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ABSTRACTSeveral simple theories of government coalition formation are described and tested. A statistical method is presented for comparing the theories and evaluating each of them relative to a certain null hypothesis. The statistical tests are based upon the formation of 132 government coalitions in twelve countries of Western Europe during 1945–71.

Research on executive-legislative relations in presidential systems have emphasized how presidents use cabinet appointments to form and manage government coalitions in the absence of majority legislative support. Yet not all coalitions are similar, as some are larger and, consequently, more prone to agency and coordination problems than others. But what shapes presidents' decision to include more parties in their coalitions? While several hypotheses exist in the literature, few have been tested in a systematic fashion, none focusing on why surplus coalitions form. This article intends to fill this gap by examining an original time-series cross-sectional dataset comprising 168 unique coalitions in all 18 Latin American presidential countries since 1979. In particular, I find that highly fragmented party systems and presidents with great legislative powers are more likely to generate oversized government coalitions. An additional analysis, with monthly data from Brazilian cabinets between 1989 and 2010, also shows that supermajority rules and bicameralism dynamics play a role in the occurrence of surplus coalitions, but party discipline and presidential approval do not.

ABSTRACTThis note attempts to add a historical dimension to formal theories of coalition formation. It is based on the electoral success of previous government coalition members. The modified theories are tested using data collected for a previous article, "Government Coalitions in Western Europe." Furthermore, the hypothesis that coalitions correctly predicted by the simple theories also last longer is tested, using the same data.

A new model of government formation is elaborated and developed to allow consideration of politics within political parties. The impact of coalition bargaining on intraparty politics is considered, as well as the impact of intraparty politics on coalition bargaining. Different intraparty decision-making regimes are shown to affect coalition outcomes. Finally, the potential impact of anticipated coalition bargaining on the choice of decision-making regime within a party is explored.

Formal coalition theory has tended to ignore the existence of local government coalitions. Local government studies have tended to ignore the existence of formal coalition theory. Yet local administrations frequently comprise coalitions of parties. There is clearly a need, therefore, to bring the two areas of study together.

Describes Indian experiments in coalition politics & minority government, drawing on comparatist analyses while attending to India's uniqueness. Key elements in the Indian experiment include: 1) the size of the victorious coalitions; (2) the foundations underpinning the coalitions; & (3) distribution of offices & length of alliances. References. K. Coddon