities who would have propended to accept that in turn of Hungarian help, Highland or at least its Eastern part could belong again under Hungarian control. Eventually, the military plans (Awakening, Dawn, Arpad) could not be implemented because of the lack of political conditions. The Polish stopped the Soviets' sudden attack, while in Czecho-Slovakia no Bolshevik turn took place.

All actors in Central-East Europe face the changing role of different regions. In Hungary, the regional policy of the new government recasts chances and duties of former development regions with primary focus on counties. The article deals with a specific region along Southern course of river Tisza. We prove that this part of a wider European region, a sometime organic one, is actually object of reintegration. We analyze different conditions and dimensions of altering relations which play eminent role in the reinforcement of the organic character. The perspective of local actors in the next period, can be found in he new European Danube Strategy, as long as they are ready to organize themselves on appropriate regional base. Danube Strategy will be filled with real content if each identity region will be ready to accommodate itself in the new and wider European structure of a functional macroregion called Danube Region. We conclude that appropriate management of conditions supports the ongoing European and inner integration process.

Central Europe means different political, economic, cultural, geopolitical and a "regional security community" contents in relation to my topic. Nowadays, this region, the "Central Europe" region primarily means the V-4 cooperation and the very important role and initiatives of the region in the EU. The V-4 cooperation, which was established in 1991, can be conceived as an attempt at creating a special form, as a mechanism and sub-stance to the political dimension of this region. The four members of the special mechanism are trying to get closer to one another by relying on solidarity with each other. The V-4 cooperation is based on the common history of the participating countries and close similarities between their recent transformation processes. Such resemblances explain the V4 structure's success, including parallel navigation in the problems of European Union and NATO accession. In the absence of permanent institutions [except the International Visegrad Fund (IVF)], the dimension and ambitions of the V-4 cooperation depends on the political objective of the governments and direct security environment, which impacts on these countries.