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Recent years have proven formative for the Swedish administration as the disciplinary commission and committee on the Constitution consider proposals whose adaption will have a far-reaching impact on the nation's social organization. As the constitutional changes can impact significantly on government at the local level, research focusing on questions of local government structure is urgently needed. A major strength of local government is political leadership, which is the key to bridging the gap between democracy and management research. The authors note that the influence of political leaders at the local level is often greater than that of their counterparts in the national government. The direction of future constitutional change will determine the extent to which local government and its leaders can preserve their strengths. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of the overview article is to encircle a research field focusing the role of local government in the Swedish national climate protection policy. First, the policy area of climate protection is historically identified as a part of a third generation policy areas. Secondly, relating to contemporary governance literature some steering measurements are presented. There is thus an increasing steering complexity containing hierarchical, market-based & network based steering. Thirdly, the role of local government is discussed in terms of reasons for engaging or not engaging in climate protection work. Political, institutional, financial & professional aspects are considered important in order to explain variations in municipal climate protection activities. Finally some research questions are put forth, such as how & why municipal leaders are handling uncertainty in certain ways, municipal leaders as network managers & local climate protection policy-making & implementation from perspectives of learning & democracy. References. Adapted from the source document.

The professional communicators inside the Swedish Government Office are today 140 (compared to a single one 40 years ago & just twenty 15 years ago), giving support to the idea that the media now has a major impact on everyday business inside the Government. This article shows that this partly true, as the media mainly have an effect on the politicians, the partisan ministerial staff & the communicators. But the relationship between the Government Offices & the media could also be turned around. The Government have resources for external communication no lesser than an international news agency's, & does oil a daily basis deliver an impressive amount of press releases & conferences -- and information leaks -- that the media has to handle. This article examines & analyses how the Swedish Government Offices, through new posts, units & strategies, has institutionalized & centralized its' media contacts during the last 40 years, as well as the reasons & the internal consequences of this development. Adapted from the source document.

Confidence and corruption in Swedish municipalities Corruption in public institutions can seriously undermine trust and cooperation. Corruption prevention requires an understanding of the mechanisms which cause individuals to engage in corrupt behavior. Against this background there is a need to determine which types of institutions can stop confidence and cooperation from degenerating into distrust and corruption. Traditionally Sweden and its institutions have been seen as relatively free of corruption. In recent years, increasing media coverage and expert reports suggest that corruption in Sweden is increasing, but how accurate is this perception? Greater empirical knowledge is needed concerning the scope and nature of corruption as well as the extent, if at all, it is increasing. Many corruption studies have focused on countries in transition from a non-democratic to a democratic form of government. Literature has therefore focused on how trust and cooperation can arise out of situations characterized by the opposite. However, a useful corruption theory ought to be able to account for how corrupt behavior can vary over time. It has been pointed out that researchers lack a commonly accepted theory that would explain both how trust and cooperation arise and how they break down. The article's authors describe how, in their upcoming project, they propose to address this question. Adapted from the source document.

This article examines the relationship between media & the partisan ministerial staff of the Government Office. The main objective of the article is to make a contribution to the knowledge about & comprehension of how medialization has affected the work of the partisan ministerial staff. The article is empirically based on four focus groups, with respectively ministers, secretaries of state, political advisors & press secretaries working under the third Persson government (2002-2006). The article demonstrates that media management is an area that The Government Office was not originally adapted for. Therefore media & communication do not enter into the existing routines & formal decision-making processes of the organization. As a result, media challenge both the process behind the government's collective decision-making & the up-holding of the impression that the government decides collectively. Thus, there is a need for complementary routines for the contacts between the partisan staff & the civil servants. Adapted from the source document.

Two main arguments are presented in this article. First, when alternatives for the future of local government is debated, two questions need to be addressed simultaneously: (a) "how many & how big municipalities ought we have?", & (b) "how strong & well secured ought the principle of local self government be in the constitution?". Second, by using these questions as guides for the analysis, we argue that there are instrumental reasons to guarantee a strong local self-government in the constitution. However, such a reform needs to be complemented by a politically neutral body of regulations that, under given conditions, secures geographically concentrated minorities a right to secede. Adapted from the source document.

The constitutional development & the parliamentarianism in Sweden since 1970 can schematically be divided into two periods. The first period was 1970-1990. The second was initiated in 1990. 1970-1990 stands out as a 'classical' period to the new constitution with its unicameral system & exact proportional representation above a 4 per cent threshold. The formation of government was mainly based on blocs with sharp opposition, although in combination with negotiating parliamentarianism in the Riksdag. In their years of parliamentary majority, 1976-1982 & 1991-1994, the right-wing patties introduced considerable constitutional changes which the social democrats in opposing position accepted. From 1990 & onwards, it is above all the disrupting EU dimension which generates new constitutional changes concerning the politico-economic institutions. The European influence in legal matters is regulated, as are the EU-processes between government & parliament. Moreover, the electoral period is extended by one year & an element of personalized voting is introduced. Both the vote of censure & the instrument of consultative referendum attain a partially new constitutional character through the development of praxis. One can also identify a series of minority governments (right-wing 1991-1994 & social democratic since 1994) with prolonged partial coalitions grounded on different issues, & with all the parties of the Parliament involved in different areas. The EU dimension is central in this respect too. The constitutional changes, the new form of parliamentarianism & the EU processes strengthen the government. In this period too, questions can be raised regarding the role of the opposition in Swedish parliamentarianism. References. Adapted from the source document.

Takes as a starting point Aristotle's cross-tabulation of forms of government, which combines the size of the governing body (one, few, many) with the purpose of the governing (in the governors' interest or in the interest of all). Among the six possible combinations, the discussion rules out those which are unrealistic &/or undesirable. This exclusionary process selects two governmental forms for comparison: government by experts (the equivalent of Aristotle's "aristocracy," ie, government of few in the interest of all) & democracy. The comparison counts both intrinsic & instrumental value of these governmental forms. Expert government's instrumental & intrinsic values are circumscribed. Democracy's instrumental value is overrated. The intrinsic value of democracy is theoretical equality of its citizens to influence their government. While this equality may be flawed in practice, no alternative form of government seems better than democracy. 18 References. Adapted from the source document.

It is pointed out that the current old fashioned method for distributing seats to political parties can he replaced by the Integer Method, which is a simple percentage calculation on the votes resulting in an improved proportionality. In comparison with traditional methods like the adjusted odd number method & the Integer Method, a number of disagreements are found with respect to the number of seats actually distributed due to a basic systematic mistake. In elections in large municipalities, the sub-division into constituencies gives rise to seat number disagreements with the effect that old-fashioned distributions overestimate right-wing numbers in relation to left-wing ones. Examples of actual distributions are listed. It is proposed that the traditional methods are reconsidered in favor of the Rounding Method & that each municipality be a single constituent all to the benefit of democracy. Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

The Swedish Sami Parliament is both a representative body elected by the Indigenous Sami people and a government agency under the Swedish state. Since its inception, this construction has been critiqued by the Sami people and Swedish governmental commissions alike: the Sami Parliaments dual roles are seen to be in fundamental conflict with one another. This article provides the first empirical study of the political and practical consequences of these conflicting roles. Using in-depth interviews with politicians and civil servants at the Sami Parliament, representatives of Sami organisations, and civil servants at the Swedish ministries, we analyse the extent to which the Sami Parliament is able to perform its role as a government agency. We argue that the dual roles of the Sami Parliament create problems not only for the decision making powers of the Parliament as a government agency, but also constitute a structural obstacle to Sami self-determination. Adapted from the source document.

The Swedish Social Democrats' coalition with the Left Party & the Green Party seems to be a departure from the party's unique position in Swedish politics. This article analyzes the Social Democrats' transformation from a minority ruling party to a coalition-forming party among others. If the transformation implies a substantial strategic shift, what is then behind it? The change is smaller than it might seem -- the coalition idea is far from new. The option has been considered before, but has for various reasons not been realized. The change of strategy can be explained as a tactical response to new circumstances, rather than as the result of drastic rethinking. Adapted from the source document.

Scandinavian countries differ with respect to dissolution powers. In Norway, it is not possible to call early elections, while Danish governments have an almost unrestricted right to dissolve parliament & the dissolution power has been quite frequently used. In Sweden, no early election has taken place after the new constitutions were implemented in 1975. Thus, in practice the dissolution power of Swedish governments are limited. This paper has three main purposes. First, I give an overview of constitutional rules regulating early election in 25 parliamentary countries. Second, I trace some of the effects of unlimited dissolution power in the hands of the minority as well as majority governments. Third, I deal with normative questions. Do convincing arguments support unrestricted dissolution power for parliamentary governments? 4 Tables, 3 Figures, 53 References. Adapted from the source document.