Later editions issued in three parts: State government, Government of counties, Government of cities and local agencies. In this library, the latter two are cataloged separately: Government of counties: KFC758.A29C3; Government of cities and local agencies: KFC752.A29A3. ; Subtitle varies. ; Title varies: 19 Government code. ; Some issues supplemented by amendments. ; Library has edition for 1945, 1949- ; Mode of access: Internet.
This article advances a political theory of regulation that accounts for the choices of regulators and regulated entities when both are governments. Leading theories of regulation assume that governments regulate profit‐maximizing firms: Governments set rules, to which firms respond rationally in ways that constrain their behavior. But often the entities that governments regulate are other governments. We argue that government agencies and private firms often face different compliance costs, and that agencies have greater incentives than firms to appeal regulations through political channels. Simultaneously, the typical enforcement instruments that regulators use to influence firm behavior may be less effective against governments. Our empirical subjects are public and private entities' compliance with the U.S. Clean Air Act and Safe Drinking Water Act. We find that, compared with private firms, governments violate these laws significantly more frequently and are less likely to be penalized for violations.
Good governance is increasingly popular when bad governance deals with KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism) actions. Good governance practices also require transparency in the overall governance process, while the formulation of the problem is how good governance is government and governance, Furthermore, the research method here is descriptive qualitative. The process begins with compiling the assumptions and rules of thought that will be used in the research. Information from research results It is more important in a very dynamic condition of community development, a better level of community life, which symbolizes "empowerment" that serves the community, government bureaucratic leaders must change the way and role (revitalization) in providing public services. ; Good governance is increasingly popular when bad governance deals with KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism) actions. Good governance practices also require transparency in the overall governance process, while the formulation of the problem is how good governance is government and governance, Furthermore, the research method here is descriptive qualitative. The process begins with compiling the assumptions and rules of thought that will be used in the research. Information from research results It is more important in a very dynamic condition of community development, a better level of community life, which symbolizes "empowerment" that serves the community, government bureaucratic leaders must change the way and role (revitalization) in providing public services.
Government officials in the exercise of discretion on laws and regulations, and in order to meet the demands of public service for the achievement of the people's welfare, then the proper government officials authorized discretion in the Organization of the Government. This research is useful for organizing Government accordingly with the nature, the purpose of the granting of discretion as well as the General principles of good governance. Type of normative legal research used in this research is normative law is also called doctrinal research. Doctrinal Research: Research which provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explain areas of difficulty and perhaps, predicts future development. Normative legal research conducted to assess the legal concepts related to the discretion of government officials who do. The target in this research related to: a. The nature and purpose of the authority of the discretion government; and, b. criteria for the use of government discretion.
Argues that the US model of corporate governance may not be the best choice for developing countries. Discussion begins with a look at the common law of fiduciary duties and market forces characteristic of the US model. Several reasons are then advanced as to why such a market-based model of corporate governance is not feasible for developing countries. In this light, it is suggested that a mandatory model of corporate law utilizing bright-line rules might result in better economic growth for developing countries. Concrete provisions for such a code are then considered, along with factors driving a thriving venture capital market.