Стаття присвячена аналізу теоретичних і практичних аспектів упровадження механізмів government relations (GR) у систему взаємодії влади та бізнесу. GR розглядається у порівнянні з лобізмом, public relations та public af-fairs. У статті відзначено, що GR створює нові можливості забезпечення узгодження інтересів влади, бізнесу та громадянського суспільства в Україні. У цьому сенсі GR є суспільно важливим механізмом для демократичного ро-звитку країни, оскільки дає можливість бізнесу та інституціям громадянського суспільства впливати на рішення влади. Деякі автори пов'язують GR з лобізмом, вважаючи, що ці поняття тотожні. Проте, різниця між ними є суттєвою. На відміну від традиційних форм лобізму, які тісно пов'язані з міжособистісною взаємодією з політиками і державними службовцями, GR має цілу низку стратегічних переваг.По-перше, в суспільній свідомості в Україні лобізм, на відміну від GR, практично є синонімом корупції, оскільки контакти зацікавлених осіб із представниками політичного істеблішменту відбуваються кулуарно. Скритність цього процесу веде до ефекту негативного сприйняття у соціальній свідомості.По-друге, лобізм призводить до залежності суб'єктів лобіювання від персоналій у владних структурах, від їх суб'єктивних переваг і побажань. Це негативним чином позначається на довгостроковому плануванні, а також ставить учасників ринку в нерівне становище, коли, наприклад, державні за-мовлення розподіляються на користь одного з учасників.По-третє, особливістю GR є постійне використання інноваційних ко-мунікативних технологій, які прийшли з форсайту, PR та електоральних кампаній.У статті робиться висновок, що GR в Україні є важливим інструментом діалогу держави і бізнесу, від якого залежать: якість державного управління, унормованість ринкового середовища, умови конкуренції, розвиток бізнесу загалом. Такий діалог потребує законодавчого захисту й механізмів ухвалення на його основі обов'язкових для всіх сторін рішень, адже бізнес, орієнтований на перспективу, найперше очікує від влади стабільних правил гри і ...
The high culture of tolerance accelerates political socialization, improves the qualities of a citizen, a sense of ownership of public affairs, instilling respect for democratic values. Relevance of the work is determined by processes that occur in today's society and that lead not only to confusion but to destruction of public relations. The article reviews the state of political tolerance in the system of relations society – authorities in Russia. Based on opinion polls statistical analyzes to determine trends in contemporary ensure political tolerance is conducted. Due to correlation between support for Putin and the perception of the political situation in the country as well is determined existence. Fixes sustainable public discontent actual situation in the country, however, people do not use the opportunities for political activism. Almost two thirds of Russians believe that the interests of the government and society in do not match. The low percentage of respondents believe that the political course of the country's leadership in the interests of ordinary people. There is a steady trend to an agreement among the Russian population to concentrate power in his hands. There is a slight increase of the population of those who are ready to connect to solve their problems in life forms of protest activity. ; Висока культура толерантності прискорює політичну соціалізацію, оптимізує формування якостей громадянина, відчуття причетності до суспільних справ, прищеплює повагу до демократичних цінностей. Актуальність зазначеної теми визначається процесами, які відбуваються сьогодні в російському суспільстві і які призводять не лише до непорозуміння та руйнації суспільних відносин. У статті розглянуто стан розвитку політичної толерантності у системі відносин суспільство – влада в Росії. На основі даних опитувань громадської думки проведено статистичний аналіз для визначення тенденцій сучасного забезпечення політичної толерантності. Визначено, що існує зв'язок між підтримкою В.Путіна та сприйняттям політичної обстановки в країні як благополучної. Фіксується стійке невдоволення громадян актуальною ситуацією в країні, разом з тим громадяни не використовують наявні можливості для політичної активності. Майже дві третини росіян впевнені, що інтереси влади і суспільства в Росії не збігаються. Низький відсоток опитаних вважають, що політичний курс керівництва країни відповідає інтересам звичайних людей. Спостерігається стійка тенденція до згоди серед населення Росії зосереджувати владу в одних руках. Існує невелике зростання серед населення Росії числа тих, хто готовий пов'язувати вирішення своїх життєвих проблем з протестними формами активності. ; Висока культура толерантності прискорює політичну соціалізацію, оптимізує формування якостей громадянина, відчуття причетності до суспільних справ, прищеплює повагу до демократичних цінностей. Актуальність зазначеної теми визначається процесами, які відбуваються сьогодні в російському суспільстві і які призводять не лише до непорозуміння та руйнації суспільних відносин. У статті розглянуто стан розвитку політичної толерантності у системі відносин суспільство – влада в Росії. На основі даних опитувань громадської думки проведено статистичний аналіз для визначення тенденцій сучасного забезпечення політичної толерантності. Визначено, що існує зв'язок між підтримкою В.Путіна та сприйняттям політичної обстановки в країні як благополучної. Фіксується стійке невдоволення громадян актуальною ситуацією в країні, разом з тим громадяни не використовують наявні можливості для політичної активності. Майже дві третини росіян впевнені, що інтереси влади і суспільства в Росії не збігаються. Низький відсоток опитаних вважають, що політичний курс керівництва країни відповідає інтересам звичайних людей. Спостерігається стійка тенденція до згоди серед населення Росії зосереджувати владу в одних руках. Існує невелике зростання серед населення Росії числа тих, хто готовий пов'язувати вирішення своїх життєвих проблем з протестними формами активності.
Introduction. The processes of property ownership reform entered into an active phase inUkraine in 1992. They were aimed, above all, at overcoming the monopoly of state ownership, resuscitation of private ownership and achieving real pluralism of different forms of ownership. However, the transformations in the area of property relations were characterized by numerous conflicts and abuses, which gave rise to a number of problems that need to be addressed.Purpose. The purpose of the article is to assess the key areas of the reform of state property management in the context of property ownership reform and to substantiate ways to increase the efficiency of public sector enterprises in the Ukrainian economy.Results. The evaluation and substantiation of concrete proposals within the framework of the main directions of the reform of management of state enterprises, in particular such as: improvement of corporate governance, are given; review of the principles and mechanisms of corporate governance by state banks; the introduction of a transparent process for the appointment of heads of state enterprises and the establishment of the market level of their wages; training managers of major state-owned enterprises; definition of clear goals of state enterprises activity, division of commercial and non-profit functions; increase of efficiency of state enterprises; introduction of property policy; introduction of advanced world practices in the sale of state-owned enterprises; corporatization of state-owned objects; restructuring and reorganization of business entities. Several areas of reformation of property relations that are not foreseen by the reform are allocated, namely: optimization of the share of state property; return of the controlling block of shares to strategically important enterprises; application of procedures for re-privatization and nationalization; formation of an effective shareholder mechanism.Originality. In contrast to the official (government) position, an attempt has been made to prove that: 1) the effectiveness of the supervision of the National Bank of Ukraine in the activities of banks, including public ones, is low; 2) the size of salaries of heads of large state enterprises is unreasonably overestimated; 3) state enterprises should clearly distinguish between commercial and non-commercial (social) functions; 4) the ineffectiveness of state-owned enterprises (as a prerequisite for their privatization) can only be said when they are cleared of corruption-related individuals and innovatively enriched; 5) the strategic vision of the government regarding the division of state enterprises into three groups (remaining in state ownership, which are intended for privatization in the process of reorganization or liquidation) or the so-called "triage" should be reconsidered in favor of the enterprises of the first group; 6) sale of large privatization objects with the involvement of an investment advisor should be justified from the point of view of national security; 7) all state-owned enterprises (and not only state-owned) should be subordinated to the relevant ministries and departments; 8) the share of state property in Ukraine is critically low; 9) the formation of a socially oriented market economy in Ukraine should take full advantage of the ownership form of ownership.Conclusion. At first glance, steps and measures for reforming property relations, in particular privatization of state property, are aimed at improving the efficiency of the functioning of the state sector of the economy. But it is possible that, instead of privatization in the context of a socially oriented market economy, we will have a large-scale giper of state ownership by representatives of the kleptocratic authority and the oligarchs approaching them.
Метою статті є характеристика державно-церковних відносин в Угорській Народній Республіці у період правління Яноша Кадара (1956 – 1989 рр.). На основі аналізу угорської історіографії прагнемо показати, що підґрунтям успішної політики угорської влади після революційних подій 1956 р. було покращення життєвого рівня населення, досягнення суспільної злагоди та велика терпимість і гнучкість в релігійній сфері. Саме у цей час в країні були врегульовані відносини з «історичними» церквами – католицькою та протестантськими (реформатська і лютеранська). Наголошується, що впродовж 50-х років ХХ ст. владі вдалося перетворити частину кліру в слухняне знаряддя здійснення своєї внутрішньої та зовнішньої політики. Нескореним залишався примас угорської католицької церкви Й. Міндсенті (József Mindszenty), який виступав проти чинного політичного режиму в країні. У статті відзначено, що представники різних конфесій не брали надто активної участі у революційних подіях 1956 р., однак підтримали своїх співвітчизників. На основі аналізу наукової літератури встановлено, що успішною була церковна політика Угорщини у 1960-х роках, оскільки католицька та протестантські церкви, примирившись з умовами релігійної свободи, наданої Угорською соціалістичною робітничою партією, допомагали державі проводити політику народного фронту в боротьбі за соціалізм. Відзначено, що на окрему увагу заслуговують відносини угорської влади з Ватиканом, які завершилися підписанням угод у 60–70-х роках ХХ ст. та візитом Яноша Кадара до папи Павла VІ у 1977 р. Янош Кадар став першим комуністичним лідером, який перетнув поріг Ватикану. У 1980-х роках вплив держави на церковне життя послабився, а в результаті суспільно-політичних змін наприкінці 80-х років церква в Угорщині здобула повну свободу. ; The purpose of the article is to briefly describe the governmemnt-church relations in the Hungarian People's Republic during the reign of J. Kadar (1956 –1989). Based on the analysis of Hungarian historiography, we seek to show that at the heart of the successful policy of the Hungarian authorities after the revolutionary events of 1956 there was an improvement of living standards of the population, the achievement of social harmony and considerable tolerance and flexibility in the religious sphere. At this partcular time relations with «historical» churches – Catholic and Protestant – were settled in the country. It is noted that throughout the 1950s the authorities succeeded in turning part of the cleric into an obedient instrument for the implementation of their domestic and foreign policies. The Primas (Head) of the Hungarian Catholic Church, József Mindszenti, remained invincible and opposed to the socialist perspective of the country's development. The article makes a point that representatives of different faiths did not take too active part in the revolutionary events of 1956, but supported their compatriots. On the basis of scientific literature analysis it was established that the church policy of Hungary in the 1960s was successful, as the Catholic and Protestant churches, having adapted to the conditions of religious freedom granted to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, helped the state to pursue a policy of «popular front in the struggle for socialism». It is pointed out that the attention is drawn to relations of the Hungarian authorities with Vatican, which ended with the signing of bilateral agreements in the 1960s-1970s and the visit of J. Kadar to Pope Pavel V; and in 1977 J. Kadar became the first communist leader to cross Vatican threshold. In the 1980s, the influence of the state on church life weakened, and as a result of social and political changes in the late 1980s, the church in Hungary was given full freedom.
Метою статті є характеристика державно-церковних відносин в Угорській Народній Республіці у період правління Яноша Кадара (1956 – 1989 рр.). На основі аналізу угорської історіографії прагнемо показати, що підґрунтям успішної політики угорської влади після революційних подій 1956 р. було покращення життєвого рівня населення, досягнення суспільної злагоди та велика терпимість і гнучкість в релігійній сфері. Саме у цей час в країні були врегульовані відносини з «історичними» церквами – католицькою та протестантськими (реформатська і лютеранська). Наголошується, що впродовж 50-х років ХХ ст. владі вдалося перетворити частину кліру в слухняне знаряддя здійснення своєї внутрішньої та зовнішньої політики. Нескореним залишався примас угорської католицької церкви Й. Міндсенті (József Mindszenty), який виступав проти чинного політичного режиму в країні. У статті відзначено, що представники різних конфесій не брали надто активної участі у революційних подіях 1956 р., однак підтримали своїх співвітчизників. На основі аналізу наукової літератури встановлено, що успішною була церковна політика Угорщини у 1960-х роках, оскільки католицька та протестантські церкви, примирившись з умовами релігійної свободи, наданої Угорською соціалістичною робітничою партією, допомагали державі проводити політику народного фронту в боротьбі за соціалізм. Відзначено, що на окрему увагу заслуговують відносини угорської влади з Ватиканом, які завершилися підписанням угод у 60–70-х роках ХХ ст. та візитом Яноша Кадара до папи Павла VІ у 1977 р. Янош Кадар став першим комуністичним лідером, який перетнув поріг Ватикану. У 1980-х роках вплив держави на церковне життя послабився, а в результаті суспільно-політичних змін наприкінці 80-х років церква в Угорщині здобула повну свободу. ; The purpose of the article is to briefly describe the governmemnt-church relations in the Hungarian People's Republic during the reign of J. Kadar (1956 –1989). Based on the analysis of Hungarian historiography, we seek to show that at the heart of the successful policy of the Hungarian authorities after the revolutionary events of 1956 there was an improvement of living standards of the population, the achievement of social harmony and considerable tolerance and flexibility in the religious sphere. At this partcular time relations with «historical» churches – Catholic and Protestant – were settled in the country. It is noted that throughout the 1950s the authorities succeeded in turning part of the cleric into an obedient instrument for the implementation of their domestic and foreign policies. The Primas (Head) of the Hungarian Catholic Church, József Mindszenti, remained invincible and opposed to the socialist perspective of the country's development. The article makes a point that representatives of different faiths did not take too active part in the revolutionary events of 1956, but supported their compatriots. On the basis of scientific literature analysis it was established that the church policy of Hungary in the 1960s was successful, as the Catholic and Protestant churches, having adapted to the conditions of religious freedom granted to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, helped the state to pursue a policy of «popular front in the struggle for socialism». It is pointed out that the attention is drawn to relations of the Hungarian authorities with Vatican, which ended with the signing of bilateral agreements in the 1960s-1970s and the visit of J. Kadar to Pope Pavel V; and in 1977 J. Kadar became the first communist leader to cross Vatican threshold. In the 1980s, the influence of the state on church life weakened, and as a result of social and political changes in the late 1980s, the church in Hungary was given full freedom.
Summary. The research aims at defining the key methods Yanukovych's regime applied to fight the opposition parties and their top leaders. The research methodology is based on historicism and objectivity principles, comprises general scientific (analysis, synthesis, comparison) as well as specified historic methods (those of diachrony, synchrony, historical genesis and retrospective). The article's scientific novelty is determined by a system analysis of the methods Yanukovych's retinue applied against his political opponents highlighting their role in building up the fourth President of Ukraine's authoritarian rule. Conclusions. The specificity of Ukraine's political and legislative climate under Yanukovych's rule has been demonstrated. The patterns of the criminal proceedings against the opposition leaders have been defined and researched. The criminal prosecution against Yuliya Tymoshenko, the Preimer and the leader of Batkivshchyna party, following her government's management audit, serves as a case of Ukraine's political field's prime cleanup. The key phases of the criminal prosecution against Yurii Lutsenko, the Orange Top leader, have been defined. The political repressions of more than twenty Tymoshenko's supporters, the article suggests, serves as a background for preparing and implementing the tax overhaul project authored by V. Yanukovych and S. Tigipko. The fundamentals of this reform, as well as its reception by Ukrainian business elite, have been analyzed in brief to provide the necessary context, i.e., to demonstrate the roles the agents affiliated with the Regions Party had taken and the methods they applied to break the so-called Tax Maidan and to subsequently persecute its organizers and participants. Specific attention has been paid to the fight Yanukovych's regime initiated against the radical right and nationalist movement, forging the criminal cases against the members of certain nationalist organizations and movements functioning in Zaporizhzhya and Kyiv regions, i.e., "Tryzub" ("The Trident"), "Ukraine's Patriot", "Social National Assembly". Restraining the forces opposite to the Regions Party and the regime was done through bribing or granting governmental preferences to the business elites. The secret ledgers of the Regions Party serve as an important source for identifying the officials thus corrupted by the regime. To define the corruption scales and the key bribery initiators identities, a thorough analysis of these ledgers (known as "the spreadsheets") has been provided. ; Анотація. Мета дослідження полягає у виділенні основних методів боротьби режиму Януковича з опозиційними партіями та їх ключовими лідерами. Методологія дослідження заснована на принципах об'єктивності та історизму, залученні загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, порівняння) і спеціально-історичних методів (діахронного, синхронного, історико-генетичного та ретроспективного). Наукова новизна полягає у системному вивченні методів боротьби оточення Віктора Януковича з політичними опонентами та демонстрації їх ролі в побудові режиму особистої влади четвертого Президента України. Висновки. Показані особливості політико-правової ситуації в Україні в період становлення режиму Януковича. В дослідженні охарактеризовано та проаналізовано специфіку розгортання кримінального переслідування лідерів опозиційного табору. На прикладі аудиту діяльності уряду Юлії Тимошенко (2007–2010) та подальшого кримінального переслідування лідерки уряду та голови політичної сили «Батьківщина» показано перший етап зачищення політичного поля в Україні та основні етапи кримінального переслідування лідера «Помаранчевої верхівки» – Юрія Луценка. На фоні політичного переслідування більше ніж двадцятьох соратників Тимошенко описано процес підготовки та реалізації проєкту податкової реформи за авторством В. Януковича і С. Тігіпка. Подано короткий аналіз основних положень цієї реформи та описано реакцію бізнес-еліт Україна на неї. Зокрема, автором здійснена спроба показати роль та методи боротьби близьких до Партії регіонів осіб у розколі Податкового майдану і подальшого переслідування його організаторів та учасників. Особливу увагу в дослідженні приділено боротьбі режиму В. Януковича проти праворадикальних та націоналістичних рухів. Описано процес фальсифікації справ проти членів окремих націоналістичних організацій та рухів («Тризуб», «Патріот України», «Соціал-Національна Асамблея»), що діяли на Запоріжжі та Київщині. Приборкання опозиційних до Партії регіонів та режиму сил, здійснювалося і за допомогою підкупу або ж через пропозиції державних преференції бізнес-елітам. Важливим джерелом у виявленні осіб, які були корумповані у такий спосіб режимом, стала так звана «амбарна книга» партії регіонів. З метою окреслення масштабів та виявлення основних фігурантів цих підкупів здійснено спробу аналізу її записів.
Summary. The research aims at defining the key methods Yanukovych's regime applied to fight the opposition parties and their top leaders. The research methodology is based on historicism and objectivity principles, comprises general scientific (analysis, synthesis, comparison) as well as specified historic methods (those of diachrony, synchrony, historical genesis and retrospective). The article's scientific novelty is determined by a system analysis of the methods Yanukovych's retinue applied against his political opponents highlighting their role in building up the fourth President of Ukraine's authoritarian rule. Conclusions. The specificity of Ukraine's political and legislative climate under Yanukovych's rule has been demonstrated. The patterns of the criminal proceedings against the opposition leaders have been defined and researched. The criminal prosecution against Yuliya Tymoshenko, the Preimer and the leader of Batkivshchyna party, following her government's management audit, serves as a case of Ukraine's political field's prime cleanup. The key phases of the criminal prosecution against Yurii Lutsenko, the Orange Top leader, have been defined. The political repressions of more than twenty Tymoshenko's supporters, the article suggests, serves as a background for preparing and implementing the tax overhaul project authored by V. Yanukovych and S. Tigipko. The fundamentals of this reform, as well as its reception by Ukrainian business elite, have been analyzed in brief to provide the necessary context, i.e., to demonstrate the roles the agents affiliated with the Regions Party had taken and the methods they applied to break the so-called Tax Maidan and to subsequently persecute its organizers and participants. Specific attention has been paid to the fight Yanukovych's regime initiated against the radical right and nationalist movement, forging the criminal cases against the members of certain nationalist organizations and movements functioning in Zaporizhzhya and Kyiv regions, i.e., "Tryzub" ("The Trident"), "Ukraine's Patriot", "Social National Assembly". Restraining the forces opposite to the Regions Party and the regime was done through bribing or granting governmental preferences to the business elites. The secret ledgers of the Regions Party serve as an important source for identifying the officials thus corrupted by the regime. To define the corruption scales and the key bribery initiators identities, a thorough analysis of these ledgers (known as "the spreadsheets") has been provided. ; Анотація. Мета дослідження полягає у виділенні основних методів боротьби режиму Януковича з опозиційними партіями та їх ключовими лідерами. Методологія дослідження заснована на принципах об'єктивності та історизму, залученні загальнонаукових (аналіз, синтез, порівняння) і спеціально-історичних методів (діахронного, синхронного, історико-генетичного та ретроспективного). Наукова новизна полягає у системному вивченні методів боротьби оточення Віктора Януковича з політичними опонентами та демонстрації їх ролі в побудові режиму особистої влади четвертого Президента України. Висновки. Показані особливості політико-правової ситуації в Україні в період становлення режиму Януковича. В дослідженні охарактеризовано та проаналізовано специфіку розгортання кримінального переслідування лідерів опозиційного табору. На прикладі аудиту діяльності уряду Юлії Тимошенко (2007–2010) та подальшого кримінального переслідування лідерки уряду та голови політичної сили «Батьківщина» показано перший етап зачищення політичного поля в Україні та основні етапи кримінального переслідування лідера «Помаранчевої верхівки» – Юрія Луценка. На фоні політичного переслідування більше ніж двадцятьох соратників Тимошенко описано процес підготовки та реалізації проєкту податкової реформи за авторством В. Януковича і С. Тігіпка. Подано короткий аналіз основних положень цієї реформи та описано реакцію бізнес-еліт Україна на неї. Зокрема, автором здійснена спроба показати роль та методи боротьби близьких до Партії регіонів осіб у розколі Податкового майдану і подальшого переслідування його організаторів та учасників. Особливу увагу в дослідженні приділено боротьбі режиму В. Януковича проти праворадикальних та націоналістичних рухів. Описано процес фальсифікації справ проти членів окремих націоналістичних організацій та рухів («Тризуб», «Патріот України», «Соціал-Національна Асамблея»), що діяли на Запоріжжі та Київщині. Приборкання опозиційних до Партії регіонів та режиму сил, здійснювалося і за допомогою підкупу або ж через пропозиції державних преференції бізнес-елітам. Важливим джерелом у виявленні осіб, які були корумповані у такий спосіб режимом, стала так звана «амбарна книга» партії регіонів. З метою окреслення масштабів та виявлення основних фігурантів цих підкупів здійснено спробу аналізу її записів.
The article is devoted to topical issues of motivation of local government officials. The study of motivation is carried out in the context of reflecting the processes that have taken in the field as a result of decentralization reform. They are associated with a change in approaches to governance, the shift of the traditional vector of relations with public authorities, awareness of the independent role of local self-government, expanding the range of powers aimed at community development. The study analyzes the main trends and challenges in increasing the motivation of officials, encouraging them to effectively perform their duties. Motivation is seen as the process of involving staff in activities to achieve the goals of the organization (in this case – village, town, city councils, their executive bodies). It determines the intensification of professional activity of officials, stimulates the implementation of tasks. It is noted that modern heads of local governments do not pay due attention to issues of motivation, encouragement of employees, identifying their needs. Practical examples of evaluation by both managers and subordinates of their motivation to work are given. Motivational factors of officials, including material, spiritual, social, industrial and household, etc. are analyzed. The connection of motivation with human needs and actions is investigated. It is emphasized that the needs of higher levels do not motivate the official until the needs of the lower level are at least partially met. The analysis of the Ukrainian legislation and normative-legal acts of local self-government bodies concerning the regulation of the sphere of motivation and incentives of officials is given. The directions and means which can be applied in modern conditions for increase of motivation of local government officials are shown.
Subject of study is evolution regularities of of social and labor relations institutes in Ukraine and in the world. The purpose of the study is to define main factors and peculiarities of labor relations socialization at the present stage, and to generalize priorities of labor relations regulation under new conditions of their socialization. Research methods. The methodological principles the research relies on include a set of general methods of scientific cognition, including the method of analysis, synthesis, synthesis, induction and deduction, and others. Results. Factors determining peculiarities of social and labor relations formation and development are analyzed. The impact of ideas on the subject of labor and technological structures on the subject– area content of industrial relations is investigated. The underlying causes forming social partnership institutions and socially responsible business are revealed. World experience of the emergence and developmentof social and labor relations institutes is analyzed. Scientific substantiation of priorities and directions of social and labor relations regulation is carried out. The urgency to revive the monitoring system in social and labor sphere is argued. Conclusions. Social partnership is one of institutional mechanisms that contribute to formation and development of social and labor relations in Ukraine. Government serves as the guarantor of fundamental rights and freedoms, the arbitrator in workplace conflicts, the organizer and coordinator of negotiation processes in the system of social partnership. The interests of workers in the system of labor relations should be respected through social partnership by means of trade unions strengthening in social dialogue.
In the article have been explained the main features of the mixed form of the state governance, defined by the effective Constitution of Ukraine. Here've been described the essence of the "dualism" of the executive authority and the peculiarities of relations between the President and the Government. Author's substantiated the necessity to improve the legal position of the President and the Government, as their existing defects may have negative impact on the modern state of functioning within the frames of the mixed form of the state (state governance) with the immanent model of the So-called "dual centre" of the executive authority. ; В статье рассмотрены основные черты смешанной формы государственного правления, установленной действующей Конституцией Украины. Розкрывается содержание дуализма исполнительной власти и особенности взаимоотношений между Президентом и правительством. Обосновывается необходимость уточнения правовых статусов Президента и правительства, существующие недостатки которых могут повлиять на функционирование смешанной формы правления со свойственной ей моделью так называемого «двойного» центра исполнительной власти. ; У статті розглянуто основні риси змішаної форми державного правління, встановленої чинною Конституцією України. Розкривається зміст дуалізму виконавчої влади та особливості взаємостосунків між Президентом і урядом. Обгрунтовується необхідність уточнення правових статусів Президента і уряду, існуючі недоліки яких здатні вплинути на функціонування змішаної форми правління з властивою їй моделлю так званого «подвійного» центру виконавчої влади.
The article is focused on the analysis of problems of implementation e-government into Ukrainian legislation. In the modern world, Internet technologies play an important role in the life of every person. Political authorities also understand how the Internet makes life easier for society. The authors analyze the interpretation of Ukraine and the European Union, the concept of «e-government». While solving the tasks of the research the authors define the own definition of e-government, where they offer to understand e-government as an integrated system of all state registries, open source data portals and administrative services that make the interaction of public administration bodies with society as easy as possible. Special attention is paid to analysis of problems of implementation e-government into Ukrainian legislation. The authors identify three main problems. The first is the insecurity of personal data. According to the authors, Ukrainian legislation is not ready for the implementation of legal acts of e-government. The second problem is the lack of knowledge and skills in using the e-government system. The absence of an appropriate authority regulating relations in this area. The third problem is the socio-informational inequality. Not all people have access to the Internet and not all people want to move into information age. The authors also analyze the achievements of Ukrainian society in the development of e-government. According to the results of the conducted studying we can concluded that implementation system of e-government has a lot of advantages. E-government is one of the keys of democracy. It is the key to get rid of bureaucracy and corruption that will lead to public confidence in government.
Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.
The subject of the study is the impact of fiscal decentralization on the financial capacity of local budgets. The purpose of the article is to analyze the problematic aspects of practical reformation of local self–government on the principles of decentralization of power and the search for ways to improve the formation of the financial independence of the united territorial communities. Methodology of work – the position of the theory of fiscal federalism, which reflects the complex schemes of relations between budgets of different levels, the concept of fiscal decentralization. Balancing financial resources at the level of local self–government bodies to finance their delegated authority. Proposals for strengthening the financial independence of local self–government bodies are developed. The results of the work – grounded the necessity of launching a new model of financial provision of local budgets and intergovernmental fiscal relations, which envisages the process of distribution of functions, rights, financial resources and coherence between central and local levels of government and administration. Changes in the formation of local budget revenues are analyzed. An estimation of the level of budget decentralization is conducted. Practical recommendations for solution of problem issues are offered. Conclusions – Budget decentralization should contribute to increasing the financial capacity of local budgets, local self–government's interest in expanding the tax base, and raising local responsibility for regional development, which requires changes to the budget legislation on the distribution of national taxes between the linkages of the budget system. One of the ways of providing financial support to local authorities is to define a new mechanism for redistribution of VAT received in the regions. This tax should be in the joint use of different levels of government, which will significantly affect the increase of local budget revenues.
The peculiarities of the process of reforming intergovernmental fiscal relations in Ukraine including the models of budget federalism that is used for the formation of intergovernmental fiscal relations are defined in the article. The mechanism of budget regulation of fiscal misbalances and the directions of providing vertical and horizontal financial equalization in government sector of Ukraine is analyzed ; У статті визначено особливості процесу реформування міжбюджетних відносин в Україні, в тому числі моделі бюджетного федералізму, яка використовуються при формуванні міжбюджетних відносин. Проаналізовано механізм бюджетного регулювання фіскальних дисбалансів та напрями запровадження вертикального і горизонтального фінансового вирівнювання у бюджетну сферу України
The article is dedicated to analyzing features of formation, principles of functioning and stability of minority cabinets in European systems of positive and negative parliamentarism. The author identified the role of cabinets in systems of inter-institutional relations in European parliamentary democracies, specified the nature of parliamentary democracies' distribution onto the systems of positive and negative parliamentarism, outlined minority cabinets' role and variations in systems of positive and negative parliamentarism. Key words: minority cabinet, parliamentary democracy, positive and negative parliamentarism, vote of confidence/vote of investiture, single-party and coalition minority cabinets, cabinet stability.