Suchergebnisse

Engl. Zsfassung u.d.T.: Lithuania in 1938 and 1939 : illusions of neutrality

The main aim of the article is to reveal problem of decentralization of autonomy for local authorities & territorial administration in Lithuania. The reform of administrative division & autonomy for local authorities of the country runs slowly & complicated. Though society, scientists, various branches of government has a lot of various propositions & discussions have been taking place for more than 15 years, the important decisions cannot be made because of the lack of political willpower. One could be under impression that the reform will never be completed. The main reasons of such a disturbances are related to the absence of authentic traditions of autonomy for local authorities as well as to constant changes of centralized models of territorial administration. The unfinished re-form not only disturbs even development of the country but also complicates development of autonomy for local authorities system, which is one of the most important institutions of modern democracy. This also disturbs formation of regional self-consciousness, identity at regional & local level. Finally, it complicates the development of modern civil society in Lithuania. The history of Lithuania shows that even during 20th century models of territorial administration of the country have been changed several times, though centralized government prevailed & autonomy for local authorities was very limited. This prevented formation of territorial autonomy for local authorities & community traditions, solidarity among population was decreasing while indifference to the social needs was increasing. The Soviet period demolished the first appearances of territorial (regional) identity. This consequently caused the lack of willpower to implement new reform of territorial administration. The same as during the years of independence before World War II there is still uncertainty whether centralized or vast autonomy for local authorities should be chosen as a priority. Lithuanian government has always paid the main attention to the reform of regional governing system but autonomy for local authorities is almost totally forgotten. The absence of local & regional autonomy for local authorities makes Lithuania a unique rather unitary state, with a transformed soviet administrative division. Because of these reasons the problem of reformation & decentralization of territorial administration of Lithuania remains topical. Adapted from the source document.

Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The idea and practice of the unity of the Baltic States: 1918 - 1940

The article deals with problems of a sub-system in the system of strategic state administration; it shows what are the obstacles for effective long-term decision making & why the authorities prefer a conjunctural principle instead. The need to create a network of think-tanks in Lithuania is substantiated; the network would provide an efficient assistance in strategic decision-making in state's institutions. These think-tanks would embrace representatives of the state's creative elite who would supply them with various development scenarios, geoeconomic projects & programs elaborated by using special methods & software programs. The ways to stimulate the process of generation of a state's strategic goals & visions are presented; the emphasis is put on the importance of synergetic logic & thinking in the search of "new quality of development" on the state & the separate main sectors level as well. The article comes to conclusion that the possibilities of integration of strategic thought discloses itself well by designing the implications of resonant consequences of governance decisions. Adapted from the source document.

Zsfassung in engl. u. dt. Sprache

The aim of this article is to explore the bargaining process of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013 & to provide the conceptual explanation of the particular result of this bargaining. Although quite a number of drafts have been discussed among member states, three of them characterize the most important turns of the bargaining: Commission's Proposal, the Luxemburg's Compromise & the Decision of the European Council. Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmental Approach has been applied as the methodological tool for the analysis of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013. Moravcsik assumes that European bargaining is a two level game. A two level game is a metaphoric concept describing how the interaction between the domestic pressure groups & decision makers formulates national preferences & how political leaders on the European level represent those national preferences. On both levels pragmatic economic interests are the driving factors of different actors. It should be emphasized that states are the main players in EU arena, whereas supranational institutions play a supporting part. Five different groups or informal coalitions could be found in the recent bargaining for the Financial Perspective. The key interest of rich member states (UK, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, & France) was to decrease EU spending -- to cut the contributions to the EU budget. Phasing out states (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) as former major beneficiaries of EU structural policy strived to diminish financial losses in the new Financial Perspective. Poorer Central European countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic & Hungary) fought for the structural funds. Finally, the UK was alone against the rest of member states which called for the radical review of the British rebate. The comparative statistical & qualitative analysis of those proposals revealed two important trends in the bargaining. First, the EU spending was cut in every turn. Second, the funds for the rich member states were redistributed at the expense of the poorer member states. Certainly, such redistribution did not change the fact that the older member states remained the net contributors & the poor Central European countries gained more benefits compared to the previous Financial Perspective 2000-2006. Besides these two main tendencies the phasing out states succeed to increase the funds for their undeveloped regions & the final Decision of the European Council offered for the UK the most favorable mechanism counting the British rebate. The article reveals the weaknesses of the popular geopolitical interpretations which were proposed in order to explain the strong clashes between member states. The geopolitical & ideological discourse was aimed at neutralizing the domestic pressure. The economic logic to pay less & get more was the dominant thinking in the bargaining for the European financial pie. The asymmetrical interdependence which was the main source of bargaining power during the previous intergovernmental negotiations on Common Market is obsolete in explaining the modalities of redistributional policies. The effect of relative power was limited to the bargaining strategy, however it did not make a remarkable impact to the final agreement. On the contrary, the typical net recipient is a small & poor member state. The author has to come to the conclusion that the poor Central European countries states were forced to support the cuts of the budget & suffered a relative defeat in the bargaining, since they were the main beneficiaries of the common EU budget. It means that the poor Central European countries were the most interested to reach an agreement as soon as possible in order to avoid the risk of facing the EU financial turbulences. For this reason their bargaining power was very weak. Adapted from the source document.

The article compares W. Wilson's, M. Weber's & J. Schumpeter's approaches towards the role of politicians & bureaucrats. W. Wilson proposed to separate politics & administration, while M. Weber considered that bureaucracy should be subordinated to the will of political leaders & J. Schumpeter argued that professional bureaucracy should be sufficiently strong to advice & even to direct politicians. The twofold explanation is provided to explain this divergence of approaches. First, it could be explained by the variety of parliamentary systems, related to the different executive-legislative linkage, ranging from the British-type of premiership of cabinet system to the French type of assembly government. Second, it could be explained by the aims of democratic societies to have both political responsive & professionally responsible bureaucracy. Adapted from the source document.

The article is dedicated to the discussion about the notions of the 'political system' and 'political regime' in the fields of its meanings as autonomous analytical constructions. The main arguments are that the 'political system' describes a stable and normal political process and determinate interrelations between power structures and civil society institutions as a complex sociopolitical unity. On the other hand, concept of 'political regime' stresses dynamic aspects of the government activity as a realization of the basic political functions. Pointing to the fact that a political system explains events and relations in the modern democratic context and a regime -- its peculiarities in the process of decision-making, the authors share attention to specific negative aspects of the separate interpretation and recognition of the various forms in the national politics spheres. All these conditions may sharp influence over the quality of the authority decisions, feedback among political institutions as a civic interests representatives etc. And otherwise, this implies that the political systems and political regimes realize an isomorphic similarity for taking evasive action between them. Adapted from the source document.

The contemporary information & communication technologies (ICT) will not, by themselves, resolve the issues, faced by Lithuanian public administration in designing & implementing its policies. This is the major argument of the article, supported by the available empirical information & various secondary sources. Why the bureaucracy, which is often considered as being slow, inflexible & inertic should suddenly change due to the mere fact of ICT being purchased & installed? The answer is often based on some intuitive logic, which is called in this article the "ideal model of e-government." The first of the assumptions in this model claim that the public sector has the right skills to select the relevant technology. The next assumption is that once the technology is installed, it will be used competently & open-mindedly -- with the right capacities, motivations & leaders available to do that. In turn, if the technology is used competently, one can indeed expect improvements in public policy making & implementation: organizational change, better inter-institutional co-operation, development of e-services, etc. Notably, many ICT projects in the public sector fail & Lithuania is no exception in this respect. The investment does not necessarily lead to a meaningful organizational change, it does not enhance co-operation between institutions & does not improve communication & trust between the citizens & the state. Surely, the e-government is a rather new development, so one should hardly expect that all the visions will be successful outright. However, while at least some of the major problems may be anticipated in advance, the solutions are not always clear-cut. In order to take a full advantage of the ICT potential in the public sector, a clear choice of an actual model of public administration is necessary. Here a number of classic dilemmas may be identified -- regarding the relations between the public & the private sectors, internal control within the organization, sharing of responsibilities between organizations, etc. It is argued in the article that the answers to these questions in Lithuania are clear only in the official strategies & statements. Meanwhile the practice shows, that the relations between the public & the private sector are unbalanced, organizations lack the culture of critically assessing their achievements, institutions are carefully avoiding "interference" from outside into their internal matters & government is far from being conceived as a "service" to the citizens. It is also noted, that the differences between the official rhetoric & the practice may well be explained by the experience of both the soviet period as well as the accession to the EU: the institutions developed the skill of flexible adjustment to the dominant discourse without finding it necessary to change the essence of policy process. All in all, while the ICT do provide opportunities for improvement of public management, in order to take a full advantage of these opportunities it is necessary to resolve some of the classical dilemmas of public administration. In order to do that, some deeper changes of attitudes, values, & culture are necessary both in the public sector as well as in the society at large. Therefore, notwithstanding the expectation of the big change towards modernization of public sector the old saying of "plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose" is applicable for estimating the potential of the ICT to change the public sector. Adapted from the source document.

Based on an international review of state-owned companies' (hereinafter SOE) management practice and review of related academic literature, the paper seeks to explain and summarise the main determinants of SOE performance efficiency. For this purpose, the concept of SOE management control and autonomy is used, showing a link between the level of control (and / or management autonomy) and the performance efficiency of SOE. A specific case of Lithuania and / or other post-soviet countries has not been analysed in depth so far. Therefore, elements of SOE performance management are analysed in this paper to understand the relations between SOE and its shareholder (state / government), SOE profitability and contribution to the budget, the quality of SOE services and production, the level of public and state interest to be included into the performance indicators of a specific SOE (e.g., in cases of natural monopolies and / or strategic interests of the state). Accordingly, as per main paradigms of public administration (including analysis of the traditional bureaucratic system, new public management (NPM)) and post-NPM, SOE performance efficiency is analysed via the concepts of control and management autonomy. Additionally, an analytical model, which could be applied for the analysis of Lithuanian SOE management reform and its impact, is presented in this paper. Adapted from the source document.

An unambiguous assessment of the results of changes in the post-communist political regime of Ukraine is hardly possible. The political system of this country has experienced both periods of democratic expectations & democratic setbacks during the last fifteen years. For example, in 1990-1994, before the first competitive parliamentary elections, there was a clear fragmentation among the old (communist) political elite in Ukraine; the country's first democratic constitution was adopted in 1996. However, after Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 1994, authoritarian tendencies gradually recrudesced, "oligarchic" clans took hold of the country's political system, & the elections were increasingly blatantly manipulated & rigged to the advantage of the ruling elite. This cycle of political development recurred ten years later. Manipulations of the results of the 2004 presidential election raised a massive protest among the inhabitants of Ukraine, which was symbolically dubbed the "Orange Revolution." A new influx of democratic expectations forced the ruling elite to concede to re-running the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, which was won by the opposition. However, the political crisis which struck the new government in September 2005 & the mutual accusations of corruption raised by the former "revolutionary" comrades-in-arms -- President Viktor Yushchenko & former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko -- raised new questions regarding the vitality of the democratic processes in Ukraine. The main question examined in this article is therefore whether the vacillation of Ukraine's political regime is not a regular, permanent condition. Having two main aims -- (1) to construct a theory of Ukraine's post-soviet political transformation, & (2) to disclose the possibilities of democracy consolidation in this country -- the article starts with making some "corrections" to the transitologist approach to regime change. Firstly, it is argued that political transformation theories should have a shared concept of democracy, irrespective of the number or type of the stages of democratization distinguished. The experience of post-communist countries shows that formal procedural democratic criteria are insufficient in order to characterize a political system as democratic. Secondly, traditional theories of regime change focus mostly on the analysis of the behavior of the main political actors (the political elite) & their decisions (agreements). The structural conditions (eg., the characteristics of socio-economic development) should be also included into theoretical thinking about regime change. Thirdly, the analysis of elites & their agreements is sufficiently developed to explain how & when the transition to democracy occurs. However, the democratic consolidation stage has remained somewhat mystified by 'transitologists.' The article argues that an assumption should probably be made that the behavior of political elite factions competing in the political system is always rational & self-interested, ie., democracy (or any other form of political regime) becomes "the only game in town" only if & when it is mostly advantageous for the political elite functioning in that system. Taking into account the above mentioned "corrections" to the transitologist approach, in the article, there is produced a model for analyzing post-soviet regime transformations. The model consists of three main explanatory variables: (1) the structure of political elite, (2) the 'rules of game' prevalent in the system, & (3) the strategies of political elite aiming at gaining business and/or mass support. Consequently, various interrelations of these variables may produce four possible ideal-type outcomes of regime change -- (1) democracy, (2) 'democracy with adjectives,' (3) zero-sum game (a very unstable option when political regime may be temporarily democratic but is at a huge risk of downfall), (4) authoritarianism. In post-soviet countries, it is not enough to examine the structure of political elite & the institutions in order to predict the consolidation of one or another form of political regime. 'Building politicians' "alliances" with business & (or) mobilizing mass support may negate any such predictions & produce additional (regressive, in terms of democratization) impulses to further regime change. The very possibilities of the political elite to form "alliances" with business & (or) to mobilize the masses are mostly determined by the structural characteristics of the country. Thus, the analysis of the latter may not also be omitted in examining post-soviet transitions. Political regime in Ukraine, which beginning of 1990s started evolving as a probable liberal democracy or at least 'democracy with adjectives,' after 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections moved to the situation of the zero-sum game. Such transition was conditioned by two factors. First, the changes within political elite structure -- the communist camp, which occupied an important, although not the most important place in the pluralist political elite structure in 1994-1998, became an anti-systemic political force after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. For these reasons, only two opposing elite factions (oligarchs-"centrists" vs. national democrats) remained in the political system of Ukraine after the 1998 elections, the ideological confrontation of which was constantly increasing & became particularly acute at the outset of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Second, the fact that the business class in Ukraine was forming with the "assistance" of politicians allowed the political elite to build an alliance with business community already in 1994-1996 & maintain these tight clientelist relations even after the privatization period was over. When at the end of 2004 the national democrats gathered mass support & became virtually equal or even more influential than the so-called "centrists," who traditionally draw support from business structures, the zero-sum game in Ukraine became especially acute. Such it remains by now, even after the Orange revolution is over. In more than ten years of independence the business community of Ukraine has consolidated its positions in the Verkhovna Rada & accumulated control over almost all national TV channels & other media outlets, as well as separate industrial regions. Therefore even anti-oligarchically disposed government cannot ignore this power. The ruling elite that cares about its survival & political success is forced to co-ordinate its decisions with the interests of various business clans. On the other hand, since Ukraine's business class consists of several competing clans, any government decisions that seek to limit the political influence of business groups immediately affect the interests of competing business clans. The government cannot remain neutral in principal. Any attempts of the supposed "deoligarchisation" will only result in provoking sharper disagreements between business groups because the curtailment of the positions of one clan will open new prospects for the strengthening of the influence of its competitors. It may be argued that for these reasons there will always be at least one (and, most likely, the strongest one) oligarchic political camp supported by an "alliance" with business. In other words, Ukraine's political regime does not have any chance to be consolidated in the liberal democracy perspective. Another structural characteristic of Ukraine is the politically unorganized working class. At least several competing political forces claim to represent the workers' interests -- the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, & the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. The internal competition among the left-wing forces encourages at least one of them (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party) to take a radical, anti-systemic position in order that potential supporters may distinguish it from other leftist parties. Therefore, it is likely that the political system of Ukraine will preserve a left-wing segment that will not wield much power but will propagate an anti-systemic ideology without "communicating" with other political forces. Due to its anti-systemic nature it will not be able to participate in the government of the state & the votes of the left-wing voters (comprising the basis for mass support) will probably be collected by the national democrats. This circumstance enables predicting that the zero-sum game will remain very intensive in Ukraine in the future as well. Thus, the permanent instability of the state & both -- democracy & authoritarianism -- in Ukraine (a zero-sum game) may actually be considered to be its consolidated political regime form. Adapted from the source document.