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The effect of outsourcing on government accountability for public services continues to be contested. Analysts point to an accountability deficit while governments insist that accountability is retained (and indeed improved). The existence of an accountability deficit is confirmed, using examples from the Commonwealth Job Network. The government claim, that accountability remains, is best interpreted as rhetorical, as a refusal to shift blame to private contractors, even though some channels of accountability may be weakened. The claim can be seen as evidence of an increasing incorporation of private contractors into the overall structure of government.

The purpose of the book is to investigate parliaments' capacity to oversee government activities, policies and budget legislation. By analysing the survey data that the World Bank Institute in collaboration with the Inter-Parliamentary Union collected from 120 parliaments, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst show what tools are available to parliaments worldwide, which tools are more or less common, how oversight capacity can be estimated, how oversight capacity is related to other institutional and constitutional factors. In addition to discussing the conditions under which oversight capacity is great.

The effect of outsourcing on government accountability for public services continues to be contested. Analysts point to an accountability deficit while governments insist that accountability is retained (and indeed improved). The existence of an accountability deficit is confirmed, using examples from the Commonwealth Job Network. The government claim, that accountability remains, is best interpreted as rhetorical, as a refusal to shift blame to private contractors, even though some channels of accountability may be weakened. The claim can be seen as evidence of an increasing incorporation of private contractors into the overall structure of government.

This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions.

This new volume of Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment includes selected articles from the 2013 annual environmental report compiled by Friends of Nature, a leading environmental protection NGO in China, with contributions from academics, environmental protection activists, public service activists, and the media.

This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions. ; Boffa acknowledges financial support from the Free University of Bolzano (WW82); Piolatto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO-2012-37131) and the Government of Catalonia (2014-SGR-420); Ponzetto from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (JCI-2010-08414 and ECO-2011-25624), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (RYC-2013-13838), the Government of Catalonia (2009-SGR-1157 and 2014-SGR-830), the Barcelona GSE and the BBVA Foundation through its first grant for Researchers, Innovators and Cultural Creators.

In this short paper I hope to point out two aspects of twenty-first century political life that relate to the challenge of ensuring government accountability. The first point relates to how advances in computer and media technology increase the potential of government accountability and how these technological developments will increase implementation of the principle of subsidiarity, or, in the American context, devolution of political power to state and local governments. Second, I will address the impact of these developments on administrative law in the next century.

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses the fiscal year 2007 budget request for the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). This request will help us continue our support of the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and will help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. Budget constraints in the federal government grew tighter in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. In developing our fiscal year 2007 budget, we considered those constraints consistent with GAO's and the Committee's desire to "lead by example." In fiscal year 2007, we are requesting budget authority of $509.4 million, a reasonable 5 percent increase over our fiscal year 2006 revised funding level. In the event Congress acts to hold federal pay increases to 2.2 percent, our requested increase will drop to below 5 percent. This request will allow us to continue making improvements in productivity, maintain our progress in technology and other transformation areas, and support a full-time equivalent (FTE) staffing level of 3,267. This represents an increase of 50 FTEs over our planned fiscal year 2006 staffing level and will allow us to rebuild our workforce to a level that will position us to better respond to increasing supply and demand imbalances in areas such as disaster assistance, the global war on terrorism, homeland security, forensic auditing, and health care."