Suchergebnisse

The authors construct a statistical model with which to test whether the regularity that democracy is more commonly found among wealthy countries stems from a democratizing effect of high income or is due entirely to other factors, such as the historical context, various features of the institutional setting, and simultaneity with the process of leadership change. Even after correcting for these many other influences, the democratizing effect of income remains as a statistically significant factor promoting the emergence of democratic political institutions. The authors go on to find that leaders' risks of losing power rise during their time in office and that these risks are higher in more democratic countries.The authors confirm the finding by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck that the democracy-promoting effect of income is stronger among the European countries. They suggest that high income has a more powerful democratizing effect among the Southern European countries because it interacts with pressure from major trading partners to democratize. This suggests a revaluation of policies designed to foster the replacement of authoritarian regimes by democratic ones through free trade.

The study reveals the causes of inequality of income distribution in high-income countries. In the research, the macroeconomic factors affecting income distribution such as economic growth rate, inflation, unemployment, globalization, technology and public revenues are considered as independent variables. The gini coefficient, which is one of the methods of measuring income inequality, is considered as dependent variable. Dummy variable is also included as an independent variable to the model to eliminate the effects of the global crisis that started in the United States in 2008 and spread all over the world. In the study, which is based on the 2008-2015 period, high-income countries are considered and the factors affecting income distribution are examined by panel data analysis. According to the findings of analysis, it is seen that inflation, economic growth, unemployment and public revenues increase income inequality in high income countries and economic globalization contributes to the improvement of income distribution in these countries. The shadow variable added to the model is also statistically significant. This shows that the crisis has a negative effect on income distribution in high-income countries.

When do high-income earners get 'on board' with the fiscal contract and accept paying a larger share of the tax burden? Progressive taxes perform particularly poorly in developing countries. We argue that the common opposition of the affluent to more progressive taxation is not merely connected to administrative limitations to coercively enforce compliance, but also to the uncertainty that high-income earners associate with the returns to taxes. Because coercion is not an option, there is a need to convince high-income earners to 'invest' in the public system via taxes. Trust in institutions is decisive for the fiscal contract. Expecting that paid contributions will be used in a sensible manner, high-income earners will be more supportive of progressive income taxation. We study tax composition preferences of a cross-section of Latin American countries using public opinion data from LAPOP for 2012. Findings reveal that higher levels of trust in political institutions strongly mitigate the opposition of the affluent towards more progressive taxation.

A transformation in the pattern of consumer expenditures has occurred in the nations that have reached high income levels during the past century. Smaller fractions of national income are spent on food, clothing, and shelter; larger fractions on recreation, medical care, education, and luxury goods. Cross-sectional studies of family budgets have been fairly reliable indicators of this trend. As early as 1857 Ernst Engel had pronounced his famous law about food expenditures on the basis of Edouard Ducpetiaux's Belgian budget studies. Similar assertions by others about clothing, fuel, and shelter followed; and in 1919 William Ogburn published his statistics of Washington, D.C., family budgets, indicating, in effect, that income elasticities of demand were highest for amusement and education. As the pattern slowly emerged, economists were not much disturbed. Why should consumers not be left alone in choosing between carrots and bedrooms? Interference with choices among luxury goods and services seemed even less warranted. Advertising posed no problem beyond encouragement of elementary veracity.In the past decade, however, this unconcern has faded. Several economists have joined sociologists, moralists, and general philosophers in questioning trends in consumer expenditures. Their concern is less with morals and social repercussions than with optimum consumption patterns in terms of economic value and resource allocation. Advertising in particular is no longer reproached merely for a bent towards mendacity. It is seen as more insidious, as manipulating consumers' choices by kindling subconscious anxieties. It puts consumers in a squirrel cage in which production and the want-satisfying process create wants that would otherwise not exist.

AbstractWhen do high-income earners get 'on board' with the fiscal contract and accept paying a larger share of the tax burden? Progressive taxes perform particularly poorly in developing countries. We argue that the common opposition of the affluent to more progressive taxation is not merely connected to administrative limitations to coercively enforce compliance, but also to the uncertainty that high-income earners associate with the returns to taxes. Because coercion is not an option, there is a need to convince high-income earners to 'invest' in the public system via taxes. Trust in institutions is decisive for the fiscal contract. Expecting that paid contributions will be used in a sensible manner, high-income earners will be more supportive of progressive income taxation. We study tax composition preferences of a cross-section of Latin American countries using public opinion data from LAPOP for 2012. Findings reveal that higher levels of trust in political institutions strongly mitigate the opposition of the affluent towards more progressive taxation.

We estimate the impact of the income earned in the host country on return migration of labor migrants from developing countries. We use a three-state correlated competing risks model to account for the strong dependence of labor market status and the income earned. Our analysis is based on administrative panel data of recent labor immigrants from developing countries to The Netherlands. The empirical results show that intensities of return migration are U-shaped with respect to migrants' income, implying a higher intensity in low- and high- income groups. Indeed, the lowest-income group has the highest probability of return. We also find that ignoring the interdependence of labor market status and the income earned leads to an overestimating the income effect on departure. Keywords: Migration dynamics; Labor market transitions; Competing risks; Immigrant assimilation ; CPC Policy Briefing BP18: Summary of research for policy and government. The research: We estimate the impact of the income earned in the host country on return migration of labor migrants from developing countries. We use a three-state correlated competing risks model to account for the strong dependence of labor market status and the income earned. Our analysis is based on administrative panel data of recent labor immigrants from developing countries to The Netherlands. The empirical results show that intensities of return migration are U-shaped with respect to migrants' income, implying a higher intensity in low- and high- income groups. Indeed, the lowest-income group has the highest probability of return. We also find that ignoring the interdependence of labor market status and the income earned leads to an overestimating the income effect on departure. Keywords: Migration dynamics; Labor market transitions; Competing risks; Immigrant assimilation

In 2004, Malta's Public Transport Association (PTA) has been demanding higher subsidies from the government in order to make up for the increased expenses of its members that own and operate bus routes. Its demands are viewed as unreasonable by the government, and PTA started limited industrial action during August. In Malta, there are currently 508 licensed buses. All 430 owners are members of the Public Transport Association (PTA (http://www.atp.com.mt/)) which is registered as an employers' association and is mainly concerned with the scheduling of its members' work. There are 91 scheduled routes covering Malta and, according to PTA, only 35 of these are viable. The profitable routes have to make up for the non-profitable ones. Public transport in Malta is among the cheapest in Europe. Unlike other service providers, bus owners cannot increase bus fares without the approval of the cabinet. Successive governments have managed to keep passenger fares low by giving bus owners subsidies, grants and exemptions from duties. ; peer-reviewed